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INTRODUCTION
State secrets doctrine catapulted to prominence post-2001, as the
executive responded to lawsuits alleging a range of constitutional and
human rights violations by refusing to disclose information during
discovery and, in some cases, requesting dismissal of suits altogether
1
on national security grounds. More than 120 law review articles fol2
lowed, and media outlets became outspoken in their criticism of the
3
privilege. In both the Senate and the House, new bills sought to co1

See, e.g., ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the
state secrets doctrine as a privilege against discovery of evidence that the plaintiffs’
communications had been intercepted); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the state secrets privilege made issues in
the case nonjusticiable and deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction), rev’d, 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g
granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc);
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D.
Or. 2008) (applying the privilege to prevent access to the government’s record); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (considering but refusing to
apply the state secrets privilege as a disclosure or an absolute bar to action); El-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying the privilege to bar discovery and dismiss plaintiff’s claims); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing the United States’ motion for summary
judgment based on state secrets invocation, which later became moot as those claims
were dismissed on other grounds), vacated, 585 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Ctr.
for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-00313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006) (arguing
that the state secrets privilege interfered with plaintiff’s representation); see also SEN.
PATRICK LEAHY, STATE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 3 (2008)
(“[W]hat is undebatable . . . is that the [state secrets] privilege is currently being invoked as grounds for dismissal of entire categories of cases challenging the constitutionality of Government action, and that a strong public perception has emerged that
sees the privilege as a tool for Executive abuse.” (citations omitted)).
2
A bibliography of secondary sources on state secrets will be posted on the website of Georgetown Law’s Center for National Security and the Law after this Article is
published.
3
See, e.g., Robyn Blumner, Injustice Hides Behind Badge of Security, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at 5P (discussing the abuse of the state secrets privilege and attempts by Congress to prevent its misuse); Bruce Fein, State Secrets Abuse, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2007, at A16 (same); Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at
A18 (same); Editorial, Secure Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A20 (same); Editorial, What’s a Secret?, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2008, at A20 (discussing the excessive de-
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dify what had previously been a common law doctrine. And in September 2009, the Attorney General introduced new procedures for re5
view and created a State Secrets Review Committee.
Despite the sudden explosion in scholarship and other attention
paid to state secrets, very little is known about how the privilege actually works. The research serving as a basis for much of the discussion focuses narrowly on published judicial opinions in which the U.S.
government has invoked the privilege and the courts have ruled on it.
Myriad concerns follow.
First and foremost, such analyses reveal very little about how the executive branch actually uses the privilege—who invokes it, under what
circumstances it is invoked, how frequently it has been threatened, and
to what end. Put simply, there is a logical disconnect between looking
at how courts rule in their final, published opinions on state secrets and
6
drawing conclusions about the executive branch’s practices.
ference given to state secrets claims); Editorial, Whose Privilege?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2008, at A24 (same); Ben Wizner, Shielded by Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25
(same); Justin Florence & Matthew Gerke, State Your Secrets, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2007,
11:32 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2177962 (same); Henry Lanman, Secret Guarding,
SLATE (May 22, 2006, 3:57 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2142155 (same).
4
In January 2008, Senator Edward Kennedy and twelve cosponsors introduced a
bill “to enact a safe, fair, and responsible state secrets privilege Act.” S. REP. NO. 110442, at 1 (2008). In the 111th Congress, House and Senate versions of bills entitled
the “State Secrets Protection Act,” H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009), and S. 417, 111th
Cong. (2009), which would limit the use of state secrets to situations in which a significant harm to national security was presented, require judicial review of the information to be withheld, and demand that the Attorney General report invocation of the
privilege to Congress within thirty days of its assertion.
5
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Establishes New State Secrets Policies and Procedures (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013.html (providing for “an internal evaluation of
the pending cases in which the privilege has been invoked”).
6
For a secondary work drawing conclusions about executive assertion of the state
secrets privilege based on reported judicial opinions, see, for example, Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249,
1249 (2007). See also Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate Complicity in
Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 490 (2009) (“[I]nvocations have
increasingly sought dismissal of pending litigation rather than limitations upon discovery
or other methods by which to shield information from public disclosure.”); Stephanie A.
Fichera, Compromising Liberty for National Security: The Need to Rein in the Executive’s Use of the
State Secrets Privilege in Post–September 11 Litigation, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 628-32 (2008)
(discussing the rise in invoking the state secrets privilege, particularly in recent cases involving the War on Terror); Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of
Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2007) (“For over two decades following Reynolds,
the executive rarely asserted the state secrets privilege . . . . But starting in 1977, the executive raised the privilege with greater frequency. Between 1953 and 1976, there were
only eleven reported cases addressing the privilege; between 1977 and 2001 there were
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fifty-nine reported cases.”); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (2006) (“In the 23-year span
between the Supreme Court case that authorized use of the state secrets privilege in 1953
and 1976, the government litigated cases involving the privilege four times. In the 24
years between 1977 and 2001, courts were called to rule on the government’s invocation
of the privilege 51 times.”); Davida H. Isaacs & Robert M. Farley, Privilege-Wise and Patent
(and Trade Secret) Foolish? How the Courts’ Misapplication of the Military and State Secrets Privilege Violates the Constitution and Endangers National Security, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 810
(2009) (explaining the competing needs of ensuring national security and encouraging
inventors); Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 132 (2007) (“[C]ourts have altered the
privilege through their jurisprudence, grafting different standards of review, refashioning
the balancing test, and relating the privilege to the prima facie case.”).
Even authors who recognize that reported cases “represent a fraction of the total
cases where the privilege is invoked or implicated” go on to suggest that broad conclusions can be drawn from the smaller sample of cases. ROBERT M. PALLITO & WILLIAM
G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 106 (2007). There are many student
notes and articles following this pattern. See J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State
Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 567, 583-85 (1994) (“During the past twenty years, an alarming phenomenon
has developed. The executive has invoked the state secret privilege much more frequently; though the privilege was invoked only approximately five times between 1951
and 1970, it has been relied upon more than fifty times between 1971 and 1994. Furthermore, the privilege has increased in breadth . . . .”); Daniel J. Huyck, Note, Fade to
Black: El-Masri v. United States Validates the Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss “Extraordinary Rendition” Claims, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 435, 435-36 (2008) (“The state secrets
privilege is integral to the Justice Department’s post-9/11 counterterrorism litigation.”); Anthony Rapa, Note, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of
Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 235
n.14 (2006) (“The state secrets privilege has been invoked just over sixty times since
1953.”); Erin M. Stilp, Note, The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding
Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 831, 839-41 (2006) (“The use of the state-secrets privilege
has expanded in two ways: (1) the absolute number of cases involving invocation of
the state-secrets privilege by the government has increased; and (2) within the increased number of state-secrets privilege cases, a larger percentage of those cases involve dismissal of the entire case due to the claimed sensitive nature of the case.”
(footnote omitted)); Holly Wells, Note, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 967 (2008) (“Bush’s Administration has
shown an increased trend towards secrecy and the denial of public access to information.”); Christopher D. Yamaoka, Note, The State Secrets Privilege: What’s Wrong With It,
How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 144
(2007) (“In the area of state secrets cases, courts have become increasingly likely to
dismiss litigation before the merits.”); Margaret Ziegler, Note, Pay No Attention to the
Man Behind the Curtain: The Government’s Increased Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Conceal Wrongdoing, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 691, 715 (2008) (“In recent years, the use of
the state secrets privilege has been expanding, both in frequency of use and in the
types of protection it provides.”).
Erroneous correlation between published judicial opinions and executive action
also appears in legal briefs. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at 2-3, United States v. Franklin, No.
05-0225 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12, 2005), 2005 WL 5912060 (“[T]he federal government used
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Second, the narrow focus on the outcome of published cases
sheds little light on how the doctrine operates—how it influences the
course of litigation, the range of cases in which it is used, or how parties respond, such as by dropping suits early in the process in the face
of the threatened or actual invocation of the privilege.
Third, current scholarship provides a truncated view of how the
courts deal with assertion of the privilege. Omitted are the many cases
in which the court sidesteps the question altogether or dispenses of
7
the state secrets questions at an early stage in the litigation. Absent,
too, are unreported and unpublished opinions (which constitute
8
around eighty percent of the appellate courts’ caseload), as well as
sealed memoranda and opinions. The resultant lack of baseline analthe state secrets privilege to withhold information only four times between 1953 and
1976, but more than 23 times since 2001.”).
This mistaken interpretation has also worked its way into Congressional documents. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 3 (“In recent years, the executive branch has
asserted the privilege more frequently and broadly than before, typically to seek dismissal of lawsuits at the pleadings stage.”).
7
See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 101 F.R.D. 97, 98 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that assertion of the privilege was proper); see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75
F.R.D. 475, 479-80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (disposing of state secrets claim as one of many
privileges asserted in discovery dispute). Early in the In re “Agent Orange” case, the government invoked the state secrets privilege; on February 11, 1983, a Special Master issued recommended guidelines to handle the state secrets claim, which Judge George
C. Pratt subsequently adopted in full. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 97
F.R.D. 427, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (pretrial order adopting in full the procedures outlined in the special master’s report). This case, however, does not treat the state secrets claim in the final, published opinion and so it is not included in compendia of
state secrets cases. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, app. at 1315-32 (listing state secrets
cases, but notably leaving out In re “Agent Orange”).
8
To some extent “unpublished” and “unreported” are synonymous, as both refer
to nonprecedential opinions. The former historically referred to opinions not included in the main reporters. Gradually, both Westlaw and LexisNexis began including unpublished opinions in their databases. Then in 2001, West Publishing introduced a Federal Appendix in which the full text, along with headnotes, topics, and key
numbers of all unpublished opinions appeared. See Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s
Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 475 (2004) (“For many years,
these opinions constituted a ‘hidden’ literature.”).
The exact status of nonprecedential opinions is of some doubt, particularly in
light of the Eighth Circuit’s holding that a judicial rule purporting to free the court
from the constraints of precedent is unconstitutional, exceeding the courts’ authority
under Article III in Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc), vacating as moot on other grounds, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Michael
Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 200 (2001) (“[T]he opinions of the United States courts of
appeals are a fundamentally important source of law.”). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266
F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding as constitutional the Ninth Circuit’s rule according precedential status to only selected decisions).

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

82

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

[Vol. 159: 77

ysis makes it difficult to conclude how the judiciary treats the privilege, as well as what variation occurs between the circuits.
In addition to the narrow adherence to published judicial opinions, state secrets research is marked by a lack of detailed historical
analysis. Modern state secrets doctrine is thus said to begin with Unit9
ed States v. Reynolds, a 1953 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
formally recognized the doctrine following the crash of a B-29 bomber. The Air Force successfully blocked the widows’ efforts to obtain
the accident report, on the ground that its release would threaten na10
tional security. Without the report, the survivors could not establish
a prima facie case of negligence. Chief Justice Vinson wrote that recourse to state secrets was not to be “lightly invoked,” but where formally asserted by the head of a department with control over the matter, and where a “reasonable danger” to national security existed,
11
information could be withheld. It would be up to the court to ascer12
tain whether to inspect the information in question.
Very few of some thirty pieces written prior to 1953 discuss the history of state secrets in depth, and outside of a handful of important
exceptions, since Reynolds was decided there has been little historical
13
exposition of the privilege prior to 1953. This gap in scholarship has
9

345 U.S. 1 (1953). This case created historical precedent in recognizing the
state secrets doctrine. Id. at 6-10. For a thoughtful and detailed exposition of this
case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 258 (2006). See also
Chesney, supra note 6, at 1284-86 (describing the ways in which the Reynolds court rejected British precedent regarding state secrets); Fuchs, supra note 6, at 168 (“Had the
Supreme Court [in Reynolds] permitted the lower court to require an in camera review
of the accident investigation report, it would have enabled the court to ask the military
to explain its rationale.”); James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875,
882 (1966) (“Almost all cases follow the leading case, United States v. Reynolds, and use
conclusory phrases such as ‘military secrets,’ ‘strategic information,’ or ‘intelligence
value’ to describe privileged matter.” (footnotes omitted)).
10
Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1
(1953).
11
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-10 (setting forth the reasonableness standard).
12
Id. at 8.
13
For important contributions to our understanding of the privilege prior to
1953, see FISHER, supra note 9, at 6-22, which describes the development of statutory
procedures to handle disputes against the government as they relate to state secrets).
See also MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURITY
156-236 (1977) (discussing various secrecy provisions relating to matters of national
security); Chesney, supra note 6, at 1271-80 (explaining how the state secrets privilege
derived from “public interest” privileges in the Anglo-American common law); Zagel,
supra note 9, at 892 (discussing the executive privilege theory, deriving from English
law and constitutional principles); Jared Perkins, Note, The State Secrets Privilege and the
Abdication of Oversight, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 235, 239 (2007) (explaining that “principles
justifying the state secrets doctrine” may have first been articulated in Marbury v. Madi-
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resulted in the proliferation of an Athena-like theory of state secrets:
in 1953 it sprung from Zeus’s forehead, with little or no previous articulation. Thus, even the authors of some of the most important work
on the privilege, Professors Robert Pallitto and William Weaver, conclude that “[i]n the United States, before Reynolds, there is virtually no
14
history with the state secrets privilege.” This claim is wrong. Yet it
reverberates in the copious articles written on state secrets, where authors frequently repeat the incantation: Marbury—Burr—Totten—
15
Reynolds, before focusing on the “modern era.” This distorted view
of state secrets has crept its way into congressional reports and judicial
16
opinions. The lack of detailed research risks more than just inaccuracy—it stunts our broader analysis, such as our ability to weigh Article
II versus common law assertions, our understanding of the courts’ historical treatment of separation of powers, or the role of state secrets as
17
a justiciability doctrine versus an evidentiary rule. And it is emblematic of how little we really understand this doctrine.
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); Ken Taymor, Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege, 91 YALE L.J. 570, 571 (1982) (“[The] heritage in American jurisprudence [of the
state secrets privilege] can be traced to Aaron Burr’s trial for treason . . . .”).
14
Brief of Amici Curiae William G. Weaver and Robert M. Pallitto in Support of
Affirmance at 4, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 0617132, 06-17137) (citing William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 92-97 (2005)). The same authors, in their book’s discussion of “The Origins of the State Secrets Privilege” in the United States, briefly discussed only a few of the early state secrets cases. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875); King v. United States, 112 F. 988 (5th Cir. 1902); District of Columbia v.
Bakersmith, 18 App. D.C. 574 (D.C. Cir. 1901); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30
(C.C.D. Va. 1807); see also PALLITO & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 93-105 (discussing “The
Origin of the State Secrets Privilege,” including early state secrets cases).
15
See, e.g., Fichera, supra note 6, at 628-32 (discussing the historical origins of the
privilege and the consequences of its increased use in recent litigation); Emily Simpson, “Nothing Is So Oppressive As a Secret,” 80 TEMP. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007) (discussing
the privilege’s historic origin in Burr and Totten).
16
See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suggesting that
the government had rarely invoked the state secrets privilege prior to World War II);
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40603, THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND
OTHER LIMITS ON LITIGATION INVOLVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 2 (2009) (focusing
solely on Reynolds as the origin of the state secrets doctrine).
17
Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (“Nowhere in the
Constitution[] . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is
constitutionally based.”), United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir.
1972) (“Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of the
[CIA] . . . are all within the President’s constitutional responsibility for the security of
the Nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of our Armed forces.”),
Rahman v. Chertoff, 244 F.R.D. 443, 454 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (explaining that the defendants argued that the case is nonjusticiable because it falls under the political question
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Legal scholars highlight the difficulty of assembling more accurate
data on state secrets. The government has not previously kept any
master list detailing the cases in which state secrets have been in18
voked. Any effort to assemble one would have to rely on a variety of
19
approaches that would likely result in an unreliable data set. Verification of invocation and attribution to particular administrations
20
would require research-intensive docket searches. And, even if a list
were to be assembled, quantitative comparisons year-to-year hold little
21
value as such litigation is deeply context-dependent.
These commentators are correct that many of the relevant docu22
ments are difficult to obtain. When found, moreover, they are often
doctrine), rev’d, 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated in part, No. 05-3761, 2010 WL
1335434 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010), El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va.
2006) (“The state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege derived from the President’s constitutional authority over the conduct of this country’s diplomatic and military affairs and therefore belongs exclusively to the Executive Branch.”), and Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29-30, Mohawk Indus.,
Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (No. 08-0678), 2009 WL 2028902 (“The statesecrets privilege, whose origins extend to early Anglo-American law, ‘performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities.’”
(citing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
947 (2007))), with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (“It may be possible to satisfy the court, from
all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.”), and Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets.”).
18
See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1301 (noting that the government does not keep a
“master list” of when the privilege has been invoked); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14,
at 111 (“[T]here appear to be no policy guidelines on the use of the privilege in any
major department or agency of the executive branch.”). This omission appears to have
been rectified by the Obama Administration. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra
note 5 (creating a State Secrets Review Committee and requiring “an internal evaluation of the pending cases in which the privilege has been invoked”).
19
See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1302 (“It makes little sense to compare the rate of
assertions of the privilege in such a year to an earlier year in which few or no such occasions arose. . . . [T]here is little point in asking whether the government asserted the
privilege at an unusually high rate in any given year.”).
20
Id. at 1301.
21
Id. at 1301-02.
22
See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010) (listing a “Motion
to Depose Former State Department IG Investigator by Richard A. Horn” as declassified on the docket, No. 94-1756, but still unavailable on PACER); Stahl v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., No. 06-0865 (E.D. Mo. dismissed Jan. 29, 2009) (state secrets declaration not available on PACER); Al-Turki v. F.B.I. Document Custodian, No. 06-01076,
2007 WL 3195129 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2007) (unable to access records via PACER);
Boone v. MVM, Inc., No. 05-02504, 2007 WL 549833 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2007) (docu-
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23

heavily redacted. Docket searches are also research-intensive: 874
state secrets documents currently appear in Westlaw’s CourtExpress electronic docket retrieval service, and an additional 100 in LexisNexis’s similar Courtlink service—neither of which contain complete
24
docket records from the past thirty years. More broadly, a search of
case holdings since 1790 returns some 700 cases in Westlaw and
25
another 670 cases in LexisNexis that refer to state secrets. Specific
court records, such as those obtained from the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (in which a significant number of state secrets cases arise),
26
augment these searches. By supplementing the resulting documents
with citations in pleadings, motions, briefs, memorandum opinions,
judicial decisions, Headnote strings, legislative searches, and secondary source materials, enough material can be assembled to—at a minimum—call into question how well we really understand this privilege,
and more positively, to suggest some new hypotheses for how the state
secrets privilege operates.
The resulting research reveals that the shadow of state secrets casts
longer and broader than previously acknowledged: more than 400

ments not available via PACER); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated August 9, 2000, 218
F. Supp. 2d 544, 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that dates of filing and the state
secrets privilege invocation are unavailable via PACER because it was a sealed proceeding); Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, No. 01-0072, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16874, at
*7-8 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2002) (confirming the state secrets privilege invocation, likely
between July and August 2002 when the government replied to plaintiff’s motion to
compel discovery, but there is no access to documents actually asserting the state secrets privilege via PACER).
23
See, e.g., Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2008 WL 4534407 (N.D. Ill Apr. 16,
2008) (showing that the amended memorandum opinion and order were redacted);
Mirage Systems, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to St.
Clair’s Motion to Compel Production of Classified Documents at 5, 7-8, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Speasl, No. 05-039164 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 5210219
(same); Complaint at 4-9, Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2005) (exemplifying a heavily redacted document).
24
Searches conducted by author in course of research.
25
Searches conducted by author in course of research.
26
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 105(a), 96
Stat. 25, 26-28 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (2006)), established the U.S.
Claims Court. This judicial body inherited most of the trial authority covered by the
Court of Claims, first created by Congress in 1855 to prevent a run on public money
through litigation. The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171), changed the
name to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The court focuses on suits brought against
the United States rooted in constitutional or statutory challenges, contractual disputes,
or damages related to actions other than torts. Appeals from this court go to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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state secrets cases emerged in the aftermath of Reynolds. In hundreds
of additional cases, moreover, state secrets doctrine played a significant role.
Careful examination of the period from 2001 to 2009 proves particularly illuminating. Hitherto, the intense academic and public debate about the Bush Administration’s use of state secrets has centered
on some twenty opinions issued as of 2006, with further attention on a
handful of highly visible ongoing suits in which the outcome turned
28
on state secrets. The central question has been whether the Administration quantitatively or qualitatively used the privilege differently
from its predecessors.
Setting aside for a moment our limited knowledge about what actually did come before, critiques and defenses have been made too
hastily, as much of the commentary came prior to the close of the

27

These numbers are significantly different from those that currently mark both
scholarship and public discourse. See, e.g., ACLU OF MASS., RESTORING THE RULE OF
LAW SCORECARD: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE 3 (2010), available at
http://aclum.org/scorecard/archive/obama_first_year.pdf (“The Bush Administration invoked ‘state secrets privilege’ 20 times in its first 6 years. The Obama Administration has used it twice in its first 60 days.”); Chesney, supra note 6, at 1298 (citing data that estimates there were eighty-nine published opinions in state secrets cases from
1954 to 2006); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 101, 109 (tallying fifty-five uses of
the privilege from between 1953 and 2001 and seven since 2001).
28
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1301 (“The available data do suggest that the
privilege has continued to play an important role during the Bush administration, but it
does not support the conclusion that the Bush administration chooses to resort to the
privilege with greater frequency than prior administrations or in unprecedented substantive contexts.”). Chesney goes on to list twenty published opinions from 2001 to 2006.
Id. app. at 1329 -32; see also FISHER, supra note 9, at 245 (“The political climate after 9/11
has emboldened the government to assert state secrets in an increasing number of cases.”); Frost, supra note 6, at 1935 (discussing “how the Bush Administration’s assertion of
the privilege differs from past practice”); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 14, at 108 (“President George W. Bush’s administration seems even more committed to secrecy and maintenance of executive power than previous administrations . . . .”).
For prominent ongoing cases centered on rendition, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009),
amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); El-Masri v. United States,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); and Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y.
2006), vacated and superseded by 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). For those cases
associated with the National Security Agency’s (NSA) warrantless wiretapping program, see Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); ACLU v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 2008); and Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v.
Bush, No. 06-0313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006).
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29

Administration. These analyses ignored the time it takes for such
cases to work their way through the courts, attributing cases that arose
under previous administrations to the current government and ignor30
ing ongoing cases that had yet to be decided. They omitted many
unpublished, unreported, and sealed cases, as well as suits voluntarily
dismissed. Missing too were cases in which either the government or
private actors threatened state secrets, but the executive refrained
from invoking it, or where the executive did invoke it, but the issue
did not work its way into the final judicial opinion.
In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001
to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive
branch’s national security litigation strategy. In one case, the Admin31
istration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times. More to
the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in
more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cases previously considered. And it is not just the executive branch that
benefitted from the privilege: in scores of additional cases, private industry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expectation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent
certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit
from moving forward. Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on
which the shadow of the privilege fell.
This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the
courts between 2001 and 2009. It begins with disputes related to government contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of
the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances. Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of
technologies involved. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negli29

For similar critiques of the Obama Administration, see Steven D. Schwinn, The
State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L. REV. 778 (2010). “[T]he Government’s new position [of expanding the state secrets privilege], first under President
Bush and now under President Obama, marks an important and disturbing change in
how it considers and treats the privilege.” Id. at 779.
30
Professor Chesney recognizes this problem and the consequent difficulty in
narrowing the scope for attribution. He explains that even if a list of state secrets cases
could be assembled, “difficult questions of political attribution arise. Particularly with
respect to cases identified by virtue of . . . circuit court opinions published in the first
or second year of a presidential administration, it may well be the case that the original
invocation of the privilege occurred under the prior administration.” Chesney, supra
note 6, at 1301.
31
Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, No. 01-0072, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16874, at
*7 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2002).
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gence cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure
and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as
the conduct of war.
These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of companies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and
the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become involved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor. Close inspection
suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step
forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes
present themselves, and unlikely—once it invokes the privilege—to
back down. Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and
invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors appears to be giving birth to a new form of “graymail”: should the government initially refuse to support the corporation’s state secrets
claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air
32
Even when no overt
legally or politically damaging information.
threat is made, the government may worry that certain information
will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically compromise the agency or individuals involved. In other cases, the government may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of national defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the
33
company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior.
The Article next turns to the telecommunications cases that arose
from the warrantless wiretapping program of the National Security
Agency (NSA). More than fifty such suits emerged between 2006 and
2009, with the government acting variously as plaintiff, intervenor,
and defendant. Although many of these cases ultimately turned on
34
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
state secrets assertions grounded on a closely held executive branch
jurisprudence played a key role throughout. These cases shed light

32

I use the term “graymail” differently here from the manner in which it was used
prior to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16
(2006). See infra text accompanying notes 682-85.
33
To distinguish between claims by corporations in which state secrets will be implicated (generally in the form of an affirmative defense) and the government’s actual
invocation of the privilege, I use the verb “claim” for the former and “invoke” for the
latter. Later in the Article, for cases where the government asserts the state secrets
privilege but does not formally invoke it, I similarly use the word “claim.” These terms,
of course, are to be distinguished from courts actually upholding the privilege itself.
34
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50
U.S.C.).
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on the parallel effect of state secrets, with similar treatment for suits in
which the privilege is never formally invoked. They also bring to the
fore the constitutional questions that accompany the privilege.
Following this discussion, the Article looks at disputes in which the
government defended the suit and invoked state secrets. These cases
stem from allegations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, torture, environmental degradation, breach of espionage contracts, and
35
defamation. Here, it appears that state secrets serve not just to protect national security interests, but also to mask officials’ unlawful behavior. As in the corporate cases and the telecommunications suits,
the executive does not change its course once it invokes the privilege.
Significant advantages, quite apart from the suppression of particular
documents or the dismissal of a suit altogether, accompany the assertion of the privilege and affect motions, attorney-client communications, and control over discovery. The privilege may also give the government access to opposing counsel’s files, if and when the attorney
tries to withdraw from the case.
Despite Judge Learned Hand’s admonition in United States v. Andolschek that the government must choose either to prosecute or to
36
drop criminal charges, the state secrets privilege has also played a
role in the criminal context and provides the basis for Part IV. Remarkably, in two cases—quite apart from Chief Justice Vinson’s requirement in Reynolds that the state secrets privilege be formally invoked—the executive did not even need to formally invoke the
37
privilege. Instead, the court simply read into the case that the privilege had been invoked and, therefore, applied.
Collectively, these cases underscore the importance of looking
38
more carefully at how the state secrets doctrine works in practice.
35

Immigration disputes are not included in this discussion. As there are precedents for state secrets arising in this context, further research specifically focused on
the use of the privilege in immigration proceedings may be warranted. See, e.g., Yang v.
Reno, 157 F.R.D. 625, 632 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that the government moved for
a protective order limiting discovery based in part on state secrets); United States v.
Koreh, 144 F.R.D. 218, 222-24 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that disclosure of documents relating to the Soviet bloc’s alleged disinformation campaign against an Eastern European emigrant would threaten U.S. national security).
36
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
37
See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Aref,
533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008).
38
This Article focuses on instances in which the U.S. state secrets doctrine has
been invoked. In the course of my research, I found dozens of further cases in which
corporations asserted foreign countries’ state secrets. See, e.g., City of Emeryville &
Emeryville Redevelopment Agency’s Opposition to Sherwin Williams’ Motion to En-
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They challenge the dominant paradigm, which tends to cabin state se39
crets as an evidentiary rule within executive privilege. They suggest
force November 25, 2008 Court Order and for Judgment of Civil Contempt at 20, City
of Emeryville v. Elementis Pigments, Inc., No. 39-03719 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2009),
2009 WL 1248140 (distinguishing, on a motion opposing sanctions for bad faith, a case
in which a corporate arm of the Chinese government was sanctioned for failing to
comply with discovery and for asserting the state secrets privilege in an untimely fashion) (citing Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1471-79
(9th Cir. 1992); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint at 18, Knopf v. Semel, No.
08-04538 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2008), 2008 WL 4066973 (arising out of Yahoo’s agreement with China to enable China to monitor Internet activity, leading to the arrest of
two democracy advocates by China for allegedly divulging state secrets); Amec Inc.’s
Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Applied’s First Amended Complaint at
11-12, Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Micro-Fabrication Equip., Inc. China, 630 F.
Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-05248), 2008 WL 1912916 (mentioning the
Chinese state secrets laws governing exports in arguing for a Chinese forum for the
litigation); Defendant Yahoo!, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Initiate Initial
and Jurisdictional Discovery at 5 n.2, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-02151 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 11, 2007), 2007 WL 4357951 (noting that pursuing discovery recommended by
plaintiffs would expose defendants to legal sanction for disclosing what the China considers to be state secrets); Memorandum of Law of J.V. Trading (Glendale) Inc. and
Jeffrey Liu in Support of Motion (1) to Dispense with Jurisdictional Hearing, as Jianlibao Group Has Waived the Defense of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Except for Alleged
Improper Service of Process, and (2) in the Alternative, to Compel Discovery on Jurisdictional Issues at 15-16, JLB Holdings (HK) Co. v. Qishu, No. 03-600705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 31, 2004), 2004 WL 3320503 (referring to the “Chinese State Secret Law” objection plaintiffs asserted twenty-eight times in their “General Objections” and separate
objections); Response of Trans Chemical Limited to CMC’s Objections and Emergency
Motion for Protective Order and Expedited Hearing, In re Arbitration Between Trans
Chemical Ltd. & China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (No. 95-4114), 1997 WL 33832255 (discussing Chinese state secrets laws as used by
the respondent to argue that the discovery sought by the petitioner was illegal). In addition to China (to which the previous examples refer), my docket searches have uncovered that state secrets have been asserted with regard to the Gambia, Georgia, Iran, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Switzerland, and Venezuela.
39
See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti & C.J. Golden, Jr., Crown Privilege and Executive Privilege: A British Response to an American Controversy, 25 STAN. L. REV. 836, 841 (1973) (detailing the role of English courts in balancing the executive interest in withholding
sensitive information against the interests of the litigants in the case); Paul A. Freund,
Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974) (“A . . . possible meaning of executive privilege is . . . an exemption from a duty to produce testimony or
documents and a legal capacity to control the production of certain kinds of evidence
by others.”); Paul Hardin, III, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879,
879 (1962) (“In the eyes of the executive departments . . . of the United States Government . . . [t]he executive branch has uncontrolled discretion to withhold from the
courts anything whose disclosure would be inimical to the public interest or even, it
seems, to the best interest of the executive.” (footnote omitted)); Neil Kinkopf, Executive Privilege: The Clinton Administration in the Courts, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 631, 634
(2000) (“When the President asserts the privilege in a judicial proceeding, the courts
understand the battle line to be drawn between the President’s constitutional powers
and those of the Judiciary. This assumption, however, is a misunderstanding.”); Heidi
Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489,
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in contrast that the doctrine has evolved to become a powerful litigation tool, wielded by both private and public actors. It has been used
to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, creating
a form of private indemnity for government contractors in a broad
range of areas. Patent law, contracts, trade secrets, employment law,
environmental law, and other substantive legal areas have similarly
been affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and
unanticipated advantages over opponents in the course of litigation.
Ascertaining how the doctrine actually works is not, in itself, a normative enterprise. It thus falls to future articles to consider structural
and procedural devices to ensure that the manner in which the state
secrets privilege operates mirrors the purpose for which it was created.
I. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND STATE SECRETS
The increasingly intricate relationship between national defense,
private industry, and technology provides the framework for scores of

493 (2007) (concluding that the executive privilege is not constitutionally based and
the courts should order compliance with statutorily proper demands for information
from the executive); William W. Lentz, Executive Privilege to Withhold Information from
Congress: Constitutional or Political Doctrine?, 42 UMKC L. REV. 374, 375 (1974) (“Limited judicial participation in the development of the doctrine of executive privilege
has resulted in a doctrine molded by political expediency and by the distribution of
power between the President and Congress as much as by constitutional theory.”); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Commentary, From Watergate to Marbury v. Madison: Some Reflections on Presidential Privilege in Current Historical Perspectives, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 73-77
(1974) (explaining the immediate effect of the presidential privilege on the Watergate
scandal, as well as the long-term effect of the privilege on the presidency and the separation of powers); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict During
the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 419-20 (2002) (arguing that the use of executive
power during President George W. Bush’s presidency deviated from its traditional use,
ultimately weakening it); Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A Response to Berger, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 541, 550-55 (2000) (arguing that
executive privilege is a legitimate power under the Constitution); Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV.
205, 211 (2001) (emphasizing that executive privilege must be reformed to repair the
“damage to the presidency itself” in the wake of the Clinton scandal); John F. Dodge,
Jr., Recent Decision, 53 MICH. L. REV. 1178, 1188 (1955) (“[S]ome courts have given
such great weight to the executive request for secrecy as to almost nullify the effectiveness of the judicial determination.”); Timothy V. Ramis, Comment, Executive Privileges:
What Are the Limits?, 54 OR. L. REV. 81, 90-96 (1975) (delineating the scope of executive
privilege and the various legal issues that arise when the privilege is claimed); Taymor,
supra note 13, at 583-89 (suggesting alternative means for the executive to protect state
secrets while minimizing the imposition on individual rights). But see JAMES E. BAKER,
IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 48-49 (2007) (arguing that state secrets is more than an evidentiary rule within executive privilege and is an absolute privilege that can be used in
what might otherwise be a justiciable case).
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lawsuits that have arisen during the War on Terror. Somewhat surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to this litigation. Yet such
suits are hardly new. In the early twentieth century, the judiciary confronted issues arising from government contractors’ construction of
weapons and military vessels. Thus, in addition to the more tradition40
al area of libel, cases like In re Grove, Pollen v. United States, and Pollen
v. Ford Instrument Co. alleged patent infringements and resulted in the
41
invocation of the state secrets privilege.
As technology advanced and the threat of the Cold War loomed,
the government sought new and more varied relationships with private companies, driving national security deeper into the public domain. In 1950, National Security Council Report 68 became the blueprint for U.S. strategy, calling for “a rapid and sustained build-up of
42
the political, economic, and military strength of the free world.” The
United States would need to draw on its industrial strength for success. In his famous farewell address in January 1961, President Dwight
D. Eisenhower explained:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment . . . .
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms
industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—
economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse,
every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative
need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave
implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is
the very structure of our society . . . . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and mili-

40

See, e.g., Pac.-Atl. S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1949) (libel in
admiralty); Republic of China v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md.
1956) (same); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (libel against the
Navy under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D.
Pa. 1948) (libel against the Armed Forces under the Federal Tort Claims Act); AngloSaxon Petroleum Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 62 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1948) (libel in admiralty); State ex rel. Kent v. United States, 1947 A.M.C. 1336 (D. Md. 1947) (libel against
the Navy under the Public Vessels Act and Federal Tort Claims Act); The Wright, 2 F.
Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1932) (libel against the Navy in admiralty).
41
See In re Grove, 180 F. 62 (3d Cir. 1910) (patent infringement for torpedo
boats); Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673 (1937) (patent infringement for gun
sightings components); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)
(same); see also United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Wash. 1944) (“The
right of the Army to refuse to disclose confidential information, the secrecy of which it
deems necessary to national defense, is indisputable.”).
42
NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, NSC-68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY 64 (1950), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_
collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.
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tary machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
43
security and liberty may prosper together.

Many trends mark the evolution of the relationship between government and private corporations. Two are of particular importance
to state secrets considerations. First is the increasing formalization of
44
Thus, in 1954, the
secrecy protections to control information.
Commerce Department established the Office of Strategic Information to work with companies to limit the dissemination of informa45
tion. Simultaneously, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a
regulation advising defense contractors to avoid publishing informa46
tion of “possible use” to enemy states. By 1960, these arrangements
had become formalized in a new system of classification specifically
47
targeted at industry. Executive Order 10,865 provided for the classification of bidding on, negotiating, awarding, performing, or terminating contracts with federal agencies, as well as for allowing private
48
actors to have access to classified information. Subsequent orders
extended and defined the relationship between the executive and pri49
vate companies. The end of the Cold War neither weakened publicprivate relations nor diminished efforts to protect national security in-

43

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address to the Nation ( Jan. 17, 1961).
The following discussion omits efforts to restrict media access to and coverage
of government activities.
45
JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 102-03 (1964).
46
Id. at 110.
47
The broader twentieth-century development of the classification system falls
beyond the scope of this Article. Its development can be traced through past executive
orders. See Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949–1953) (extending military classification to civilian departments and agencies for the first time and establishing four
classification categories); Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949–1953), reprinted
as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (revoking Exec. Order No. 10,290 and establishing the Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret classifications in order to safeguard official information); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 678 (1971–1975), reprinted as
amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III 1973) (creating new procedures for classification
and declassification of national security information and revoking Exec. Order No.
10,501); see also Developments in the Law—The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1189-90 (1972) (discussing the classification of government
documents for national security purposes).
48
Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959–1963), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
49
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,909, 26 Fed. Reg. 508 ( Jan. 17, 1961) (defining and
amending Exec. Order 10,865); Exec. Order No. 11,382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16247 (Nov. 28,
1967) (changing all mentions of the Federal Aviation Agency to referencing the Department of Transportation with regard to classified information); Exec. Order No. 12,038,
43 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Feb. 3, 1978) (transferring the functions of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
44
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formation held by third parties. To the contrary, in 1993, the executive formally established a robust National Industry Security Program
to safeguard classified information released to contractors, licensees,
50
and grantees of the federal government.
While these devices centered on public-private contractual relations, new legislation extended the executive’s ability to control noncontractual entities to private actors that held information central to
national security. Following World War II, the Invention Secrecy Act
became the first peacetime measure to restrict private actors’ inven51
tions in the name of national security. Between 1963 and 1979, the
annual number of secrecy orders placed on inventions derived from
52
government contracts hovered between 4100 and 5100. During the
following decade, the total number of secrecy orders increased signifi53
cantly. Since that time, the number of annual secrecy orders has ho54
vered around 5000 per year.
Beyond secrecy orders, the Atomic Energy Act tethered nuclear
technologies to the national interest, classifying such discoveries from
55
birth. Both benign and nefarious explanations for the increase in
secrets and secrecy orders abound. The numbers could be equally
tied to the growth of the bureaucratic state and the government’s
growing dependence on technology rather than attributing the increase to information control. But, in the context of this Article, such
50

See Exec. Order No. 12,829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3479 ( Jan. 6, 1993), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,885, 58 Fed. Reg. 65863 (Dec. 14, 1993).
51
Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–188).
52
See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1540, at 62 (1980) (“According to Patent Office records,
the number of secrecy orders climbed to 6,149 by December 31, 1958, dropped to
4,503 at the end of 1963, and rose to 5,092 at the end of 1967. On January 1, 1971,
there were 5,006 secrecy orders in force. The number declined to 4,887 at the beginning of 1973, to 4,145 at the beginning of 1976, and to 4,109 at the outset of 1978.”).
53
See Gary L. Hausken, The Value of a Secret: Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy
Orders Under the Invention Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201, 202 n.10 (1988) (showing
3513 orders in effect in 1979); Letter from Robert Fawcett, Program Analyst, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Steven Aftergood, Fed’n of Am. Scientists (Oct. 22, 2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.pdf (showing a total of
5556 orders in 1989).
54
See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM 299 (2008) (tracking the number of secrecy orders since 1950); Letter from Robert Fawcett to Steven
Aftergood, supra note 53; Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy Activity, as Reported by the
Patent and Trademark Office, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
othergov/invention/stats.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
55
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 10, 60 Stat. 755, 766-68 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161–2166 (2000)) (restricting the dispersal of data
relating to atomic energy use or technology).
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arguments are less important than the fact of the expansion, as these
and other executive orders and statutory devices became intimately
linked to state secrets assertions: when such devices are implicated in
56
suits, the state secrets privilege often attends. The privilege has thus
become part of a broader framework through which the government
tries to limit its vulnerability.
A second trend deserving of notice is the increasingly complex relationship between private industry and the national security establishment. In the context of state secrets, this relationship plays out in a few
important ways. For one, our understanding of national interest and
homeland security has expanded, involving a broader spectrum of
companies implicating national security concerns. Thus corporations
owning any part of the critical information infrastructure, such as biotech firms with insight into biologically engineered diseases, hightechnology companies with access to double-key encryption codes, firms
that log flight plans, and mobile telephone service providers become
central to national defense. Proliferating points of contact have created
57
the potential for an increasing number of disputes.
The increasing complexity also plays out in a deeper role for private industry within the military domain: it is not just the companies
which manufacture weapons or build battleships that contribute to
U.S. national security, but also corporations that fight, train forces,
collect intelligence, and carry out special operations under contract.
Such private military companies (PMCs) maintain a corporate struc-

56

See, e.g., Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming that documents in a lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act were not discoverable on state secrets grounds); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958) (alleging a
lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act involved state secrets); Foster v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 492, 493 (1987) (same); AT&T Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157, 158 (1983)
(upholding state secrets privilege in lawsuit under the Invention Secrecy Act).
57
See, e.g., United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 431-38 (E.D. Wash. 1944)
(arising in the course of the Manhattan Project), aff’d, 153 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946);
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146-47
(1981) (concerning the storage of nuclear weapons). For discussion of the growing
relationship between government and industry in the twentieth century, see SEYMOUR
MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM 71-96 (1970), which explains the Pentagon’s involvement with private means of production. See also CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 131-49 (2004) (tracking the United States military’s use of private
contractors); C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 169 (1956) (“[T]he distinction between the political and the economic man has been diminishing . . . . [M]ore and
more of the corporate executives have entered government directly; and the result has
been a virtually new political economy . . . .”); THE WAR ECONOMY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1-8 (Seymour Melman ed., 1971) (discussing the effect of the military-industrial
firm on industrial capitalism).
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ture, distinguishing them from traditional mercenary models. Sandline International, once one of the largest PMCs, explained that its
“business was established in the early 1990s to fill a vacuum in the post
59
cold war era.” The company specialized in strategic advice, threat
analysis, basic and advanced military and special forces training, intelligence operations, humanitarian operations, strategic communications, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, operations to counter organized crime, protection of key installations, and other operational
support (e.g., command, control, communication and intelligence
60
teams, special forces units, pilots, and engineers).
Sandline is just one of many contractors that have become involved in U.S. military operations. According to the Congressional
Research Service, as of September 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense had more contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan (218,000) than
61
uniformed personnel (195,000). These numbers did not include the
significant number of contractors hired on behalf of other U.S. entities, such as the Department of State or USAID. Perhaps the starkest
measure of the degree to which contractors have become integrated
into the war effort is morbidity: by July 2007, according to Reuters,
more than 1000 government contractors had died in Iraq and Afghanistan since the wars began, and more than 13,000 had been severely
62
These numbers represented approximately
wounded or injured.
one civilian contractor killed for every four members of the U.S.
58

P. W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS 45 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2003). Singer
explains that the newest wave of companies are, first and foremost, commercial enterprises. See id. (“[PMCs] are hierarchically organized into registered businesses that
trade and compete openly (for the most part) and are vertically integrated into the
wider global marketplace. They target market niches by offering packaged services
covering a wide variety of military skill sets.”).
59
Corporate Overview, SANDLINE INT’L, http://www.sandline.com/company/
index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
60
Incorporated in the Bahamas, with offices in London and Washington, D.C., the
company guaranteed “strict rules of confidentiality.” Id. In 2004, the company closed
operations. In 2002, Sandline’s director, former British Army Lieutenant Colonel Tim
Spicer, founded Aegis Defense Services, a private military company that contracts with
the U.S. Department of Defense. See Tim Spicer, AEGIS, http://www.aegisworld.com/
index.php/tim-spicer (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
61
MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (2009); see
also GARY MOTSEK, ASSISTANT DEPUTY UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF
U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE USCENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN 1 (2010) (reporting a total of 207,553 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan in the
second quarter of fiscal year 2010).
62
Bernd Debusmann, In Outsourced U.S. Wars, Contractor Deaths Top 1,000, REUTERS,
July 3, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0318650320070703.
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Armed Forces, with upwards of 3919 U.S. soldiers having died in Iraq
63
and Afghanistan as of July 2007.
The government has expended considerable resources to hire these
firms. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that from 2003 to
2007, the Department of Defense committed some $76 billion to con64
tractors in the Iraq theater. In fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, the DoD spent an additional $22 billion on its contracts
65
and obligations in Iraq. Nevertheless, very little is known about the
private companies working for the United States overseas. It was not
until the second half of 2007 that the DoD began to collect information
66
on contractors—and even this data has been brought into question.
What is remarkable about these contractors is that, quite apart
from Reynolds’s requirement that only the government invoke the state
secrets privilege, PMCs such as Halliburton, DynCorp, and L-3 Communications, as well as more traditional contractors, such as Boeing
Company, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and Honeywell Interna67
tional, consistently assert state secrets as an affirmative defense. Yet
there is virtually no scholarship on how and when these companies
have claimed the privilege, how successful they have been in claiming
that it applies, the role of the privilege as a tactical device, or the conditions under which the executive branch formally supports such
claims by intervening and invoking the privilege.
The pattern over the past eight years is that these corporations respond to complaints by claiming state secrets as an affirmative defense. They then approach the executive to intervene and prevent the
68
suit from moving forward. The federal government subsequently (a)
does nothing, (b) files a motion of interest and requests time to consider the national security implications, (c) files a motion to intervene
and requests time to consider the national security implications, (d)

63

Id. At a minimum, these numbers highlight significant corporate interests in
the wars.
64
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 3053, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ 3 (2008). The Iraq theater includes Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Id.
65
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-19, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING:
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN 21 (2008).
66
SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 4.
67
See infra Section I.B.
68
On occasion, intelligence agencies may also alert the executive to suits as they
arise, as Department of Justice personnel indicated to the author during a discussion at
American University School of Law on November 18, 2009.
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files a motion to suppress certain evidence, or (e) files a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment on state secrets grounds.
A number of observations that have previously escaped notice can be
drawn—precisely because of the narrow focus on published opinions
adjudicating the state secrets question.
First, the executive appears to adopt a conservative approach: it
only intervenes in commercial disputes once other formalities have
been met and the suit is, indeed, moving forward. Even at this point, it
does not always become involved. For instance, although there are exceptions, the executive appears more likely to intervene in contract,
patent, and trade secrets cases than in class action torts (although
many of these suits are still in their infancy and the government’s approach may change). Similarly, the executive appears more willing to
intervene in tort suits involving military equipment and technology
than in cases regarding contractors’ services—even where the contractors are engaged in a more traditional armed-forces capacity. Additionally, there appears to be a one-way ratchet: such suits often span
multiple administrations, but once the executive has invoked the state
secrets privilege, subsequent administrations hold the line.
Second, many government contractors—including most of the top
ten in terms of volume of business—benefit from use of the state secrets doctrine in suits that allege a range of illegal activity including
torture, disappearances, chemical warfare, assault, battery, racial discrimination, toxic dumping, fraud, breach of contract, patent infringement, trade secrets, and libel.
Two further observations are of note. First, and perhaps most importantly, the operation of the privilege gives rise to the potential for
a new form of “graymail.” Many of these companies have access to information that would make the state politically and legally vulnerable
to exposure. Once a company is confronted with a suit, it can approach the government and threaten that, in the course of litigation,
information that the state does not want in the public domain may
emerge. If the government refuses to intervene, the company may
not just make the information it currently holds public, but it can begin subpoenaing internal government documents and reports allegedly necessary to its defense, thus spurring the government to act. In
other cases, there may be no wrongdoing involved; that is, companies
may not deliberately be seeking to provoke the government to respond by threatening to air politically or legally damaging information. Nevertheless, the natural evolution of the lawsuit may result in a
similar outcome: the government, aware that the agency or individu-
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als involved may be compromised if the lawsuit is to continue and if
the company is to be provided with the opportunity to defend itself,
may step in to prevent a case from proceeding. Second, quite apart
from these risks, the corporation may be so embedded in the country’s
national defense that the state cannot afford for it to be subject to significant financial penalties—or bankruptcy. In each of these situations,
the state secrets privilege gives rise to a form of private indemnity.
Even where the government never becomes involved in the suit,
the threat of the state secrets privilege gives companies a tactical advantage. It shapes litigation in important and prejudicial ways, often
dropping out of the picture by the time the court issues its opinion resolving the case. Once it becomes an affirmative defense, for instance,
the privilege provides a hook for companies to remove the case to federal court. Its use draws out litigation, giving companies, which tend to
have significantly more resources than plaintiffs, more time to mount a
defense. The privilege may scare off litigants who may be unwilling or
unable to sustain a multiyear, even multidecade, court battle, particularly if the case is ultimately unlikely to come to trial. Whether or not
the government will eventually intervene is unknown; corporations
claiming that state secrets are at stake are privy to classified materials,
and precedent for the state intervening in every type of suit exists.
A. Breach of Contract, Patent Disputes, and Trade Secrets
The most common contractor actions implicating state secrets involve breach of contract, patent disputes, and trade secrets. Indeed,
one of the first state secrets cases to arise in the Bush Administration
came from a suit involving Virtual Defense and Development International, Inc., a corporation claiming to be entitled to a sales commission
69
on MiG-29 fighter jets. The contractor, who brought suit on January
22, 1998, sought production of an unredacted classified cable from the
U.S. Ambassador to Moldova to the State Department, which reported
70
on a meeting in which a potential arms deal was discussed. The Secre71
tary of State invoked the state secrets privilege. After reviewing the cable in camera, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina ordered the State Department

69

Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11, 23
(D.D.C. 2001).
70
Id. at 23.
71
Id.
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72

to declassify two of the redacted sentences. On August 15, 2001, the
73
court granted summary judgment in favor of Moldova.
74
Such cases certainly predate the Bush Administration. Indeed,
contract suits, like Virtual Defense & Development International v. Republic
of Moldova, often span multiple administrations. For instance, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics entered into a full-scale engineering and development contract with the Navy in 1988 to develop a
75
stealth aircraft known as the A-12 Avenger. In 1991, the contractors
sought $3.992 billion in a claim for equitable adjustment and conver76
sion of the contract termination for default to one of convenience.
77
Successive rounds of litigation carried the case through 2009. The
state secrets claim played a complex role throughout, and the appeals
78
court ultimately sustained it in the third round of litigation. The lengthy timeframe that applies to breach of contract cases also marks patent
79
infringement and trade secrets disputes.
Many of these disputes extend beyond traditional military aircraft
or weapons specifications. The technologies range from digital imag80
ing, fiber optics, and radar to data mining and source code. At the
72

Id. at 24 (order granting reconsideration).
Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, No. 98-0161 (D.D.C. Aug.
15, 2001) (order granting summary judgment for defendant and dismissing the case
with prejudice).
74
See, e.g., N.S.N. Int’l Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 140 F.R.D. 275,
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding a government motion for a protective order barring
release of classified documents discussing state secrets).
75
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
76
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
77
See id. (concluding that the government was justified in terminating the contract
because of a default by the plaintiff).
78
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
79
See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 738 (2009) (B-2 bomber patent infringement case filed March 25, 1996; in November of the same year the government filed a motion for a protective order based on state secrets—a motion
granted by the court ten years later); D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d
327 (4th Cir. 2001) (misappropriation of trade secrets case involving state secrets,
which endured for nearly eight years); see also Motion with Memorandum in Support
by USA for Protective Order, and Exhibits A-D, D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d 327
(No. 96-01852) (entered on September 14, 1998, and modified on April 27, 2000).
80
See, e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d at 329 (arguing that the defendant misappropriated trade secrets regarding data mining); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, patent infringement, and breach of contract in a dispute regarding fiber-optic
technology); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., No. 06-0056, at 2-10 (D. Nev. May 29,
73
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heart of the Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies litigation, for instance,
lies surveillance software claimed to assist intelligence agencies in
scanning traffic for Al Qaeda communications. On June 21, 2007, Director of National Intelligence Jonathan Negroponte invoked state se81
crets. The United States sought a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to prevent disclosure of
information regarding the
existence . . . of any actual or proposed relationship, agreement, connection, contract, transaction, communication, or meeting of any kind between an intelligence agency . . . and any actual or proposed interest in,
application, or use by any intelligence agency, or any current or former
official, . . . of any technology, software, or source code owned or
82
claimed by any individuals or entities associated with these lawsuits.

After reviewing the evidence in camera and ex parte, the court
83
granted the order on August 29, 2007.
While private corporations tend to claim the applicability of the
state secrets doctrine in the first instance, the executive branch often
84
steps in to formally support such claims. It only tends to do so, however, once it appears that the suit is, indeed, moving forward. For instance, a dispute between Crater Corporation and Lucent Technologies stemmed from a patent filed in 1991 by Philip French and co-

2008) (order regarding source-code discovery), 2008 WL 2277118, at *2-6 (discussing
allegations involving source code, breach of contract, and patent infringement and
ordering the plaintiffs to produce all documents in response to discovery requests);
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law at 7-9, Sensis Corp. v. Lysack, No. 07-00543 (N.D.N.Y.
May 22, 2007), 2007 WL 4675710 (alleging misappropriation of trade secrets regarding
radar technology); Mirage Sys., Inc.’s Amended Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to St. Clair’s Motion to Compel Production of Classified Documents
at 2, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Speasl, No. 05-039164 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2007), 2007
WL 5303264 (claiming the defendant infringed digital imaging technology patents).
81
Montgomery, No. 06-00056, at 2 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2007) (protective order).
82
Id. at 1.
83
Id. at 2.
84
See, e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C., 245 F.3d at 330 (moving to quash defendant’s
subpoenas served to numerous federal agencies through the United States’ invocation
of the state secrets privilege); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d
1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (remanding the state secret issue to the trial court); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., L.L.C., No. 06-0056, 2009 WL 910739, at *8 (D. Nev. Mar.
31, 2009) (involving the state secrets privilege invocation by the United States in a trade
secret mis-appropriation case); Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova, 133
F. Supp. 2d 9, 23 (D.D.C. 2001) (discussing state secrets invoked by the State Department
to oppose plaintiff’s motion to compel disclosure of a classified cable); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 270, 272 (1996) (dismissing multiple claims by a
military contractor after the government invoked the state secrets doctrine).
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inventors Charles Monty and Steven Van Keuren. Lucent Technologies, a subsidiary of AT&T, was interested in using the inventors’ design for an underwater fiber-optic coupler in conjunction with a classi86
fied contract it had secured with the U.S. government. The inventors provided Lucent with drawings and consented to a research and
87
development license, with the future design to be negotiated. They
alleged that Lucent subsequently denied the inventors access to the
88
CAD drawings and offered some $100,000 to license the technology.
In May 1998, the inventors brought suit for misappropriation of trade
89
secrets, patent infringement, and breach of contract. Three months
90
later Lucent moved for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). The
district court dismissed the suit based on the patent infringement
91
claim. With the trade secrets and breach of contract claims still in
play, however, litigation continued, prompting the U.S. military to intervene on March 12, 1999, and to invoke the state secrets privilege to
92
protect some 26,000 documents. The government argued that the

85

Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96; see also Chesney, supra note 6, at 1303
n.294 (citing Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir.
2005)) (discussing the Crater case, in which a protective order was granted against fact
discovery regarding production of radar technology due to the state secrets privilege).
86
Crater Corp., 624 F. Supp. 2d at 796-97. For detailed discussion of this case, see
Isaacs & Farley, supra note 6, at 789-99.
87
Second Amended Complaint at 2-3, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 9800913), 2006 WL 2699395.
88
Isaacs & Farley, supra note 6, at 790 (citing Kevin Poulsen, Secrecy Power Sinks Patent Case, WIRED (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/
2005/09/68894).
89
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1261-62 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 98-00913, 1999 WL 33973795, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 255 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Section 1498(a) provides an affirmative defense for government contractors that shifts
liability to the government for patent infringement, where a patented invention is used
by or manufactured for the government by a private party. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
91
Crater Corp., 1999 WL 33973795, at *3. A separate administrative claim filed
against the United States was still pending as of 2007. Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
92
See Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating the government’s position that none of the approximately 26,000 documents could be disclosed); United
States’ Motion to Intervene and Supporting Memorandum at 1, Crater Corp., 625 F.
Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 1999 WL 34870263 (asserting grounds for intervention
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24); United States’ Motion to Quash and
for a Protective Order and Supporting Memorandum at 4-8, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp.
2d 790 (No. 98-00913) [hereinafter Motion to Quash in Crater Corp.], 1999 WL
34870264 (providing grounds for the state secrets privilege and protection pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 45(c)).
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93

state secrets privilege was an absolute bar to the suit moving forward.
Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig and Acting Secretary of the Navy
Hansford T. Johnson submitted classified and unclassified declara94
tions in support.
The Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies case illustrates the chickenand-egg problem with patent disputes in the national security realm.
It also underscores a certain judicial sloppiness that has crept its way
into state secrets cases, with courts allowing the executive branch to
draw a wide net—preventing a broad range of documents from entering the public domain—on the grounds that some portion of the material withheld qualifies as a state secret.
Crater Corporation argued that it did not need any classified in95
formation to make its case: the coupler was not a state secret. The
company objected to Lucent’s claim, arguing that only the govern96
Lucent disagreed.
ment could invoke—and argue—state secrets.
Not only could the company argue state secrets, but dismissal was warranted: the exclusion of such privileged material would leave the
plaintiff unable to mount its case and the defendant unable to con97
firm or deny the allegations. Upon inspection of the documents in
93

See Motion to Quash in Crater Corp., supra note 92, at 1 (“Plaintiff in this case
seeks to discover information from defendants and various third-parties whose disclosure is prohibited by the state secrets privilege. That privilege, as properly invoked by
the United States here, acts as an absolute bar . . . .”).
94
Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1263, 1265.
95
See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 34, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2007 WL 5248865 (“This
court should deny defendants[’] motion for summary judgment because defendants[’]
state secret defense is false, because the Crater coupler was never a secret and the government intentionally allowed public presentation . . . .”).
96
Plaintiff Crater Corporation’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2003 WL
25749187.
Defendants’ claim that this case should be dismissed as a result of the State
Secrets privilege should be rejected because the Government—the holder of
the privilege—has not moved to dismiss on that ground. AT&T and Lucent
do not have authority to assert the Government’s state secret privilege offensively against Crater as grounds for dismissal. Only the Government can invoke the state secrets privilege in this manner. Moreover, Defendants lack
standing and should not be permitted to argue here that operation of the
state secrets privilege has prejudiced their defense to Crater’s claims.
Id.
97

See Defendants’ Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, Crater Corp., 625 F.
Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2004 WL 5583982 (“[D]ismissal is appropriate when, as
here, the state secrets privilege would prevent a defendant from either confirming or
denying plaintiff’s factual allegations.”); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Memo-
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camera, the district court ordered that a substantial portion of the
98
documents be disclosed.
The government refused. The district
court then held a show-cause hearing, following which it determined
that even if some documents could be released, others could not be—
and that these documents were central to the plaintiffs establishing a
99
prima facie case. Although the Federal Circuit upheld the invocation of the state secrets privilege (without examining the documents),
Judge Newman registered concern that the military had failed to distinguish between public information and documents that genuinely
100
The court remanded the case
posed a threat to national security.
for consideration of trade secrets, whether Crater and Lucent had a
101
contract in place, and what its terms might have been. The United
States argued that the court did not even need to reach the state se102
crets question. Lucent responded that it was “entitled to judgment
as a matter of law due to the United States’ invocation of the state se103
The company wrote, “[n]either party can escape
crets privilege.”
the iron curtain of the state secrets privilege. Crater cannot make out
a prima facie case, and Lucent cannot adequately defend itself with104
The court subsequently
out evidence protected by the privilege.”
found insufficient evidence to support Crater’s claim that the coupler
105
had been used. In June 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
106
Circuit affirmed.
randum in Support at 1-2, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2003 WL
25749186 (“Crater’s remaining claims require it to prove . . . that Lucent somehow incorporated Crater’s technology into the Government’s classified device. Given the
Government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege, however, neither Crater nor Lucent will be able to prove or disprove this allegation.”).
98
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 98-00913, 2004 WL 3609347, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Feb. 19, 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 423
F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
99
Id. at *2-3.
100
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 423 F.3d at 1270 (Newman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
101
Id. at 1268 (majority opinion).
102
See United States’ Response to Plaintiff’s Informal Request for Information,
and Response to Plaintiff’s Brief Concerning Case Scheduling and Report at 1, Crater
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2006 WL 5808938 (“[P]laintiff is ‘putting
the cart before the horse’ by seeking information regarding damages when it has failed
to prove that any wrongdoing occurred or even could have occurred.”).
103
Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
at 2, Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 790 (No. 98-00913), 2007 WL 5248864.
104
Id. at 2-3.
105
Crater Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
106
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 319 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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The use of state secrets in the corporate realm may hamper efforts
by employees to draw attention to contractor fraud. For example, this
107
Dr.
may have occurred in United States ex. rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc.
108
Nira Schwartz alleged violation of the False Claims Act, on behalf of
the United States against defendants TRW and Boeing; wrongful termination in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), against TRW; and wrongful
109
termination in violation of California public policy against TRW. She
stated that, starting in 1990, the United States began contracting with
Boeing to develop an exoatmospheric kill vehicle to intercept incoming
110
ballistic missiles as part of its national missile defense program. Boeing, in turn, contracted with TRW to develop algorithms to enable the
system to distinguish between decoys and the infrared signatures of in111
coming missiles.
Schwartz alleged that TRW and Boeing misled and lied to the
government by providing falsified data, rigging tests, concealing errors, and repeatedly failing to comply with the technical requirements
112
and specifications to which they had agreed. Schwartz claimed that
her suspension and termination, ostensibly on grounds of misconduct, related to complaints she had lodged about the false representa113
tions. On January 15, 2003, the U.S. government, which had failed
to comply with Reynolds formalities in its first invocation of the state
secrets privilege, invoked the privilege a second time through a motion to intervene and a motion to dismiss the suit. Five weeks later,
114
the court granted the request.
B. Negligence, Wrongful Death, and Bodily Injury
Recourse to the state secrets privilege in suits brought against private actors for negligence, wrongful death, or bodily injury predates
the Bush Administration. In 1974, for instance, the Southern District

107

211 F.R.D. 388 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also United States ex rel. Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., 150 F. App’x 627, 628 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of the whistleblower
lawsuit alleging Raytheon failed to perform on defense contract on state secrets
grounds).
108
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006).
109
Schwartz, 211 F.R.D. at 390.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 390-91.
114
Civil Minutes, United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., No. 96-3065 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 2003).
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of New York sustained the government’s invocation of state secrets in
regard to CIA documents in a personal injury case brought by Pan
115
American World Airways against Aetna. In 1989, a California district
court dismissed an action brought against the United States and
twelve defense contractors by the families of passengers and crew
aboard an airliner shot down by missile fire from the U.S.S. Vin116
cennes, based in part on the invocation of the state secrets privilege.
The following year, the Second Circuit granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in a suit brought by the estate of a sailor killed by Iraqi
fire against the designers, manufacturers, testers, and marketers of an
anti-missile system and weapons system on the U.S.S. Stark, on the
117
grounds of state secrets, as well as the political question doctrine. In
1993, a California district court held that the government’s invocation
of the state secrets privilege, in response to a suit brought by the family of a Marine killed in the Persian Gulf, precluded adjudication of the
118
Looking at lawsuits from 2001 through 2009, it quickly beclaim.
comes clear that similar suits include, but go considerably beyond,
mere product liability.
1. Product Liability
The traditional product liability national security suit centers on
weapons and equipment. Many of these have emerged, with a signifi119
cant percentage of cases focused on helicopter malfunction.
In
115

Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 113941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
116
Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
117
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1134, 1135, 1142 (D. Conn.
1990), aff’d, 935 F.2d 544, 548 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit followed suit in a
case based on the same incident in Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140,
1144 (5th Cir. 1992).
118
Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-97 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
119
For instance, Duncan Ruth and Clayton Shearcroft died on November 3, 2005,
when the Boeing-Vertol model BV 107-II helicopter they were piloting broke in midair
and crashed to the ground. Complaint at 4, Ruth v. Boeing Co., No. 07-04851 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 4882640. Boeing removed the case from the Court of
Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal at 2-4, Ruth, No. 07-04851 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 4761731. Ruth codefendant Honeywell International raised state secrets as an affirmative defense. See Answer of Honeywell International Inc. to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 30, Ruth, No. 07-04851
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2007), 2007 WL 4874833 (asserting state secrets as the thirty-second
affirmative defense).
In another case, family members of fourteen American servicemen killed in a
Black Hawk helicopter crash near Kirkuk, Iraq, on August 22, 2007, sued the compa-
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February 2007, for instance, a U.S. Army Chinook helicopter crashed
120
in Afghanistan, killing eight soldiers and wounding fourteen others.
The following October, seven persons injured in the accident and
some of their spouses, as well as the surviving heirs of seven decedents,
brought suit in San Francisco County Superior Court against The Boeing Company, Honeywell International, Inc., and Goodrich Pump and

nies responsible for helicopter maintenance. Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 6,
McLead v. L-3 Commc’ns Vertex Aerospace, LLC, No. 08-00264 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7,
2008), 2008 WL 3924669. The plaintiffs alleged that negligence had resulted in a foreign object being left in the engine during a Phased Maintenance Inspection, causing
the driveshaft to fail. Id. at 6. L-3 Communications responded to the complaint by asserting the state secrets privilege. See Defendant L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace, LLC’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at 4, McLead, No. 0800264 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 464073 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred in
whole or in part by the political question doctrine and the state secrets doctrine.”).
Yet another aircraft accident, this time involving a charter flight that crashed into
a mountain in Afghanistan on November 27, 2004, resulted in an industrial state secrets assertion. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 2, 18, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 410 F. Supp.
2d 1189 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (No. 05-01002), 2006 WL 422219. The complaint alleged
that all five defendants, operating under contract with the United States “to provide air
transportation and operational support services to the Department of Defense (‘DoD’)
in Afghanistan,” negligently caused the deaths of the plaintiffs’ spouses. Complaint at
5, 7-9, McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(No. 05-1002), 2005 WL 4902790. Blackwater, one of the defendants in the suit,
moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Blackwater
Lodge and Training Center, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction,
McMahon, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (No. 05-1002), 2005 WL 3806018. State secrets assertions—despite the government’s statement that it would not step in to formally assert
the privilege—played a role throughout the litigation. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Unseal Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support at 1, 5, McMahon v.
Presidential Airways, No. 05-1002 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 773422 (moving
for the court to unseal a renewed motion to dismiss and its supporting exhibits as no
governmental secrets were at issue).
120
Answer of Defendant Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. to
Amended Complaint at 1, Getz v. Boeing Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(No. 07-06396), 2008 WL 4762725; Amended Answer of Defendant The Boeing Company at 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-6396), 2008 WL 744106; Notice of Removal
of Civil Action from Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco at 2, Getz,
690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-6396) [hereinafter Notice of Removal in Getz], 2007 WL
5017768; US Troops Killed in Chopper Crash, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6372813.stm. It was not the first Chinook to
crash in Afghanistan and result in American casualties. See US Troops Killed in Chopper
Crash, supra (discussing the April 2005 Chinook crash in which sixteen people died,
thirteen of whom were U.S. personnel, as well as a July 2005 helicopter crash in which
all sixteen soldiers on board were killed). A number of unreported cases that deserve
further examination have dealt with prior Chinook crashes. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Boeing Co., No. 85-4524, 1986 WL 8129, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1986) (dismissing a lawsuit
for injuries suffered in a helicopter crash based on the government contractor defense).
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121

Engine Control Systems, Inc.
The defendants removed to federal
court on December 18, 2007, based in part on Boeing’s claim to the
122
Eighteen months
state secrets privilege as an affirmative defense.
later, the company still had not amassed sufficient information to file
additional dispositive motions on the state secrets privilege—resulting
in efforts to further push back discovery within the case management
123
schedule.
As in the Lucent case, discussed above, Judge Claudia Wilken
noted the chicken-and-egg problem that accompanies such suits:
Defendants’ state secret privilege and political question defenses
present additional problems, since the viability of those defenses depends
not only on evidence produced by the government, but also the evidence
that the government refuses to produce to defendants. It is well settled
that summary judgment is appropriate when the government’s assertion
of the state secrets privilege deprives a defendant of information that
would support a valid defense to plaintiffs claim. Therefore, before the
defendants can even prepare a motion based on the state secrets privilege, we have to wait and see what information the government produces
124
and what information the government refuses to produce.

The refusal of the government to provide even seemingly innocuous
information could have a profound effect:
As the Ninth Circuit noted in Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
1998), “if seemingly innocuous information is part of a classified mosaic,
the state secrets privilege may be invoked to bar its disclosure and the
court cannot order the government to disentangle this information from
other classified information.” Id. at 1166. Under this standard, defendants anticipate that the government will withhold considerable information critical to their defenses herein. However, defendants cannot
make such a showing until such time as the government produces doc121

Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Modify Case Management Order at 4 nn.1, 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-06396) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opposition in Getz], 2009 WL 2407163; Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant the
Boeing Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Government Contractor Defense at 2, Getz, 690 F. Supp. 2d 982 (No. 07-06396) [hereinafter Motion for
Summary Judgment in Getz], 2009 WL 3785314.
122
Plaintiffs’ Opposition in Getz, supra note 121, at 4; Notice of Removal in Getz,
supra note 120, at 5, 7. Additional affirmative defenses included the government contractor defense and the political question doctrine. Notice of Removal in Getz, supra
note 120, at 5, 6.
123
See Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Modify Case Management Order at 5, Getz v. Boeing Co., No. 07-06396 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
3, 2009), 2009 WL 2407164 (explaining how the viability of the state secrets privilege
depends on what documents the government refuses to produce).
124
Id. (citations omitted).
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uments in response to defendants’ requests and asserts the state secrets
125
privilege as to other information.

Like the other aircraft cases cited above, Getz v. Boeing Co. relates
to an accident in the theater of war. However, as in Reynolds, even
where the incident involving aircraft is far removed from the actual
126
This holds even in bibattlefield, state secrets may still play a role.
zarre cases tangentially involving military aircraft, where government
127
contractors claim in the first instance that state secrets are at stake.
125

Id. at 5-6. In any event, the first card Boeing played was the government contractor defense. Motion for Summary Judgment in Getz, supra note 121. As of the time
of this writing, the case has yet to be resolved.
126
On November 2, 2007, Stephen Stilwell, on routine training maneuvers for the
Missouri Air National Guard in restricted Military Operations Area airspace over southcentral Missouri, executed a break turn in an F-15C Eagle. Complaint at 3-4, Stilwell v.
Boeing Co., No. 08-00395 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 21, 2008), 2008 WL 2364199. The plane allegedly began violently shaking and broke apart. Id. at 4. Stilwell, who ejected from
the aircraft and was hit by parts of it, suffered debilitating injuries. Id. at 4-5. On
March 21, 2008, he sued Boeing. Id. at 1. Boeing responded by arguing, inter alia,
state secrets as an affirmative defense. See Defendant’s Answer and Additional Defenses to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 7, Stilwell, No. 08-00395 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 5467424 (“The First Amended Complaint, and each purported cause of action therein, may be barred, in whole or in part, if the government
invokes the state secrets privilege to preclude production of information necessary to
Boeing’s defense or to Plaintiff’s prima facie case.”). On April 16, 2009, the case was
dismissed with prejudice. Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, Stilwell, No. 0800395 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 1147055.
127
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Wrongful Death, Personal Injuries, and Business
Loss at 3, 5, Sheffels v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
Complaint in Sheffels], 2003 WL 23981154 (involving a suit on behalf of a deceased civilian pilot, Louis Roger Sheffels, who crashed on May 2001 in his Piper PA-18 aircraft).
Wilbur, Washington, where the crash occurred, is a rural town with a population of 960,
located sixty-five miles west of Spokane, Washington. Jonathan Martin, Crop Circles Lure
Visitors to Wilbur, Wash., SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR
15825974. Sheffels’s heirs and his surviving passenger, Michael J. Palmquist, brought an
action against Boeing, alleging that the C-17 Globemaster III, manufactured by Boeing,
had an ultrahazardous wake turbulence profile, posing an “unreasonable risk to general
aviation aircraft,” and that a C-17 had been the proximate cause of Sheffels’s crash.
Complaint in Sheffels, supra, at 5, 9-10. Boeing responded to the complaint by, inter alia,
asserting state secrets as an affirmative defense. Defendant The Boeing Company’s
Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim at
10, Kuch v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2004), 2004 WL 3108354.
The C -17, operated by the U.S. Air Force, is a military transport aircraft used for rapid
airlift of troops and cargo to main and forward-operating bases. C -17 Globemaster III, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/c17/index.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2010). The court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider
Dismissal and Reconvene Trial, Kuch v. United States, No. 03-0355 (E.D. Wash. Oct.
23, 2007), 2007 WL 3129674, at *1 (denying plaintiff’s motion to have the court reconvene and consider additional testimony). In September 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion
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Aircraft are not the only focus of such suits. Liability cases arise
from a wide range of products. Some involve weapons, where the government may be particularly vulnerable to exposure. For instance, U.S.
Navy combat pilot Lieutenant Nathan White’s death from “friendly fire”
while on patrol over Iraq led to a suit against the manufacturer of the
128
errant Patriot missile. On June 26, 2007, Raytheon moved to dismiss
the suit, arguing that it raised a nonjusticiable political question: “the
discretionary decision of the Army to deploy the Patriot system in ‘Op129
The court denied the motion, and in Deeration Iraqi Freedom.’”
130
cember 2007 the parties began discovery.
Although the defendants
claimed that state secrets were involved, the government had not yet intervened in the suit to invoke the privilege. Raytheon subsequently
served a number of document requests on the U.S. Army, including reports on the internal investigation of the incident, communications between the government and Raytheon about the incident, information
on the U.S. Army’s missile defense operations, and the Patriot missile
131
On September 5, 2008, Peter Geren,
system’s rules of engagement.
Secretary of the Army, filed an affidavit invoking the state secrets privi132
lege. The court upheld the state secrets invocation on December 17,
2008, concluding “that the information which the Secretary has claimed
as privileged is relevant and necessary to prove and defend the
Amended Complaint[,] and . . . its public disclosure would endanger
vital security interests of the United States . . . . Therefore, I have no al133
ternative but to order the case dismissed.”
Personal injury suits extend beyond dysfunctional weapons. In one
case, plaintiffs Kevin R. McLane and Sharon Brown alleged that, while
in Iraq on August 17, 2004, they were shocked by an antenna supplied

to reopen the case. Id. At his first deposition on March 24, 2004, Palmquist testified
that his last memory before the crash was flying over a field he was surveying and that he
had not seen any other aircraft that day. Id. However, after undergoing hypnosis to
enhance his memory, at his second deposition on October 13, 2004, Palmquist recalled
seeing a large aircraft directly in front of their windshield. Id. After District Court
Judge Suko dismissed the case on summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
exclusion of the posthypnotic recollections but reversed the grant of summary judgment. Id. The district court subsequently declined to reopen the case under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Id. at *2-3.
128
White v. Raytheon Co., No. 07-10222, 2008 WL 5273290, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec.
17, 2008).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at *5.
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134

by Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. (HTSI). In seeking removal
to a federal court, HTSI noted, “If the equipment at issue was supplied
by HTSI, it was delivered to the National Security A[gency] by HTSI
135
HTSI argued for reunder a classified contract with that agency.”
136
moval under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, and on the basis of
137
the incident being located in a federal enclave. Defendants further
138
claimed state secrets as a colorable defense.
In a similar case, Sergeant Chris Everett, a member of the Texas
Army National Guard, died from electrocution while he was cleaning
139
a Humvee in Iraq. The generator providing electricity for the power
washer was not properly grounded, a responsibility that his mother
said fell squarely on the shoulders of defendants Arkel and Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services, Inc. (KBR), who had contracted with the gov140
State seernment to install, operate, and maintain the generator.
141
crets once again provided an affirmative defense.
Personal injury due to radiation provides the nexus for a number
of suits currently pending in the courts. From November 2002
through January 2003, dozens of people seeking recovery for exposure to ionizing radiation while working with Honeywell radar devices
filed class action complaints in Texas, Massachusetts, and New Jer142
sey. In the Norwood v. Raytheon Co. actions, Honeywell claimed state

134

Notice of Removal at 1-2, McLane v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 07-02816 (D. Md.
Oct. 16, 2007), 2007 WL 4603347.
135
Id. at 2.
136
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006).
137
Notice of Removal, supra note 134, at 2, 4.
138
See Defendant Honeywell International Inc. and Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc.’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, McLane, No. 07-2816 (D. Md. Oct. 23,
2007), 2007 WL 4603348 (“Plaintiffs’ claims and/or causes of action are barred, in
whole or in part, because the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege irrevocably prejudices the Honeywell Defendants’ ability to defend themselves.”).
139
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at i, McGee v. Arkel,
No. 08-4707 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5366105.
140
Id.
141
See id. at iv (“KBR claims that the state secret doctrine applies as a defense to
this action, citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). However, there is no
doubt that proper electric grounding, generators, and power washers do not involve
issues of national security.”). The Army’s public report of the incident, as well as Congress’s public investigation, helped strengthen the plaintiffs’ contentions. Id. (citing
Deficient Electrical Systems at U.S. Facilities in Iraq: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform)).
142
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Sever and Dismiss the German
Plaintiffs’ Claims Pursuant to the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens at 3, Tichenor v.
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143

secrets as an affirmative defense. A Texas district court subsequently
deemed Honeywell to have asserted its Norwood state secrets defense in
144
that lawsuit as well.
2. Infrastructure and Services
The integration of PMCs into military operations means that contractors are now providing a broad array of services that have become
the subject of tort allegations. Indeed, one of the companies claiming
that state secrets are at stake most frequently is KBR, which received
145
nearly $5 billion in government contracts in fiscal year 2007 alone.
The base operations and facilities management branch of KBR’s government and defense market delivers on-demand logistical support
services to national security clients across the full military mission
146
cycle. This includes taking out the trash.

Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 09-00014 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 2007) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s
Opposition in Tichenor], 2007 WL 6211225.
143
Norwood v. Raytheon Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
144
Plaintiff’s Opposition in Tichenor, supra note 142, at 15 (“Presumably, Defendants will raise those same defenses against all plaintiffs in these actions.”). At defendants’ request, the case had been removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas. Id. at 3-4. Fort Bliss, located in El Paso, is home to the U.S. Army Air
Defense Artillery Center and School and serves as the worldwide headquarters for
training soldiers on the Nike and HAWK missile systems. Id. at 2-3. The Texas court
downplayed the state secrets claim to the degree that it implicated the political question doctrine:
Plaintiffs’ claims involve radar systems acquired during the Cold War, but
American military strategy is not implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims on the face of
the pleadings. . . . [A]ny analysis by the court of the American military’s use of
the radar systems would not involve inquiries into rules of engagement, reactions of United States servicemen during combat, or any information that Defendants contend is protected by the state secrets privilege.
Norwood, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
145
Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). Court documents
similarly report that the company received billions of dollars in no-bid contracts in fiscal year 2003 for work in Iraq. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint & Jury
Demand at 2-3, McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (No. 080186), 2009 WL 3253907; Defendants’ First Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 1-2, 9, McManaway, 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (No. 08-0186), 2009 WL 108453;
Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, McManaway, 695 F. Supp. 2d 883
(No. 08-0186), 2008 WL 5110377.
146
Base Operations / Facilities Management, KBR, http://www.kbr.com/Markets/
Government-and-Defense/Base-Operations-Facilities-Management (last visited Sept. 15,
2010); see also Infrastructure & Minerals, KBR, http://www.kbr.com/About/BusinessUnits/Infrastructure-and-Minerals (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
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Early in the war effort, millions of dollars went to KBR to dispose of
147
waste on bases and camps in Iraq and Afghanistan. The company allegedly said that it would minimize safety risks, environmental impact,
148
It then allegedly took tractors and indiscrimiand smoke exposure.
nately pushed waste (e.g., trucks, tires, lithium batteries, Styrofoam, paper, petroleum-oil lubricating products, metals, hydraulic fluids, munitions boxes, medical waste, biohazard materials such as corpses and ananimal carcasses, medical supplies used during smallpox inoculations,
latrine waste, paints, solvents, asbestos insulation, pesticides, dangerous
chemicals, and plastic water bottles) into massive trenches and burned
149
The resulting flames reportedly extended hundreds of feet into
it.
the sky, burning blue, green, and other colors, with thick black and
150
white smoke frequently filling nearby bases and living quarters.
In May 2009, soldiers and others deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan brought a class action lawsuit, claiming injury from the toxic
151
smoke, ash, and fumes. Symptoms ranged from burning eyes, sharp
pain in the lungs, and lesions in the nostrils, to upper respiratory con152
KBR
gestion and infections, headaches, and loss of consciousness.
claimed state secrets as an affirmative defense “to the extent that clas153
The company further stated that it
sified information is involved.”
147

Complaint at 4, Brister v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00097 (D. Alaska May 18, 2009),
2009 WL 1499260.
148
Id. In their answer, Defendants admitted only that KBR, pursuant to its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III contract with the U.S. Army,
provides a number of essential services to support the United States Army in
its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including assistance with some
aspects of waste disposal at some U.S. military bases and camps in Afghanistan.
All waste disposal work performed by KBRSI under the LOGCAP III contract
is done pursuant to contractual and regulatory requirements and under the
supervision and control of the United States Army.
Defendants’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Brister, No.
09-00097 (D. Alaska June 5, 2009) [hereinafter Defendants’ Answer in Brister], 2009
WL 1642730.
149
Complaint, supra note 147, at 4.
150
Id. at 5-6.
151
Id. at 1-2; Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 4, Cain v. KBR, Inc.,
No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2009), 2009 WL 1632528; Notice of Removal at 2-4,
Cain, No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 1632118; Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition at 2, Cain, No. 09-00435 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 1632117; Notice
of Removal at 3-4, Massman v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-0117 (D. Wyo. May 29, 2009), 2009
WL 3150062; Notice of Removal at 2-4, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00094 (E.D.N.C. May
29, 2009), 2009 WL 2441836; Notice of Removal at 2-4, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 0900237 (E.D.N.C. May 29, 2009), 2009 WL 2441839.
152
Complaint, supra note 147, at 7-8.
153
Defendants’ Answer in Brister, supra note 148, at 14.
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was immune from all claims “stemming from the performance of official, discretionary duties pursuant to contracts with the United States
to provide essential support services to the United States military in
154
Iraq and Afghanistan.”
In addition to providing direct support to military bases, KBR also
helps to build infrastructure. The company has claimed state secrets in
this domain as well. One suit has been brought against it for disregarding and downplaying the danger of site contamination by sodium dichromate, a toxic chemical used “as an anti-corrosive and containing
155
nearly pure hexavalent chromium” at a water plant in Iraq. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services lists this hexavalent chro156
Accordmium (Chromium(VI) or Cr(VI)) as a known carcinogen.
ing to the Centers for Disease Control, an increased risk of lung cancer
has been demonstrated in workers exposed to Cr(VI) compounds.
Other adverse health effects associated with Cr(VI) exposure include:
“dermal irritation, skin ulceration, allergic contact dermatitis, occupational asthma, nasal irritation and ulceration, perforated nasal septa,
rhinitis, nosebleed, respiratory irritation, nasal cancer, sinus cancer,
eye irritation and damage, perforated eardrums, kidney damage, liver
damage, pulmonary congestion and edema, epigastric pain, and ero157
In June 2008, congressional
sion and discoloration of the teeth.”
hearings drew attention to KBR’s apparent efforts to mask the contin158
In February 2010, the
ued contamination of its work site in Iraq.
159
court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.
154

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1988) and Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292
(1988)).
155
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 3, McManaway v. KBR,
Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (No. 08-0186).
156
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT:
CHROMIMUM (2008), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp7-c1-b.pdf (stating inhalation of chromium(VI)
has been shown to cause lung cancer, exposure to chromium(VI) in drinking water has
been correlated with an increase in stomach tumors, and laboratory experiments have
shown chromium(VI) to cause tumors in the stomach, intestinal tract, and lungs).
157
Hexavalent Chromimum, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/hexchrom (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (“The
NIOSH 1988 testimony to OSHA on the air contaminants standard recommended that
all Cr(VI) compounds, regardless of their degree of solubility in water, be considered
occupational carcinogens.”).
158
See, e.g., The Exposure at Qarmat Ali: Contractor Misconduct and the Safety of U.S.
Troops in Iraq, Hearing Before the S. Democratic Policy Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (featuring witnesses describing how KBR exposed contractors, workers, and soldiers to sodium dichromate, a poentially deadly chemical).
159
McManaway, 695 F. Supp. at 896.
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Like other government contractors, KBR has claimed state secrets
even in cases seemingly insulated from actual hostilities. For example,
on March 10, 2004, Texas resident Lonnie Amason and a KBR driver
(whose identity is not provided in court records) were both driving
nonmilitary vehicles when they had a car accident in Baghdad’s Green
Zone at the intersection of the road to the Al Rashid Hotel and the
160
road to the North Gate. Arguing for removal to a federal court, KBR
claimed the following as colorable federal defenses: government contractor defense, the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort
161
Claims Act, the political question doctrine, separation of powers, and
162
the state secrets doctrine.
KBR’s claim to state secrets as an affirma163
tive defense echoes in numerous other cases against the company.
3. Conduct of War
The subject matter of state secrets cases varies: in addition to personal injury suits that show a broad range of contractor involvement
in national security (e.g., designing, maintaining, and operating aircraft, supplying missile systems, providing communications equipment, generating electricity, manufacturing radar equipment, disposing of waste at overseas bases, and building water plants), there are
also tort claims based on contractors’ involvement in what can best be
understood as the actual conduct of war. Two observations follow:
first, the growing military role of PMCs creates tension between ordinary soldiers and contractors. Thus, U.S. soldiers are now lodging
suits complaining of failures in base security, the operation of supply
convoys, and the like. Second, the involvement of contractors in the
conduct of war has placed contractors in positions traditionally filled
by the military, such as conducting counternarcotics missions, trans160

Motion to Remand at 2, Amason v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., No. 05-03029
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2005), 2005 WL 3133922.
161
28 U.S.C. § 2680( j) (2006).
162
Motion to Remand, supra note 160, at 6.
163
See, e.g., Defendants’ Answer in Brister, supra note 148, at 14; Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 151, at 13; Notice of Removal, Cain v. KBR,
Inc., supra note 151, at 15; Notice of Removal, Massman v. KBR, Inc., supra note 151, at
19; Notice of Removal, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00094, supra note 151, at 15; Notice
of Removal, Ochs v. KBR, Inc., No. 09-00237, supra note 151, at 15; Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, supra note 139, at xxiii-xxiv; Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at 23-25, McGee v. Arkel Int’l, LLC, No. 08-2709 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3,
2008), 2008 WL 4499471; Defendant Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Memorandum in Support Thereof, Lessin v. Kellogg
Brown & Root at 8 n.2, No. 05-01853 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Motion to
Dismiss in Lessin], 2005 WL 3663857.
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ferring prisoners, and interrogating suspects—arguably with neither
the oversight and discipline developed by the state, nor the legal protections traditionally extended to soldiers on the battlefield. Civilian
claims against PMCs are thus emerging. In all of these cases, corporations claim state secrets as a colorable federal defense, often obtaining
advantages even in the absence of federal corroboration.
One of the services provided by Halliburton, for instance, is base
security. On December 21, 2004, a suicide bomber detonated explosives in the mess tent on Forward Operating Base Marez in Mosul,
164
Iraq. Survivors of Allan Keith Smith, one of the soldiers who died in
165
the explosion, brought suit against Halliburton. Defendants, based in
166
part on their colorable federal defenses, successfully petitioned for
removal from the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Harris County,
167
Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
168
Supply convoys present a similar situation. On March 26, 2004,
for instance, a military escort assigned to provide security accompanied a supply convoy allegedly controlled and operated by KBR and
was traveling along one of the principal supply routes into and out of
169
Iraq. En route to Kuwait, one of the trucks had an equipment mal-

164

Notice of Removal at 1-2, Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. 06-00462 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 10, 2006), 2006 WL 520176.
165
Id.
166
Such defenses included the state secrets doctrine, the government contractor
defense, the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680( j) (2006), the political question doctrine, and the Defense Production Act of
1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C app. §§ 2061–2172)). Notice of Removal, supra note 164, at 1-2.
167
Notice of Removal, supra note 164, at 1-2.
168
See, e.g., Complaint for Wrongful Death Damages, Estate Damages and Punitive
Damages, Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (M.D. Ga.
2006) (No. 05-00078), 2005 WL 2303546. In April 2004, a soldier serving in the
Second Armored Calvary Regiment of the U.S. Army in Iraq was escorting trucks
owned and operated by KBR on their return from Al Kut, Iraq, to the Convoy Support
Center in Scania, Iraq. Id. at 3. As the convoy approached a bridge over the Tigris
River, one of KBR’s drivers lost control of the truck and went over the edge of the
bridge, setting off a violent explosion as the truck fell. Id. at 5. Marquis A. Whitaker
was operating a U.S. Army escort vehicle behind the truck and immediately stopped,
but another KBR truck hit him from behind, causing his vehicle to teeter precariously
on the edge of the bridge. Id. at 5-6. During his attempt to extricate himself from the
vehicle, Whitaker fell off the bridge into the aqueduct and drowned. Id. at 6. In July
2005, his surviving heirs brought a wrongful death suit. Id. at 10. KBR asserted state
secrets, as well as the political question doctrine; the court later dismissed the case as
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. Whitaker, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
169
Motion to Dismiss in Lessin, supra note 163, at 6.

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

The Shadow of State Secrets

117
170

function on its loading ramp and was forced to stop.
The military
secured the perimeter and Sergeant Sean Lessin, a member of the
U.S. Army’s Bravo Battery, tried to help. The ramp assist arm struck
171
and injured him, requiring him to be evacuated by Army helicopter.
172
In May 2005, Lessin and his wife sued KBR for negligence. In its defense, KBR stated that the case was nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine and was preempted by federal law interpreting the
173
“combatant activities” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The company expressly reserved the right to claim that state secrets
were at stake:
[A]ny further prosecution or defense of this case may trigger the protections of the state secrets privilege because classified information may
have been implicated regarding the supply needs of the United States
military, its procedures for intelligence gathering and threat assessment,
and its rules and protocols regarding force protection provided to civi174
lian contractors.

In other words, the company was not actually claiming that classified information was implicated—merely that it might arise in the future, thus presenting a bar to discovery or preventing the case from
moving forward altogether. On the one hand, the inclusion of the
reference may be seen as a good-faith effort to provide the court with
notice of the issues that may arise. On the other hand, the manner in
which such an executive privilege enters into private litigation, and
the potential chilling effect of such statements on the progress of such
suits, are equally relevant.
State secrets cases over the past eight years also include tort suits
brought by nonmilitary personnel for contractor behavior related to the
conduct of war. DynCorp International’s work in offering major programs in law enforcement training and support, security services, base
operations, aviation, contingency operations and logistics support to
further “U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives” provides a
175
Its predecessor, Land-Air, Inc., began by providing
prime example.
teams of technicians to maintain aircraft. On its website, the company
170

Id.
Id. The Army subsequently barred military convoy escort personnel from operating or repairing civilian vehicles absent direct command. Id.
172
Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint at 2-3, Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. 051853 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2005), 2005 WL 1512296.
173
28 U.S.C. § 2680( j) (2006).
174
Motion to Dismiss in Lessin, supra note 163, at 8 n.2.
175
Overview, DYNCORP INT’L, http://www.dyn-intl.com/overview.aspx (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010).
171
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boasts that it has now “broadened its reach” and has “recruited, trained,
and deployed more than 6,000” soldiers to eleven countries, including
176
FurtherAfghanistan and Iraq, for the U.S. Department of State.
more, the company provides “logistics and contingency support to the
U.S. military around the world,” including major contract task orders in
Afghanistan and Kuwait to augment U.S. Army logistics capabilities, as
177
It also
well as support for African Union peacekeepers in Somalia.
maintains more than 300 intelligence professionals within the United
178
States and operates “on all continents except Antarctica.”
DynCorp has at times found itself the focus of public attention. In
2009 the company terminated one of its senior vice presidents, who also served as the company’s chief compliance officer, following disclosures that the firm had bribed officials through its subcontractors to
“expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from
foreign government agencies”—potentially violating the Foreign Cor179
rupt Practices Act. The company has been implicated in sex crimes,
including trafficking girls as young as twelve years old and running
180
prostitution rackets, as well as engaging in the illegal arms trade. Ac176

Id.
See Contingency Operations, DYNCORP INT’L, 1 (Feb. 2010), http://www.dynintl.com/media/5585/dy376_dy322_033010_somalia_casestudy_2pg.pdf (detailing how
DynCorp equipped, deployed, sustained, and trained all African Union peacekeepers
as part of its service to U.S. Department of State); Press Release, DynCorp Int’l, DynCorp International Awarded New LOGCAP IV Task Order for Southern Afghanistan
Support ( July 8, 2009) (announcing that the U.S. Army awarded DynCorp a new task
order to provide existing Afghanistan bases with operations and maintenance support); Press Release, DynCorp Int’l, DynCorp International Has $77 Million LOGCAP
IV Task Order in Kuwait (Feb. 18, 2009) (stating that the U.S. Army Sustainment
Command awarded a task order to make DynCorp responsible for movement control
operations and management of logistics and facilities needed for U.S. military personnel arriving in and departing Kuwait).
178
Overview, supra note 175. For more information on the history of DynCorp International, see KEN SILVERSTEIN, PRIVATE WARRIORS 182-87 (2000), which describes DynCorp as “a hydra-headed firm” involved in state matters in Africa and South America.
179
DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 19 (Nov. 12, 2009); see
also August Cole, DynCorp Fires Executive Counsel, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28–29, 2009, at B5
(reporting the termination of DynCorp’s senior vice president, executive counsel, and
chief compliance officer shortly after the firm disclosed that subcontractors may have
broken U.S. law).
180
See OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS, DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF DOD EFFORTS TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING
IN PERSONS: PHASE II—BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter
OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS], available at
http://www.dodig.mil/fo/foia/HT-Phase_II.pdf (investigating claims of human trafficking of underage women and a pornographic videotape that appeared to document
a rape by DynCorp employees); see also Mary Alice Robbins, RICO Used in Wrongful177
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cording to congressional reports, the contractor overcharged the gov181
ernment in providing much-needed fuel in Iraq. The company also
reportedly cut corners with regard to vital national security staffing, assigning “waitresses, security guards, cooks, and cashiers” to maintain
182
In a seventy-page amended complaint, a previous
combat aircraft.
employee alleged ten company schemes, several of which involved
183
many subschemes, to defraud the U.S. government.
DynCorp, on behalf of the U.S. government, also runs counter184
narcotics operations in South America.
On September 11, 2001, a

Termination Suit, TEX. LAW., Apr. 2, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WLNR 12941467 (reporting a suit by a DynCorp whistleblower alleging DynCorp employees purchased
women and girls from Serbian Mafia members who brought them into Bosnia from
other Eastern European countries); Robert Capps, Sex-Slave Whistle-Blowers Vindicated,
SALON.COM, (Aug. 6, 2002), http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/08/06/
dyncorp/index.html (recounting that a tribunal in the U.K. vindicated a whistleblower
of the DynCorp Bosnia sex trade by ruling in her favor).
181
See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, JANURARY QUARTERLY AND SEMIANNUAL REPORT 21 (2005), available at http://www.sigir.mil/
files/quarterlyreports/January2005/Report_-_January_2005.pdf (estimating that DynCorp may have overcharged the government by as much as $600,000, with a potential
additional claim of $85,000).
182
P. W. SINGER, supra note 58, at 156.
183
The ten schemes were:
seeking double reimbursement for travel expenses; seeking reimbursement
for inflated or unearned per diem, danger pay, and post differential allowances; charging the Government for services without verifying documentation,
such as time cards; seeking reimbursement for employee living expenses such
as cable television and lawn services that were not payable under the INLEA
Contract; failing to return relocation expenses advanced by the Government
when employees did not relocate or resigned shortly after relocating; failing to
return payroll expenses advanced by the Government but never paid by Dyncorp; seeking reimbursement for severance payments and associated attorneys’ fees, which were not payable under the INLEA Contract; seeking reimbursement for employee expenses without supporting documentation;
seeking reimbursement for compensation to unapproved employees; charging
the Government for purported expenses that were actually embezzled by a
Dyncorp employee, and failing to reimburse the Government upon discovering the embezzlement; and seeking reimbursement for a variety of other general expenses either not earned or not permitted under the INLEA Contracts,
including double-charging for vacation pay, seeking reimbursement for rental
car damages that were paid by an insurance company, and seeking reimbursement for employees’ personal travel and cell phone expenses.
United States ex rel. Longest v. DynCorp, No. 03-0816, 2006 WL 47791, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 9, 2006).
184
See Defendants’ Answer at 1, Quinteros v. DynCorp, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330
(D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-01042), 2007 WL 4459753 (admitting that the company had
“acted pursuant to its contracts with the United States government to assist with the
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class action lawsuit on behalf of 10,000 citizens of Ecuador was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against DynCorp
185
The complaint alleged personal inand several previous affiliates.
jury, property damage, and wrongful death resulting from DynCorp’s
fumigation of crops in Colombia and adjacent land in Ecuador.
Four more lawsuits relating to the same underlying allegations followed on December 4, 2006, December 29, 2006, March 14, 2007, and
186
April 24, 2007.
Three of these suits, filed on behalf of three Ecuadorian provinces, alleged violations of Ecuadorian law, international
law, and Florida state statutory and common law, including negligence, trespass, and nuisance; the fourth case, filed on behalf of 1663
citizens of the Ecuadorian provinces of Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos,
alleged personal injury, negligence, trespass, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violations of the Alien Tort
187
188
Claims Act, and violations of international law. DynCorp claimed
as its fifth defense that it may not be able to defend itself in the suit
“based on the U.S. government’s claims of confidentiality or ‘military
and state secrets’ regarding documents that are necessary to prove the
defendants’ lack of responsibility or culpability for the claims made
189
against them in this suit.” The court consolidated the four suits on
May 22, 2007, and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for
190
the District of Columbia.
In DynCorp’s Quarterly Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2007, the company explained
why it would not be held accountable for its actions: “The spraying
aerial eradication of coca and poppy plants in the Republic of Colombia”); see also
DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 9.
187
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
188
Consolidated Complaint at 14, Quinteros, 677 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. 07-1042),
2007 WL 4459752; see also DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 16.
189
Defendants’ Answer, supra note 184, at 16.
190
Consolidated Complaint, supra note 188, at 1-2. The same set of facts gave rise
to Province of Sucumbios v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, No. 06-61926 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 27,
2006) and Province of Esmeraldas v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, No. 07-60311 (S.D. Fla. filed
Mar. 5, 2007). These two cases were consolidated into No. 06-61760 on May 18, 2008.
Later, Quinteros v. DynCorp Aerospace Operations LLC, No. 06-61760 (S.D. Fla. filed
Nov. 21, 2006) and Province of Carchi, Republic of Ecuador v. DynCorp Aerospace
Operations LLC, No. 07-60550 (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 17, 2007) were consolidated into
No. 06-61760 on September 15, 2010. Province of Carchi, No. 07-60550, at 2-3 (S.D. Fla.
May 18, 2007) (order consolidating the actions and administratively closing case number 07-60550); Defendants’ Answer, supra note 184, at 1; see also DynCorp Int’l LLC,
Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10.
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operations were and continue to be conducted under a DoS [State
Department] contract in cooperation with the Colombian government. The terms of the DoS contract provide that the DoS will indemnify the company against third-party liabilities arising out of the
191
contract, subject to certain limitations.”
Among the most prominent of the state secrets suits are those centered on coercive interrogation and rendition. While much of the focus has been on suits lodged against the executive branch and successive administrations’ stance on the privilege, precious little attention
has been paid to such suits as a species of private indemnity. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, five plaintiffs alleged that the company
logged flight plans for the so-called “extraordinary rendition” of suspects to third countries, where they were tortured and held without
192
193
charge. Plaintiffs filed suit on May 30, 2007. Unusually, the United
States moved to intervene in the case in October 2007—before Jeppe194
CIA Director General Michael
sen even answered the complaint.
195
The district
Hayden then submitted declarations of state secrets.
court, following an in camera, ex parte review of the classified version,
concluded that the very subject matter of the suit represented a state
196
In January 2009, the Obama Adsecret, thus warranting dismissal.
ministration issued an executive order to ensure that the interrogation
191

DynCorp Int’l LLC, Quarterly Report, supra note 179, at 10.
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2009),
amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th
Cir. 2009), rev’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
193
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129-30 (N.D. Cal.
2008), rev’d, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th
Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
194
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 07-02798, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb 13, 2008)
(order granting the United States’ motion to intervene and granting the United States’
motion to dismiss with prejudice); Civil Minutes, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d
1128 (No. 07-02798); Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 7, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2008 WL 273865; Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposition to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 19, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL
4438281; Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene at 2, Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F.
Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL 3194319; Notice of Motion and Motion to Dimiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by the United States of America at 2,
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 07-02798), 2007 WL 3223297.
195
See Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d at 999 (stating that Hayden filed two declarations in support of the motion to dismiss, one of which was classified and the other
public).
196
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1132, 1136.
192
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of individuals held by the United States be conducted in a manner
197
consistent with the Geneva Conventions. The document went on to
create a special task force to study rendition, with the purposes of
ensur[ing] that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in
the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise
for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the
commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane
198
treatment of individuals in its custody or control.

While it is important to distinguish between interrogation, rendition, and extraordinary rendition, these and other steps taken by the
new Administration signaled a shift in U.S. policy away from transfer199
Leon
ring prisoners to other countries for coercive interrogation.
Panetta, moreover, subsequently stated during his confirmation hearings for CIA Director that he would no longer engage in extraordinary
200
rendition, as it had been outlawed by executive order. Nevertheless,
the Obama Administration maintained its stance that the Jeppesen suit
centered on a state secret and should not be allowed to proceed.
201
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.
Judge Hawkins,
writing for the panel, held that the suit was not barred under either
Totten or Reynolds, that classification alone did not compel a finding of
state secrets, and that the case should be allowed to proceed with state

197

See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 ( Jan. 27, 2009) (prohibiting “violence to life and person” and “[o]utrages upon personal dignity . . . whenever
such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility
owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States”).
198
Id. at 4895; see also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901, 4901 ( Jan. 27,
2009) (creating a special task force to review lawful options with respect to the detention and transfer of individuals apprehended in armed conflict and counterterrorism
operations consistent with national security and foreign policy interests).
199
A U.S. Department of Justice Press Release in August 2009 stated that the United States would continue to send suspects to third-party countries after obtaining assurances that the prisoners would be treated humanely and after securing the ability to
periodically monitor their individual situations. See Daphne Eviatar, Commission Inquiry
into Rendition May Rankle Obama Administration, WASH. INDEPENDENT, Aug. 27,
2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/56888/commission-inquiry-into-renditionmay-rankle-obama-administration (comparing the Obama Administration’s approach to
that of the Bush Administration and suggesting that the Department of Justice Press Release indicates the Obama Administration may be resistant to an inquiry into rendition).
200
Editorial, Not Even a Little Torture, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A24.
201
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended
and superseded by 579 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2009), rev’d, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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202

secrets treated as an evidentiary rule, not a justiciability doctrine.
On December 15, 2009, the Ninth Circuit assembled en banc to re203
In a 6-5 decision, the court ruled that the five
consider the case.
plaintiffs could not use even public documents to make a case that the
204
company played a pivotal role in the rendition program.
Judge
Raymond Fisher, writing for the majority, suggested that the executive
branch could make reparations to the five men—or the legislature
could open an investigation, pass a private bill, or introduce remedial
205
legislation. But the judiciary’s hands were tied.
Jeppesen is not the only case to challenge the role of private contractors in the exercise of interrogation. On June 30, 2008, an Iraqi
filed a complaint against CACI International, L-3 Services (formerly
Titan Corporation), and Timothy Dugan, formerly employed as a
screener and interrogator for CACI International, in the U.S. District
206
Court for Ohio, Southern District, Eastern Division.
The plaintiff
alleged repeated torture at the hands of defendants (including electric shock, beatings, food deprivation, sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, extreme temperature exposure, forced nakedness, stress
207
positions, and death threats) while imprisoned in Abu Ghraib. The
suit centered on violations of domestic and international law, with
counts including cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; torture;
war crimes; assault and battery; sexual assault and battery; intentional
infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring and supervision; and
208
civil conspiracy, as well as aiding and abetting to many of the same.
The court granted the defendant’s motion to change venue in August
2008, at which point the case was transferred to the Eastern District of
209
The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff’s claims
Virginia.
against L-3 and Dugan without prejudice, accepting an amended

202

Id. at 1004-07.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1070.
204
See id. at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“[Plaintiffs] are not even allowed to
attempt to prove their case by the use of nonsecret evidence in their own hands or in
the hands of third parties.”).
205
Id. at 1091-92 (majority opinion); see also Laura K. Donohue, State Secrets: Contractors’ Easy Out, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2010, at A19.
206
Civil Complaint and Jury Demand at 1-3, Al Shimari v. Dugan, No. 08-0637
(S.D. Ohio June 30, 2008).
207
Id. at 4-5.
208
Id. at 16-29.
209
Al Shimari, No. 08-0637 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2008) (order granting transfer of
venue).
203
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complaint on September 15, 2008.
The case, which continued
against CACI, is currently on appeal following partial denial of CACI’s
motion to dismiss.
As of the time of writing, although CACI has claimed protection
under the state secrets privilege, the Department of Defense has
211
represented that it does not intend to intervene.
Nevertheless, the
case illustrates how uneasily the PMC phenomenon sits within the
current law. Had the contractors been troops enlisted in service of
the U.S. government, and had the state come forward to claim the
state secrets privilege, the court’s hands would be tied. However, it is
not at all clear how the court should treat a similar assertion from a
private corporation—nor is it clear how, exactly, international law
could be applied to a private actor:
THE COURT: You want me to go way down the road on this, and I’m
trying to understand how do I instruct the jury on such a thing. . . .
....
. . . [T]he soldier would be absolutely immune if the government
came forward and asserted immunity.
[ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]: That’s correct, Your Honor. And in
the same way, what they’re asking for here basically is to put themselves
in the shoes of the soldiers. And they’re not allowed to be in the shoes
of the soldiers for a couple reasons. They’re corporate employees who
had a contractual duty to obey the law. And the United States, the military, has not intervened. . . .
....
The military has also represented that it does not intend to invoke
the state secrets. So what you’re really dealing with here is you’re dealing with a group of people, some of whom are military and some of
whom are corporate employees, all of whom are bad actors in the sense
that they conspired to torture.
Now, they have different—they have different levels of immunity. . . .
But the duty, the duty is the same. They all have the same duty not to
torture.
THE COURT: Well, I don’t think that anyone disputes nor I don’t [sic]
think that CACI is saying it has any right to torture. . . .
210

Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2008) (order
dismissing claims against Dugan without prejudice); Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 20, 2008) (order dismissing claims against L-3 without prejudice); Amended
Complaint, Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 2008).
211
Transcript of Motions Hearing at 20, Al Shimari, No. 08-0827 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24,
2008).
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The more precise legal question I have today is whether the victim of
torture in a battlefield circumstances [sic] who has been detained in the
military prison can come into federal court and assert some type of tort
claim against the soldiers or the private—more precisely the private contractor who carried out the interrogation and allegedly carried out the
torture. That is the legal question. . . .
....
. . . [T]he claim here is one of some type of negligence of some sort,
and I don’t know what that is. I mean, I know that it violates Geneva
Convention and the law. You shouldn’t torture people. But what is the
duty here? . . .
....
. . . [M]y question has to do with the government contractors who are
interrogators or others who are breaking the law by torturing people in a
battle zone in a military prison whether such a case has been brought to
trial in federal court.
....
Why shouldn’t a government contractor who has been engaged to
carry on a government function which is interrogation of detainees in a
military detention be held immunized from suit as if they were soldiers?
212
Aren’t they soldiers in all but uniform?

Indeed, why shouldn’t government contractors, fulfilling the same
functions as soldiers, benefit from the same legal protections? The
question is whether contractors would thus be subject to the same mil213
itary rules which, in the absence of civil penalties, apply to soldiers.
The case also brings out the difficult position in which a court
confronted with such cases finds itself.
[ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]: [P]erhaps on your precise question
as to whether a government contractor has been brought to a jury, the
answer to that I believe is no.

212

Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 211, at 19-23, 31.
In 2006, Congress amended one of the jurisdictional provisions of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2006), to extend jurisdiction over “persons
accompanying the armed forces in the field” to include both contingency operations and
declared wars. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109 -364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)).
The change could allow courts-martial jurisdiction to reach contractors. There is some
question as to whether this provision would survive judicial review. See Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 3, 39-41 (1957) (holding that the military could not try the civilian wife of a soldier under military jurisdiction for the murder of her husband, which occurred on a military base). Appellate review of this authority has yet to occur.
213
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THE COURT: So I would be the first district judge in America to allow
such a claim to go forward?
[ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The first out of 1,236 district judges to let it go forward?
[ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS]: Your Honor, Judge Robertson in the
District of Columbia just a few miles across the river was letting it go forward. It’s up on appeal, but he let it go forward. . . .
THE COURT: I know Judge Robertson. I would follow his opinion if I
thought that it was judicially sound. And it may be in a D.C. Circuit.
I’m in the Fourth Circuit and as you know, we’ve had Hamdi and several other cases involving Moussaoui where this circuit is really conservative and they are, you know, very expansive in their view of what the government can do particularly in a wartime and a battlefield.
District judges around here have been beaten down three or four
times involving those issues. It’s only been the Supreme Court that
stood up and said well, wait a minute in Hamdi, the right of habeas corpus does apply on the battlefield to people detained here.
So, I’m in a Fourth Circuit circumstance where I’ve got to be very
thoughtful about how I do this. And so, if I’m going to do this, this one
214
sentence from Judge Robertson’s opinion is not going to help me.

The application of international law to contractors involved in
hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq raises novel questions. Courts appear uneasy about being the first to forge into such new territory.
Additional suits against CACI, alleging torture, are working their
215
way through the courts. These and other cases demonstrate the dif214

Id. at 24-26.
In June 2004, a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006), the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. Constitution, and common law torts was brought against Titan Corporation, CACI International, and contractors at Abu Ghraib. Class Action Alleging Violations of RICO, Conspiracy to Violate RICO, Violations of the Alien Tort Claims Act, Violations of the Geneva
Convention, Violations of the United States Constitution, Violations of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and Common Law Torts at 1, Al Rawi v.
Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (No. 04-1143), 2004 WL 2545652.
The complaint stated,
215

Defendants contracted with the United States to provide interrogation and
other related intelligence services. Instead of providing such services in a lawful manner, they conspired with each other and with certain United States
government officials to direct and conduct a scheme to torture, rape, and, in
some instances, summarily execute Plaintiffs.
Id. Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against the conduct, compensatory and
punitive damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees under RICO, declaratory relief, and
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ficulty of addressing the role of PMCs under more traditional military
216
doctrines. For the most part, these suits are still in their early stages;
it is too soon to know on which defenses the defendants will rely or
whether the Department of Defense will step in to support their state
secrets claims. These suits reflect the many different functions private
industry has assumed in national security, both in the multitude of industries implicated and the degree to which private actors now populate traditional military operations.

a permanent injunction against any future contracting with the U.S. government. Id.
In a parallel case, also brought in the Southern District of California, plaintiffs again
lodged a suit against Titan, CACI International, and others. See Saleh v. Titan Corp.,
361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (suing for alleged abuses in Iraqi prisons).
For a discussion of the relationship between these cases, see Motion to Intervene for
Purposes of Opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enjoin Pending ‘Duplicative Action’ in District of Columbia and Brief in Support Thereof at 1-3, Saleh, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (No.
04-1143), 2004 WL 2714618. The defendants in Saleh asked the court to enjoin another suit brought in the District of Columbia, Complaint, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 556 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 04-01248), 2004 WL 1773191, on the grounds that the
Ibrahim suit was duplicative and sought redress for the same harms. See Iraqi Prisoners
Fight Dismissal of Suit Against Contractors, ANDREWS LITIG. REP., Dec. 16, 2004, at 3, 3-4
(summarizing the claims in Al Rawi and the parallel litigation pursued in Ibrahim).
CACI objected that
[b]ecause most, if not all, of the evidence relating to each detainee’s arrest
and detention is likely highly sensitive and in the possession of the United
States government, it also is likely that the United States will assert a state secrets privilege to prevent discovery of these materials. . . . This is precisely the
type of wartime claim that defies resolution through the judicial process.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion of Defendants CACI
International Inc., CACI INC.-FEDERAL, and CACI N.V. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint at 15-16, Saleh, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (No. 04-01143), 2004 WL
5577919.
216
See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 454 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642-44 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(deciding whether certain actions were taken by the Army or the private military contractor), rev’d sub nom. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 568 (5th Cir. 2008). Some
suits have been dismissed on the grounds that they raise nonjusticiable political questions. See, e.g., Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. 06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *5-6 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (“Even if defendants had some responsibility for implementing
force protection measures promulgated by the military, the court would still be called
upon to examine the military’s decision-making in many respects . . . .”); Whitaker v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (finding that
“no judicially discoverable and manageable standards” existed to resolve the questions
presented). But not all such suits have come out this way, as PMC cases often sit uneasily in the Baker analysis. See, e.g., Lane, 529 F.3d at 568 (“It appears . . . that these tortbased claims of civilian employees against their civilian employers can be separated from
the political questions that loom so large in the background.”); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 228 (1962) (“[T]he nonjusticiability of claims resting on the Guaranty Clause which
arises from their embodiment of questions that were thought ‘political’ can have no bearing upon the justiciability of the equal protection claim presented in this case.”).
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Two final points are left to make about these contractor cases.
First, in many of them, defendants answered complaints by claiming
state secrets as an affirmative defense well before—and often in the
absence of—the government intervening and formally invoking the
privilege. But as seen in the foregoing examples, and by the amount
of time such suits take to work their way through the courts, the specter of state secrets may play a significant role. The mere assertion of
state secrets by a government contractor may help to get a suit removed to federal court, at which point lengthy delays may ensue as
the contractor, either unable or unwilling to pressure the government
to provide enough information even to sustain the state secrets claim,
draws out the suit.
Second, the effect of companies claiming that state secrets are at
stake in one suit may have important carryover effects on the immediate suit and in parallel, related actions—even without the state formally intervening and invoking the privilege. On September 11, 2004,
for example, a Hellenic Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter crashed in217
Three years later, the survivors of four Greek
to the Aegean Sea.
passengers who died in the accident brought suit in Cook County, Il218
The following day, the plaintiffs
linois, alleging product liability.
filed a virtually identical complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
219
Boeing removed the case to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on the grounds
of federal officer removal and federal jurisdiction arising from the
220
Death on the High Seas Act; it then filed a motion to transfer the
case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the two cases could
221
be consolidated. In doing so, Boeing again claimed both a government contractor and a state secrets privilege defense.
Boeing invokes the State Secrets Privilege. The CH-47D helicopter is the
United States Army’s primary multi-mission, heavy-lift transport helicopter, providing tactical and combat support for armed forces at wartime.
The CH-47D helicopter is also a key combat support tool for the Hellenic Army’s armed forces. Furthermore, the crash of the subject helicopter
occurred while members of the Hellenic Army were transporting a
number of high officials of the Greek Orthodox Church, including Petros VII, the Patriarch of the Church. Some information relevant to is217

Defendant The Boeing Company’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand
at 1, Papapetrou v. Boeing Co., No. 07-5862 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2007), 2007 WL 4874802.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (2006).
221
Id. at 1-2.
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sues herein may, therefore, be state secrets about which the United
States and/or Greek Governments may assert privilege, thereby impair222
ing Boeing’s ability to defend itself herein.

Honeywell International, also named as a defendant in the suit,
223
similarly raised state secrets as an affirmative defense.
And Boeing
224
again raised state secrets as a defense in a parallel suit.
C. State Secrets as a Litigation Strategy
The contractor cases suggest that we are just now starting to see
lawsuits coming out of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that we should
expect to see more of them in the years ahead, and that private corporations are counting on the government to intervene on their behalf.
225
For many of these suits, it is too early to know what will happen.
Thus far, at least, the executive seems to have adopted a conservative
222

Defendant The Boeing Company’s Notice of Removal at 5, Papapetrou, No. 075892 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 4874834 (citations omitted).
223
Answer of Honeywell International Inc. to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 13, Papapetrou, No. 07-5892 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2007), 2007 WL 3232423.
224
See The Boeing Company’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at Law at 10, Nolan
Law Grp. v. Boeing Co., No. 09-8056 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009) (stating as the sixth
affirmative defense: “The Complaint, and each purported cause of action therein, may
be barred, in whole or in part, if either the United States Government or the Greek
Government invokes the state’s secrets privilege to preclude production of information
necessary to Boeing’s defense or to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case.”); see also Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Kerwood v. Lear Siegler Servs., No. 05-61790 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 3522813 (alleging a helicopter crash on November 23, 2003);
Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Smith’s Aerospace LLC to Second
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Kerwood, No. 05-61790 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 3791283 (claiming a denial of due process if the United States
invokes the state secrets privilege to limit discovery). The state secrets privilege was
similarly asserted in a sister suit. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant
Smith’s Aerospace LLC to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, LaPointe-Plumhoff v. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., No. 05-61791 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2006),
2006 WL 424023 (“Invocation of the state secrets privilege by the United States government will preclude SMITHS from obtaining full and necessary discovery, and thereby result in a denial of due process.”).
225
Many more cases, ripe for state secrets assertions, loom on the horizon. For
example, on September 9, 2007, Blackwater employees opened fire in Al Wathba
Square, Baghdad, killing unarmed civilians in an incident described in the complaint
as merely “one episode in a lengthy pattern of egregious misconduct by Xe-Blackwater
acting in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world.” Complaint at 4, In re Xe Servs.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009) (No. 09-00616), 2009 WL
2390908. This case was one of five similar claims brought against the company, alleging
violation of the Alien Tort Statute and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act—suits consolidated for purposes of discovery and retrial motions. See In re Xe Servs.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 569, 573 (combining Nos. 09-0615, 09-0616, 090617, 09-0618, and 09-0645). In total, some sixty-four plaintiffs (forty-five Iraqi nationals

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

130

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

[Vol. 159: 77

approach: it only joins once it is clear that a suit is going to move forward, and, even then, only in a subset of cases. At the broadest level, it
appears that breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, and tort
cases centered on traditional military equipment give rise to more federal intervention than do class action torts or conduct-of-war disputes.
But hedging must accompany any such tentative conclusions, as it is
226
really too early to ascertain what the executive will do.
What does appear to be consistent is that once an administration
becomes involved and invokes the privilege, subsequent administrations hold the line. Why they do so may be important: for instance, it
may be that, in every case, the new administration scrutinizes the list
of cases it has inherited and concludes that the invocation of the privilege is valid. This explanation suggests that a merits analysis would
find little out of order in how the doctrine operates in the courts. As
a practical matter, however, this explanation is unlikely, not least because the Obama Administration appears to be the first to try to compile a list of state secrets cases. It is also highly doubtful that, over the
past seven decades, not a single case out of hundreds demonstrated
an improper invocation. Reynolds itself was based on a questionable
227
claim. More plausible explanations might point to bureaucratic inertia or the continued presence of the same civil servants that played a
key role in the earlier period. Or it may be that there is very little
downside to continuing the previous administration’s policies while,
on the other hand, there is much to gain by invoking state secrets. In
some cases, it may simply relate to agencies’ broad policies—such as
intelligence organizations’ blanket refusal to confirm or deny employment contracts—and to raise the state secrets privilege whenever
such issues reach court.
and the estates of nineteen deceased Iraqi nationals) sought damages for wrongful death
and personal injury when Blackwater contractors shot or beat them. Id. at 573-74. Thus
far, the suit has turned in large measure on the political question doctrine, but the pattern closely fits other tort clams in which the defendants assert the state secrets privilege.
226
Dozens of cases are still working their way through the courts, the outcomes of
which could significantly skew the statistics.
227
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). The declassified report later
demonstrated that the crash was caused by a fire in the aircraft’s engine. Petition for a
Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Remedy Fraud Upon This Court app. at 10a, In re Herring,
539 U.S. 940 (2003) (No. 02-0076) (Report of Special Investigation of Aircraft Accident Involving TB-29-100XX No. 45-21866). A subsequent application to the Supreme
Court for a writ of error coram nobis failed. In re Herring, 539 U.S. at 940. The case was
refiled. See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no
fraud in the government’s assertion of the privilege in 1953 on the grounds that some
of the information contained in the report, in historic context, might have compromised national security).
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Setting aside questions of justice, practical arguments militate
against the use of state secrets in regard to breach of contract and patent disputes. Under such conditions, the state secrets privilege may
prevent whistleblowers from being able to draw attention to contractors’ failure to perform. For example, in a June 4, 2001, whistleblower
qui tam action alleging that Raytheon had failed to perform on a defense contract, the Bush Administration invoked the state secrets privilege on January 15, 2003, and moved to dismiss the case, a request
228
granted on February 24, 2003. The state secrets privilege may similarly encourage contractors to engage in poor business practices with regard to subcontractors. Thus, pilots and flight crewmembers denied
promised “hazard pay” for flights into and out of Baghdad, Iraq and
Kabul, Afghanistan brought a class action lawsuit against Vision Air229
lines. The defendant in the case claimed state secrets in relation to its
230
Smaller compacontracts and payments with upstream contractors.
nies that specialize in cutting-edge technologies, moreover, may become reluctant to partner with corporations who essentially steal their
technologies and then draw the veil of state secrets over the dispute.
And larger companies may see little incentive not to adopt such predatory behavior.

228

Civil Minutes, United States ex rel. Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., No. 01-4937 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 2003).
229
Class Action Complaint at 2, Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc., No. 09-00117 (D.
Nev. Jan. 20, 2009), 2009 WL 274237.
230
The docket records dispute the degree to which Vision Airlines is asserting
state secrets. Compare Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of the Motion to Compel at 5-6, Hester, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. Aug. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 2481871 (“Vision’s statement that its
‘objections on the basis of the State Secrets Doctrine [are] limited to items requesting
discovery related to its contracts and payments there under [sic] with upstream contractors, mainly Capital and McNeil’ is demonstrably false. It has made no such effort
to limit the assertion of this privilege, which it has no right to assert in any event, and
instead has made blanket use of it in response to requests for production number 1, 9,
13, 15, and 19, and as to interrogatories number 1, 2, and 4. As we understand it, only
the government contract itself is classified. Further, we do not believe that Vision is in
possession of any classified documents, making its objections on this ground bad
faith.”), with Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Countermotion to Compel at 13-14, Hester, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. July 27, 2009), 2009 WL 2350802 (arguing that the defendants successfully invoked the privilege), and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Defendant Vision Airlines, Inc.’s
Countermotion to Compel at 13, Hester, No. 09-00117 (D. Nev. July 27, 2009), 2009 WL
2350803 (“Defendant VISION’S objections on the basis of the State Secrets Doctrine is
limited to items requesting discovery related to its contracts and payments there under
[sic] with upstream contractors, mainly Capital and McNeil.”).
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On the contractor side, the suits implicate a spectrum of legal
claims, and they involve a range of industries. The changing role of
contractors in mainstream military activities, though, sits uneasily in
the current legal regime. Private companies are not subject to the
same constraints as the military. They do not fall directly within the
U.S. command-and-control structure, and they often provide services
that blur the lines between civilian and military functions. A U.S. military study on DoD contractors, created in response to concern that
private entities were engaging in criminal activity, found that although
contract employees were considered part of the military fighting
force, they were “not subject to the same restrictions that are placed
231
on U.S. Service members.” The study explained:
[C]ontractor employees are sometimes permitted to live outside U.S.controlled military installations and, with few restrictions, to circulate in
host country communities. . . . DoD contractors also employ many host
country nationals, all of whom live in local communities and whose behavior is neither restricted nor monitored by DoD authorities. As members of SFOR and KFOR, contractor employees are forbidden from patronizing establishments designated by the United Nations or the
European Union Police Mission as off-limits because of illegal prostitution and human trafficking concerns. However, we found that while
some contractors make an effort to monitor their employees’ activities
and address employee misconduct, contractor behavior in this regard is
not uniform. Not surprisingly, anecdotal evidence suggested some level
of DoD contractor employee involvement in activities related to human
232
trafficking in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Efforts to control corporate entities through contractual requirements may only be of limited effect. Between 2001 and 2009, for instance, Blackwater (recently renamed Xe Services), obtained some
233
The company’s founder and
$1.5 billion in government contracts.
former Navy SEAL, Erik Prince, later confirmed that the company had
participated in highly sensitive military and intelligence operations,
including raids on suspected militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
claimed that at one point the CIA asked the company to assassinate
234
Pakistani nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan.

231

OFFICE OF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 180, at 2.
Id.
233
Adam Ciralsky, Tycoon, Contractor, Soldier, Spy, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2010, at 74, 75-76.
234
Ciralsky, supra note 233, at 121; see also Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 141, at 23 (statement of Erik D. Prince,
Chairman, The Prince Group, LLC and Blackwater USA) (examining the impact of
privatization on U.S. military forces); James Risen, Blackwater Chief at Nexus of Military
232

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

The Shadow of State Secrets

133

On September 16, 2007, Blackwater contractors were assigned to a
Tactical Support Team, call sign “‘Raven 23,’ whose function was to
provide back-up fire support for other Blackwater personal security
235
details operating in the city of Baghdad.” The contractors “opened
fire with automatic weapons and grenade launchers on unarmed civilians located in and around Nisur Square in central Baghdad, killing
at least fourteen people, wounding at least twenty people, and assault236
ing but not injuring at least eighteen others.” In December 2008, a
federal grand jury indicted five of the company’s security guards on
charges of manslaughter and weapons violations, while a sixth pled
237
guilty to charges of voluntary manslaughter.
In this case, the defendants’ signing of conditions for employment
as State Department contractors played a role in the plea, as the State
Department’s Mission Firearms Policy required that the use of deadly
force to be objectively reasonable under all the circumstances known
238
to the individual at the time. The State Department contract, however, was not sufficient for a District of Columbia court to uphold a
parallel civil action brought for war crimes under the Alien Tort

and Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at A6 (analyzing the relationship between Erik
Prince’s political connections and his success).
235
Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea at 2, United States v. Ridgeway, No.
08-0341 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2008); see also United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 112, 115
(D.D.C. 2009) (“In their zeal to bring charges against the defendants in this case, the
prosecutors and investigators aggressively sought out statements the defendants had
been compelled to make to government investigators in the immediate aftermath of
the shooting and in the subsequent investigation.”); Information, Ridgeway, No. 080341 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008) (alleging voluntary manslaughter and attempt to commit
voluntary manslaughter).
236
Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 2. However, Slough
describes the factual circumstances differently.
[A] shooting incident erupted, during which the defendants allegedly shot
and killed fourteen persons and wounded twenty others. The government
contends that the dead and wounded were unarmed civilians who were the
victims of unprovoked violence by the defendants. The defendants maintain
that they came under attack by insurgents and that their actions constituted a
legitimate response to a mortal threat.
Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (citation omitted).
237
Indictment at 1, 3, Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (No. 08-0360); see also Factual
Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 2 (describing the factual circumstances surrounding the deaths that occurred in Nisur Square). Judge Urbina later
dismissed the indictment against Paul Slough, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, Donald
Ball, and Nicholas Slatten on the grounds that the government utilized statements
made to Department of State investigators that had been compelled under threat of
job loss. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 115-16, 166.
238
Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea, supra note 235, at 3.
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Claims Act, assault and battery, wrongful death, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training,
239
and supervision.
Contractor use of the state secrets privilege as an affirmative defense does have important benefits: it gives the other party early notice
that concerns about confidential state material may hamper discovery
or the development of the suit. In this capacity, private corporations’
reference to the privilege may end up saving litigants money and resources, even as it alerts the courts to potentially problematic aspects of
the claims in question. Such reference may also serve as a trigger for
executive branch action, thus putting the burden on private corporations and not on the state to alert it to the public release of potentially
damaging information. This does not absolve the government of its
responsibility to recognize where its interests might be implicated, but
it may be thought of as providing a safety net.
The mention of state secrets also may have other intended or unintended consequences: as illustrated above, federal courts may remove cases from the state level, based in part on the state secrets
240
claim.
Such claims often appear to lead to lengthy lawsuits. In an
altercation with Overland Storage, Inc., for example, Raytheon
claimed that its “government customer of the programs at issue ha[d]
informed Raytheon that these programs are state secrets”; however,
efforts to obtain “a formal letter asserting the state secrets privilege”
had “required the use of intermediaries,” which had slowed the

239

See Estate of Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge & Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1, 4
(D.D.C. 2009) (staying the defendants’ motion to allow plaintiffs to request discovery
on venue).
240
In addition to the documents cited above, see Plaintiffs’ Opposition in Getz,
supra note 121, at 1, which contends that the defendants had not identified the additional, specific information they needed from the Army. See also Defendant The Boeing Company’s Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, supra note 217, at 2 (arguing that the removal was not “defective”); Motion to Remand, supra note 160, at 6
(pointing out defendant’s “weak” assertions). For example, Defendant’s Notice of
Removal in Finnegan contains the following:
In addition, because Plaintiffs’ claims may implicate military classified information, the federal doctrine of state secrets is potentially applicable. Under United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), the Executive Branch may invoke an absolute evidentiary privilege encompassing state secrets whose
disclosure would harm the national security. . . .
Removal to this Court is proper in that federal question jurisdiction exists . . . .
Notice of Removal at 4, Finngean v. Lucent Techs. Inc., No. 07-03261 (D.N.J. July 13,
2007), 2007 WL 4648084.
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241

process.
In another Raytheon case, at the defendant’s urging, the
court extended the deadline for the government to intervene and invoke state secrets—with a consequence of further drawing out the liti242
Lengthy time delays have become a common complaint of
gation.
243
those involved in such suits.
Facing a long process, which, in light of the credible threat determination, may well end in dismissal prior to trial, may prove a significant deterrent to litigants. Plaintiffs in tort cases, who may be
suing for medical and other basic expenses, may not have the resources to engage in litigation, particularly if there is a high probability that the suit will be voided owing to the presence of state secrets
further down the line. The same may hold for small technology companies, suing over patent rights or breach of contract. This may be no
less true for suits lodged against the U.S. government where the potential applicability of the state secrets privilege is claimed or a stay of
244
proceedings is requested to consider the state secrets implications.
241

Raytheon Company’s Opposition to Overland Storage Inc’s Motion to Compel
Production of Documents Relating to Classified Programs at 2, Raytheon Co. v. Overland Storage, Inc., No. 03-0013 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004), 2004 WL 3359781.
242
See Wells v. Raytheon Sys. Co., No. 00-10922, at 2 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001) (order extending the deadline for government assertion of the state secrets privilege to July
13, 2001); Wells, No. 00-10922, at 23-25 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2001) (order granting in part
and denying in part defendant’s motion for review and reconsideration) (extending the
state secret assertion deadline to August 3, 2001, and refusing plaintiff’s argument that
Raytheon waived the privilege by failing to assert it); Wells, No. 00-10922, at 1, 35 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 17, 2002) (order from January 17, 2002, granting summary judgment for the
defendant, which was then filed on January 25, 2002).
243
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for
Relief from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009 at 1, Jewel v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2876650 (“In the over
three years that these cases have been pending, despite the ongoing nature of the
harms and the accumulation of a mountain of pleadings and boxes of evidence in
support of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Government’s strategy of raising and re-raising the
same arguments based on the state secrets privilege and other governmental privileges
has successfully limited forward motion toward the merits. This, despite repeated rejection of those arguments . . . .”); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5, Whitehead v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 08-0421
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2009), 2009 WL 1092206 (“The tangled web of issues was due largely, in part, to what ultimately had nothing to do with the Whitehead Plaintiffs: state
secrets privilege. Nonetheless, the state secrets issue plagued the Whiteheads for over
one year, beginning on March 2, 2007.” (emphasis omitted)).
244
See, e.g., Defendant United States of America’s Reply Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2, Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2004), 2004 WL 3705982 (“It is understandable that Plaintiff wishes a speedier
resolution of the anthrax murders, but Plaintiff’s good intentions will not lessen the
damage that proceeding with this action would cause to the criminal investigation.”);
see also discussion infra Part III.
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If the privilege is casting this shadow, the obvious question is
whether we should be concerned about it. The government does have
information that would, in the public domain, have a significant impact on U.S. national security. Dependent on the help of private contractors, the government is not the sole entity with access to such data.
As for removal, we may well want cases potentially affecting state secrets to be dealt with in a federal forum. Whatever delays that exist
may be minimal, and the intimidation that other parties may feel may
be no different, or even less concerning than other power disparities
that mark litigation. As long as the claim that state secrets may apply
is a legitimate assertion, should the shadow matter?
But the cases studied point to an additional consideration: the
potential for what could be considered a form of “graymail.” An increasing number of companies have intimate access to a broad range
of government data. Although properly classified materials may be
subject to other constraints, companies may threaten to reveal legally
damaging or politically embarrassing information in the course of the
lawsuit unless the state steps in to protect it. If the state refuses, the
company may then start lodging subpoenas in an effort to draw out
even more information with the knowledge of where weaknesses may
245
be exploited—thus spurring the government to become involved.
Even where the companies do not intend to elicit a protective response from the government, the nature of the information that would
be required for the private entity to mount a reasonable defense may
legally or politically compromise the government. The effect would
thus be similar to efforts to involve the state in the judicial proceedings.
Quite apart from the potential use of sensitive information to draw
the government into a suit, the government independently may have
every motivation to do so: its security, after all, may depend on the
viability of the corporate entity. Consider Raytheon, the fifth-largest
246
U.S. government contractor. According to the U.S. government, the
company obtained between $15.7 and $16.2 billion in government
247
The company produces the Patriot
contracts for fiscal year 2009.
245

This appears to be precisely what happened in White v. Raytheon Co., No. 0710222, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2008), 2008 WL 5273290. See also supra notes 128-33
and accompanying text.
246
See Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT,
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
247
See id. (listing Raytheon as receiving an award of $15.7 billion in fiscal year
2009); Raytheon Company, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov (search
“Raytheon Company,” then check “2009” in the “By Fiscal Year” box) (last visited Sept.
15, 2010) (noting over $16 billion dollars awarded to Raytheon).
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ground-based air-defense missile system; ground-based phased-array
radars integral to the U.S. Army’s Theater Missile Defense Program;
the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), which is
the primary air-to-air missile for the U.S. Air Force and Navy fighter
aircraft; as well as the Tomahawk, TOW, Stinger, Maverick, Standard,
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, Paveway laser-guided bombs, Ex248
It is also the prime
tended Range Guided Munitions, and others.
249
contractor for the NATO Sea Sparrow Surface to Air Missile System.
Its Electronic Systems business segment focuses on electronic warfare,
infrared, laser, and GPS technologies, as well as surveillance, recon250
naissance, targeting, navigation, commercial, and scientific systems.
With the company so deeply embedded in the U.S. national security
establishment, Raytheon can become indispensible during wartime.
The bankruptcy of or significant financial losses to Raytheon could
threaten national defense, as well as the provision of vital services.
Occasionally, the executive files a statement of interest, or explicitly reserves the right to invoke the state secrets privilege, without ac251
At other times, it takes no action whatsoever. Untually doing so.
der these circumstances, the tactical importance of state secrets claims
ought not to be overlooked. In In re September 11 Litigation, the plaintiffs claimed state secrets as a tactical argument for why discovery in252
volving the National Security Council (NSC) might be bothersome.
248

Raytheon Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 24, 2003).
Id.
250
Id.
251
See, e.g., Penn v. Aerospace Corp., No. 08-0620, 2009 WL 585839, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 6, 2009) (noting that the case was filed on June 13, 2008); Penn, No. 08-0620
(E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (order advising the government to be prepared on December
5, 2008, to report whether it intends to assert the state secrets privilege); Penn, No. 080620 (E.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2009) (order granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion and dismissing the case with prejudice); see also Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T.
SCRL, 607 F. Supp. 2d 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (acknowledging that the defendants
raised the possible invocation of the state secrets privilege in their memorandum, potentially obstructing the defendants’ data from all plaintiffs); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 5069133, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (reserving the
federal defendants’ right to assert the state secrets privilege if the other privileges
claimed relating to sensitive security information and law enforcement are found not
to apply); Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 29
n.22, Amnesty v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08-6259), 2008
WL 4819852 (“To the extent classified information concerning the operation of surveillance under FAA did become an issue in this case or necessary to its resolution, the
Government reserves the right to assert the privilege at such time.”).
252
See, e.g., Revised Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion of the Aviation Defendants for So-Called “Focused” Discovery from the Government at 20 n.17, In re
249
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Los Alamos National Security, LLC also argued that “retaliatory actions will require judgments about classified information. The Sponsor may well intervene in this matter to assert a state secrets defense
253
Overtly threatening language perunder U.S. v. Reynolds . . . .”
254
meates these and other suits.
Such claims, especially but not exclusively when supported by a
statement of interest, may well be regarded as a credible threat because these companies do have access to a range of classified materials.
While it is not known what the executive will do in the future, there is
precedent in each of these areas where the government has intervened to invoke the state secrets privilege, and there is a framework of
statutes and executive orders that supports such claims. The privilege,
even when only threatened and not actually invoked by the executive,
may thus affect both the courts and the litigants.
In conclusion, a final point deserves notice: set against the paltry
number of corporate cases that have thus far made their way into the
state secrets debate (e.g., D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., and the
255
earlier McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States), the multitudinous
September 11 Litig., Nos. 21-0097, 21-0101 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2007) [hereinafter Revised
Memorandum of Law in In re September 11 Litig.], 2007 WL 2272256 (“[I]t is questionable
whether the Aviation Defendants could depose any individual from the NSC without
running afoul of the executive privilege or state secrets privilege given that the very function of the NSC . . . is to advise the president on national security.”).
253
Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand at
15, Files v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., LLC, No. 08-0636 (D.N.M. July 31, 2008), 2008 WL
5706495 (footnote omitted).
254
See, e.g., Revised Memorandum of Law in In re September 11 Litig., supra note 252,
at 20 n.17; Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 2-3 n.1, White v. Raytheon
Co., No. 07-10222 (D. Mass. 2007), 2007 WL 1910325 (“[A]ny further prosecution or
defense of this case may trigger protections of the state secrets privilege because classified information is implicated in virtually every fact and circumstance necessary to adjudicate this matter.”); Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Smith’s Aerospace LLC to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 10, Walters v. Lear
Siegler Servs., Inc., No. 05-61789 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2000), 2000 WL 34602661 (“Invocation of the state secrets privilege by the United States government will preclude
SMITHS from obtaining full and necessary discovery.”).
255
See Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., 150 F. App’x 627, 628 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that the United States asserted the privilege and Schwartz failed to show how
the parties could litigate the case without access to privileged and sensitive material);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting, in a breach of contract case, that the state secrets privilege’s proper invocation by
the government precluded the hearing of plaintiff’s superior knowledge claim);
D.T.M. Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 334-35 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing
the case to proceed despite the assertion of state secrets); United States ex rel. Schwartz
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suits discussed above—many of which are pending in relation to military contractual relationships—point to significant gaps in our understanding of the privilege. A similar situation holds for the telecom256
munications cases, despite scholarly and public attention.
II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS CASES
More than four-dozen state secrets cases between 2001 and 2009
stem from President Bush’s authorization of the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) in the aftermath of 9/11 and the program’s

v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting, in a wrongful death case,
the government’s failure to assert the state secrets privilege validly through a formal
claim by a head of a government department); see also Crater Corp v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the privilege was properly invoked but the district court wrongly dismissed the suit).
Chesney’s and Frost’s discussion includes all five of these cases. See Chesney, supra
note 6, at 1301 (concluding the Bush Administration does not differ substantially in its
use of the privilege). But see Frost, supra note 6, at 1939 (“I disagree, however, with
[Professor Chesney’s] conclusion that these numbers prove that the Bush Administration’s assertion of the privilege does not differ from that of previous administrations.”).
Other publications discussed the uniqueness of these five state secrets corporate
cases. See Martha Bellisle, eTreppid Case Gets Special Treatment: Justice Department Engages
in Unusual Fight to Bypass State Secrets Privilege, RENO GAZETTE-J., Apr. 19, 2007, at A01,
available at 2007 WLNR 27960663 (discussing the Department of Justice’s unusual attempt to use a protective order to preserve sharing of information over which the Director of National Intelligence asserted the state secrets privilege, unlike in the Crater
litigation, where the government followed the assertion with a motion to dismiss that
was granted at the trial stage); William J. Broad, Missile Defense Hits Bump in Court: A
Whistleblower Says Her Lawsuit Will Show the System Doesn’t Work. The Government Says a
Trial Will Jeopardize Military Secrets, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 9, 2003, at A10, available
at 2003 WLNR 13822408 (summarizing the controversy over the TRW litigation); Suman Guha Mozumder, MIT Researcher Drops Bombshell on Missile Defense Contracts, INDIA
ABROAD (New York), Apr. 14, 2006, at A12, available at 2006 WLNR 11109534 (reporting on an accusation by a government analyst that the Government Accountability Office had falsely exonerated Boeing and TRW of wrongdoing); Hampton Stephens, Supreme Court Filing Claims Air Force, Government Fraud in 1953 Case, INSIDE THE AIR FORCE,
Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/03/iaf031403.html (describing the letter Sen. Charles Grassley and Rep. Howard Berman sent to Attorney
General John Ashcroft, warning him against misuse of the privilege, after it was invoked
in U.S. ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc. in a claim by Schwartz under the whistleblowerprotection law Grassley and Berman authored).
256
See, e.g., Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of
Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV.
541, 569-82 (2008) (discussing the viability of judicial review of the Terrorist Surveillance Program in the face of the state secrets privilege); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless
Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 428 (2009) (advocating narrowing the state secrets privilege
so as not to duplicate the FAA’s telecommunications privilege).
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257

continuing reauthorization every forty-five days.
Yet, owing in part
to the incredible complexity of the litigation and the consolidation of
most of the suits through the multidistrict litigation (MDL) process,
little has been understood about how the privilege played out in the
suits. Of the fifty cases brought before the Northern District of California through the MDL process, moreover, not one of the forty-six
dismissals that ensued was based on state secrets—-a result likely, under the current academic approach, to disqualify each of these from
being considered a state secrets case. Yet the privilege has had a profound effect on the course of the litigation.
These cases draw attention to the dynamics surrounding state secrets claims. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) played a key role in
developing the legal underpinnings for the presidential authorizations that became the foundation for the government’s defense of
state secrets—-suggesting a close relationship between a closely held
258
executive office jurisprudence and state secrets. Similar to both defense contractor and criminal cases, in the telecommunications suits,
courts have at times simply assumed the state secrets privilege applies
without requiring the government to invoke it, suggesting a parallel,
carryover effect from prior suits in which the privilege was asserted.
Finally, the visible machinations between the executive, the judiciary,
and Congress in the telecommunications cases serve to highlight the
deeper separation-of-powers issues that attend.

257

OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 1, 6 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICERS OF INSPECTORS GEN.], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
pdf/IGTSPReport090710.pdf (providing a review of the President’s Surveillance Program to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House
Committee on the Judiciary as required by Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.)). Thirty-eight of the multidistrict litigation telecommunications cases discussed in this Part are suits filed against corporate actors;
they could thus be equally included in the foregoing Part, looking at constitutional
challenges brought to corporate actors. However, because of the strong links between
the telecommunications cases, regardless of whether the state acts as plaintiff, intervenor, or defendant, this Article considers this group of cases under a separate heading.
258
A Deputy Assistant Attorney General would not normally speak for the entire Department of Justice; indeed, the Attorney General’s role in neither recusing himself nor
signing the memos should here be noted. For the ensuing discussion, however, this Article focuses on the author of the memos with the understanding that broader conclusions about the Department of Justice’s position on the questions posed thereby apply.
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A. Executive Branch Jurisprudence and State Secrets
TSP, a warrantless wiretapping program that President Bush instituted in the weeks following September 11, 2001, relied heavily on the
OLC to justify its continuance. Before each presidential authorization,
OLC reviewed CIA (later, National Counterterrorism Center) memoranda on terrorist threats and intelligence obtained through the program and then advised the attorney general whether a Fourth
Amendment constitutional standard of reasonableness had been met
259
such that continuing the program was warranted.
These OLC memos, as well as related documents, provide detail about the Administration’s reasoning regarding the NSA program and its subsequent invocation of state secrets.
One of the first and most important memos, written September
25, 2001, focused on whether the proposed shift under FISA from foreign intelligence being “the purpose” of a search to being “a purpose”
260
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo found the new standard constitutional but
cautioned that the historical deference granted to the Department of
Justice depended in some measure on ensuring that criminal investi261
gations would not become the primary purpose of FISA. He offered
a strong Hamiltonian rationale:
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the government interest in
conducting searches related to fighting terrorism is perhaps of the highest order—the need to defend the nation from direct attack. As the Supreme Court has said, “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no govern262
mental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.

259

OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 2, 6-8.
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to David S. Kris,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/memoforeignsurveillanceact09252001.pdf.
261
The memorandum from John Yoo explains:
260

Some warrant applications might be rejected by the courts if prosecutors become too involved in the planning and execution of FISA searches. Nonetheless, as we observed in 1995, “the courts have been exceedingly deferential to
the government and have almost invariably declined to suppress the evidence,
whether they applied the ‘primary purpose’ test or left open the possibility of
a less demanding standard.” We believe that the Department would continue
to win such deference from the courts if it continues to ensure that criminal
investigation not become a primary purpose of FISA surveillance.
Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted) (describing the Dellinger memorandum, the full contents
of which remain classified).
262
Id. at 5 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
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In the context of Federalist No. 23, “‘circumstances which may affect
the public safety’” are not “‘reducible within certain determinate limits’”; therefore, “‘it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that
there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the
defen[c]e and protection of the community, in any matter essential to
263
its efficacy.’” Yoo’s constitutional argument presaged the President’s
subsequent claim of legal authority for the NSA wiretapping program.
The text, structure and history of the Constitution establish that the
Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility, and
therefore the power, to ensure the security of the United States in situations of grave and unforeseen emergencies. Intelligence gathering is a
necessary function that enables the President to carry out that authority.
The Constitution, for example, vests in the President the power to deploy military force in the defense of the United States by the Vesting
Clause, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and by the Commander in Chief Clause, § 2,
cl. 1. Intelligence operations, such as electronic surveillance, very well
may be necessary and proper for the effective deployment and execution
264
of military force against terrorists.

Yoo then alluded to executive branch jurisprudence: “This Office
has maintained, across different administrations and different political parties, that the President’s constitutional responsibility to defend
the nation may justify reasonable, but warrantless, counter265
In support, he cited a string of OLC deciintelligence searches.”
266
sions that reached back to 1980.
The President’s Commander-inChief authorities included, by implication, the authority to collect
267
When
whatever information may be necessary for their exercise.
considered alongside the Authorization for Use of Military Force
268
(AUMF), the constitutional authority provided sufficient grounds
269
for the legal underpinnings. Yoo wrote,

263

Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147-48 (Alexander Hamilton) ( Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)). The memo also cites various cases supporting a broad understanding
of presidential power. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (noting that the President “exercis[es] the executive authority in a world that presents each
day some new challenge with which he must deal”); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934) (observing that federal war powers are “well-nigh limitless”
in extent).
264
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, supra note 260, at 6.
265
Id. at 7.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1541 note
(2006)).
269
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, supra note 260, at 8.
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The courts have observed that even the use of deadly force is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if used in self-defense or to protect others. Here, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the right to self-defense is
not that of an individual, but that of the nation and of its citizens. If the
government’s heightened interest in self-defense justifies the use of
270
deadly force, then it certainly would also justify warrantless searches.

Within weeks of writing the September 25, 2001, memo, Yoo was “read
271
into” the compartmented NSA program.
The only other non-FBI
officials from the Department of Justice brought into the program
were Attorney General John Ashcroft and Counsel for Intelligence
272
Policy James Baker.
On October 23, 2001, Yoo developed the reasoning behind his
FISA analysis in a memo addressing domestic military operations. Although intended to apply to active military operations, the arguments
he put forward would appear again in relation to the NSA initiative.
He wrote, “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to domestic military operations designed to deter and prevent further terrorist at273
Even if it did apply, the reasonableness requirement protacks.”
vided a loophole:
[W]e believe that the courts would not generally require a warrant, at least
when the action was authorized by the President or other high executive
branch officials. The Government’s compelling interest in protecting the
nation from attack and in prosecuting the war effort would outweigh the
274
relevant privacy interests, making the search or seizure reasonable.

Although “courts could decide otherwise,” Yoo “conclude[d] that
the President has both constitutional and statutory authority to use
the armed forces in military operations, against terrorists, within the
275
United States.”
On the day Yoo sent this memo, Representative Sensenbrenner in276
troduced the USA PATRIOT bill into the House of Representatives.

270

Id. (citations omitted).
OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 10.
272
Id. On the same day that he was read into the program, Ashcroft certified that
it was consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 11.
273
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William
J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense 25 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf.
274
Id. at 2.
275
Id. at 34, 37.
276
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162,
271
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Two days later, White House officials and Lieutenant General Michael
Hayden, NSA Director, began providing briefings on the NSA war277
rantless intercept program to members of Congress and their staffs.
It was not until November 2, 2001, however, after the NSA program
was underway, that Yoo was asked to provide a memo directly on the
278
wiretapping initiative. This memo closely followed the reasoning of
the earlier two missives.
Yoo acknowledged that FISA “‘purports to be the exclusive statutory
means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,’”
but, he argued, “‘[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional
279
infringement on the President’s Article II authorities.’”
FISA was
merely a “‘safe harbor for electronic surveillance’”—it could not “‘restrict the President’s ability to engage in warrantless searches that pro280
tect the national security.’” The test for warrantless searches was the
Fourth Amendment—which did not apply to electronic surveillance in
281
“‘direct support of military operations.’” Yoo suggested that “‘unless
Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area—which it has not—then the statute must be construed to avoid
282
such a reading.’”

107th Cong. (introduced to the House on Oct. 23, 2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
277
OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 6-7. The first briefings were
given to Nancy Pelosi and Porter Gross, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Id. at 16. From October 25,
2001, to January 17, 2007, Hayden and NSA Director Keith Alexander conducted approximately forty-nine briefings on the NSA warrantless wiretapping program to members of Congress and their staff; seventeen took place before the December 2005 media reports. Id. For reference to earlier briefings on NSA electronic surveillance
programs, see Letter from Nancy Pelosi, Ranking Democrat on House Intelligence
Comm., to Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, Nat’l Sec. Agency Dir. (Oct. 11,
2001), available at http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2006/01/releasesJan06-declassified.shtml, which expressed concern about NSA electronic surveillance
activities and the authority under which surveillance was being conducted.
278
OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 11.
279
Id. (quoting Yoo’s memo from November 2, 2001).
280
Id. (same).
281
Id. at 12 (same).
282
Id. at 11-12 (same). Subsequent memos left the analysis largely intact. See
Second Redacted Declaration of Steven G. Bradbury at 9, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.
Dep’t of Justice, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-00096) (discussing OLC
115, a two-page memorandum for the Attorney General from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General regarding the Attorney General’s review of the legality of the President’s Authorization for the NSA wiretapping program); OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN.,
supra note 257, at 13 (noting that on October 11, 2002, Yoo drafted another opinion
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For nearly two years, these memoranda provided the legal rationale for upholding the constitutionality of the TSP. But following
Yoo’s resignation from the Department of Justice in 2003 and his replacement by Patrick Philbin, the November memo, which ignored
283
the fifteen-day war exemption that FISA authorized, began to cause
substantial concern. Equally distressing was the absence of any discus284
sion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a leading case on the
distribution of government power between the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, there was no detailed description of the activi285
Once he was
ties actually taking place under the NSA program.
read into the program, Philbin convinced David Addington, Counsel
to the Vice President, to read Jack Goldsmith, Jay Bybee’s replace286
ment, into the program. Philbin and Goldsmith further noted that
FISA prevents intentional electronic surveillance “under color of law
287
In autumn 2003, Philbin and
except as authorized by [statute].”
Goldsmith therefore began to develop an alternative analysis that
288
They alerted Ashcroft, Addington,
drew heavily from the AUMF.
289
and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to their concerns.
B. The Onslaught of Litigation
With TSP classified at security clearance level “Top Secret-SCI”
and OLC memoranda hidden, the program remained largely shielded
from public view. However, in autumn 2004, journalists Eric Lich290
Citing the extblau and James Risen uncovered TSP’s existence.
treme danger that would be created for national security, the White

concerning the TSP at Ashcroft’s request, reiterating legal analysis laid out in the November 2, 2001, memo).
283
See 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006) (limiting the duration of electronic surveillance
without a court order to fifteen days).
284
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
285
See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 13 (describing Yoo’s omission of the Youngstown case from his memoranda as an “important factor” in OLC’s
reconsideration of Yoo’s work and describing Yoo’s “factual discussion” of spying activities as “insufficient”).
286
Id. at 19-20.
287
Id. at 20 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1)).
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW 186-211 (2008) (discussing the story’s genesis);
see also Eric Lichtblau, The Education of a 9/11 Reporter: The Inside Drama Behind the Times’
Warrantless Wiretapping Story, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2008, 7:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2187498/pagenum/all (retelling a portion of the story).
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291

House pressured the New York Times not to publish the information.
292
For thirteen months, the newspaper held the story. The journalists
desisted, but their renewed interest in the story earned them an invita293
tion to the White House in early December 2005. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and other officials threatened that publication
would not only hurt national security but also financially devastate the
telephone carriers who had cooperated, causing them public embar294
Officials argued that the reporters’ patriotic duty was to
rassment.
prevent the information from becoming public.
On December 15–16, 2004, as a coronal mass ejection hit Earth,
295
causing severe geomagnetic storms, a political storm of equal intensity broke: Lichtblau discovered that the Bush Administration had
considered seeking a Pentagon Papers–type injunction to prevent the
296
Sensitive to this historic event, in
story from becoming public.
which their paper had played a prominent role, the editors of the New
York Times decided to put the story online the night before it was due
297
According to Lichtblau, “The administration
to run in the paper.
might be able to stop the presses with an injunction, but they couldn’t
298
stop the Internet.”
The article, which appeared online Thursday evening, December
15, 2005, reported that President Bush had signed an order in 2002
authorizing the NSA to intercept telephone and e-mail communica-

291

See LICHTBLAU, supra note 290, at 193-95 (describing his meetings with top government officials); Lichtblau, supra note 290 (depicting the anxiety of New York Times
staff as they met with “White House VIPs”).
292
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
293
Lichtblau, supra note 290.
294
Id. The argument that information should not become public because it would
embarrass the corporations who engaged in the behavior and lead to financial harm has
also arisen in the academic literature in relation to corporate complicity in rendition. See
Dhooge, supra note 6, at 509-10 (arguing that potential damage to a company’s reputation is reason to prevent disclosure of its involvement in rendition programs).
295
Dec. 15, 2004, SPACEWEATHER.COM, http://www.spaceweather.com/archive.php?
day=15&month=12&year=2004&view=view (last visited Sept. 15, 2010); Dec. 16, 2004,
SPACEWEATHER.COM, http://www.spaceweather.com/archive.php?day=16&month=12&
year=2004&view=view (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
296
Lichtblau, supra note 290.
297
Id.
298
Id. Risen and Lichtblau went on to win the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for National
Reporting for their coverage of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program. 2006 Winners and Finalists, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/2006 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010).
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299

tions within the United States, without court-approved warrants.
Other newspapers quickly picked up the story, and by Monday, the
300
White House was on the defensive.
In his first press conference that addressed the program, the President announced that he had authorized the NSA to intercept international communications into and out of the United States by individuals
301
linked to Al Qaeda. Echoing Yoo’s legal memoranda, he cited as his
authority “the Constitution, as well as the authorization of force by the
302
He added, “I want to make it clear to the
United States Congress.”
people listening that this program is limited in nature to those that are
303
The calls were “not interknown al Qaeda ties and/or affiliates.”
cepted within the country, they are from outside the country to in the
country or vice versa. So in other words, if you’re calling from Hou304
FISA would be the approston to L.A., that call is not monitored.”
priate vehicle for such interceptions. When pressed on the legal underpinnings, the President said, “I think I’ve got the authority to move forward. I mean, this is what—and the attorney general was out briefing
305
this morning about why it’s legal to make the decisions I make.” He
then warned that it would be imprudent to discuss the legal questions:
“[A]n open debate about law would say to the enemy, ‘Here’s what
306
we’re going to do.’ And this is an enemy which adjusts.”
It soon appeared that the scope of the program was broader than
307
first admitted.
Lawsuits challenging the legal and constitutional
299

Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 292.
See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005,
at A01 (reporting on the Times story and discussing Eggen’s pursuit of a response from
the Bush Administration).
301
See Bush:
U.S. Must Think, Act Differently, CNN.COM, Dec. 19, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/bush.transcript/index.html (transcribing President Bush’s press conference on December 19, 2005).
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 27 (2006)
(statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen.) (stating that he could
“not . . . rule . . . out” that the White House had legal authority to monitor domestic
traffic without a warrant); see also Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Suggests Legal Basis for Domestic
Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A23 (“The attorney general made his comments, which critics said reflected a broadened view of the president’s authority . . . .”);
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm (reporting
that the NSA wiretapping program was significantly more expansive than the White
300
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underpinnings followed. The Center for Constitutional Rights lodged
the first action just over a month after the New York Times ran the sto308
On January 30, 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
ry.
309
launched the second case, Hepting v. AT&T.
The third case, Al310
Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, emerged in late February.
Thereafter, it was relatively quiet, until May of that year—-which was a
bad month to be a telecommunications company. In all, some twenty311
seven cases were filed, most of which targeted private companies. In
312
June, six more cases followed.
House acknowledged in 2005 and naming AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth as the three
largest telecommunications companies involved).
Senator Russ Feingold expressed his displeasure on the program’s scope from the
Senate floor:
The President was blunt. He said that he had authorized the NSA’s domestic spying program, and he made a number of misleading arguments to defend himself. His words got rousing applause from Republicans, and I think
even from some Democrats.
The President was blunt, so I will be blunt. This program is breaking the
law, and this President is breaking the law. Not only that, he is misleading the
American people in his efforts to justify this program . . . .
Congress has lost its way if we don’t hold this President accountable for his
actions.
152 CONG. REC. 5758 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold).
308
See Complaint at 1, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-00313 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 17, 2006) (requesting injunctive relief halting the program).
309
439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
310
Complaint, Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D.
Or. 2006) (No. 06-0274) (bearing a date of February 29, 2006).
311
See, e.g., Herron v. Verizon Global Networks, Inc., No. 06-2491 (E.D. La. filed
May 12, 2006); Fuller v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0077 (D. Mont. filed May 12,
2006); Hines v. Verizon Nw., Inc., No. 06-0694 (D. Or. filed May 12, 2006); Conner v.
AT&T, No. 06-01557 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 12, 2006); Joll v. AT&T Corp., No. 062680 (N.D. Ill. filed May 15, 2006); Dolberg v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-0078 (D. Mont.
filed May 15, 2006); Bissitt v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0220 (D.R.I. filed May
15, 2006); Mahoney v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0223 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006);
Mahoney v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0224 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006); Shubert
v. Bush, No. 06-2282 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 17, 2006); Trevino v. AT&T Corp., No. 060209 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 2006); Suchanek v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 06-0071
(W.D. Ky. filed May 18, 2006); Harrington v. AT&T, Inc., No. 06-0374 (W.D. Tex. filed
May 18, 2006); Marck v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-2455 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 19,
2006); Terkel v. AT&T Inc., No. 06-02837 (N.D. Ill. filed May 22, 2006); Waxman v.
AT&T Corp., No. 06-2900 (N.D. Ill. filed May 24, 2006); Solomon v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-02193 (E.D. Pa. filed May 24, 2006); Lebow v. BellSouth Corp.,
No. 06-1289 (N.D. Ga. filed May 25, 2006); Cross v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 040605 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed May 25, 2006); Riordan v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 0603574 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); Campbell v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., No.
06-452626 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006); Dubois v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00085
(W.D. Mich. filed May 26, 2006); Electron Tubes, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, No. 06-
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At the end of June, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
313
Rumsfeld opened the field even more to legal challenge. If the AUMF
was insufficient grounds to overcome the limits on military commissions
implicit in 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836(b), then it was rather a stretch to say
that the AUMF superseded FISA’s express requirement that FISA and
Title III provide the “exclusive means” of engaging in surveillance—or
for it to overcome the fifteen-day wartime surveillance provision, allow314
ing surveillance until December 3, 2001, but no longer.
315
As more cases emerged, the multidistrict panel ordered on August 9, 2006, for the cases to be consolidated and transferred to Chief
Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California, who had
been presiding over Hepting since January and Al-Haramain since Feb316
By
ruary and was furthest along in the telecommunications suits.
04048 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 26, 2006); Roe v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-3467 (N.D. Cal. filed
May 30, 2006); Hardy v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-2853 (E.D. La. filed May 30, 2006); Basinski v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4169 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2006).
312
See, e.g., Payne v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4193 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 2,
2006); Fortnash v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-60828 (S.D. Fla. filed June 12, 2006); Chulsky
v. Cellco P’ship, No. 06-2530 (D.N.J. filed June 13, 2006); United States v. O’Donnell,
06-02683 (D.N.J. filed June 14, 2006); Crockett v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, No.
06-00345 (D. Haw. filed June 26, 2006); Derosier v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 0600917 (W.D. Wash. filed June 28, 2006).
313
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
314
Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Professor of Law, Duke Univ., et al. to Sen. Bill
Frist et al. 4 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/FISA.AUMF.
ReplytoDOJ.pdf.
315
Spielfogel-Landis v. MCI, LLC, No. 06-04221 (N.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2006);
Mink v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 06-01113 (E.D. Mo. filed July 20, 2006);
Bready v. Verizon Md., Inc., No. 06-05961 (Md. Cir. Ct. filed July 21, 2006).
316
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 14, 2006). This case appears to be the first time that the Judicial Panel on MultiDistrict Litigation ( JPMDL) has transferred and consolidated national security constitutional challenges into a single federal district court. It raises important questions
about whether the MDL process is appropriate for this type of suit as opposed to
commercial mass tort lawsuits. Such consolidation prevents circuit splits on questions
of first impression, which may be particularly helpful to the Supreme Court’s subsequent attention to novel challenges. It also risks glossing over important nuances between the cases: in the telecommunications context, for instance, there are multiple
defendants, with the government itself acting variously as plaintiff, defendant, and intervenor. Further, the inclusion of state secrets matters alters the incentive structure.
Instead of being more efficient, many cases may be tied up for a much longer period
of time, owing to the difficulties that attend the use of classified materials. Additionally, the question of distribution of resources postjudgment plays out very differently
when injunctive relief, and not monetary remuneration, is sought.
These unique challenges posed by the use of MDLs in the national security context have not been addressed by writers focused on this process. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 21-22 (2007) (focusing on more
conventional mass torts such as asbestos, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals); Deborah R.
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June 3, 2009, a total of fifty telecommunications cases had been assembled before his court; the scene was set for a monumental battle
317
between the branches.
C. State Secrets, Judicial Independence, and Congressional Action
Between May 2006 and March 2008, the federal government invoked the state secrets privilege in thirty-three out of fifty telecommu318
nications cases (including all cases against Verizon from April 2007).
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large
Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 185-86 (2001) (addressing antitrust,
securities, and mass tort multidistrict litigation); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of MultiDistricting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883,
895-96 (2001) (neglecting to include national security as a relevant type of MDLs); Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2295 (2008) (analyzing the critical role the JPMDL has played in the resolution and “posttransfer handling . . . of the cases it has transferred”); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The QuasiClass Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 107, 114-18 (2010) (examining MDLs generally using three medical products
examples).
317
In addition to the foregoing cases, see Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw.,
Inc., No. 06-04177 (W.D. Mo. filed Aug. 10, 2006); United States v. Adams, No. 0600097 (D. Me. filed Aug. 21, 2006); Souder v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-01058 (S.D. Cal.
filed Aug. 22, 2006); United States v. Palermino, No. 06-01405 (D. Conn. filed Sept. 6,
2006); United States v. Volz, No. 06-00188 (D. Vt. filed Oct. 2, 2006); Cross v. AT&T
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0932 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 3, 2006); Guzzi v. Bush, No. 06-0136
(N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 3, 2006); Roche v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-4252 (D. Minn. filed Oct.
23, 2006); Jacobs v. AT&T Corp., No. 07-60365 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 14, 2007); Anderson v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03650 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 10, 2007); and
McMurray v Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 08-6264 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2008).
318
For cases in which the government intervened or acted as defendant or where
it also asserted state secrets privilege, see Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 0600313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, No. 0600274 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 28, 2006); Herron v. Verizon Global Networks, Inc., No. 062491 (E.D. La. filed May 12, 2006); Fuller v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0077 (D.
Mont. filed May 12, 2006); Hines v. Verizon Nw., Inc., No. 06-0694 (D. Or. filed May
12, 2006); Conner v. AT&T, No. 06-01557 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed May 12, 2006); Hepting
v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00672 (N.D. Cal. filed May 13, 2006); Bissitt v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-0220 (D.R.I. filed May 15, 2006); Shubert v. Bush, No. 06-2282
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 17, 2006); Marck v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-2455 (E.D.N.Y.
filed May 19, 2006); Solomon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-02193 (E.D. Pa. filed
May 24, 2006); Cross v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., No. 04-0605 (Ind. Sup. Ct. filed May 25,
2006); Dubois v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-00085 (W.D. Mich. filed May 26, 2006); Campbell v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., No. 06-452626 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006);
Riordan v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03574 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 26, 2006);
Roe v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-3467 (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 2006); Basinski v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4169 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2006); Payne v. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-4193 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 2, 2006); Chulsky v. Cellco P’ship,
No. 06-2530 (D.N.J. filed June 13, 2006); Crockett v. Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, No.

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

The Shadow of State Secrets

151

In the state cases—a handful of suits brought by the federal government against state entities to enjoin investigation into matters linked
to the NSA wiretapping program—the government stated that the
subject at issue in the suits was the same as in the telecommunications
cases. The government had invoked state secrets in those cases, and
state secrets similarly applied to these cases. It did not, however, enter
319
This strategy would be
formal motions to recognize the privilege.
06-00345 (D. Haw. filed June 26, 2006); Spielfogel-Landis v. MCI LLC, No. 06-04221
(N.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2006); Bready v. Verizon Md., Inc., No. 06-05961 (Md. Cir. Ct.
filed July 21, 2006); Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 06-04177 (W.D.
Mo. filed Aug. 10, 2006); Jacobs v. AT&T Corp., No. 07-60365 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 14,
2007); and Anderson v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-03650 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 10,
2007). Note that on July 10, 2008, a new Verizon case, McMurray v. Verizon Communications, was filed after the motion to stay all proceedings against Verizon, but Chief Judge
Walker subsequently included it in these cases. McMurray v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 08-6264 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2008).
319
United States v. Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. filed July 25, 2006), provides a
good example. There, the plaintiff argued that
in other related proceedings, the Director of National Intelligence, supported
by the Director of the National Security Agency, has asserted the federal state
secrets privilege, in part, to protect information directly implicated by the Missouri subpoenas: whether to confirm or deny that telecommunications carriers are (or are not) assisting the NSA. . . . [A]ctions of the State Defendants
are therefore preempted under this authority as well.
Indeed, the DNI recently successfully asserted the state secrets privilege with
regard to the kind of information requested, including whether or not the information even existed.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 7, Gaw, No. 07-01242 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2006), 2006 WL 2618346.
Additionally, the plaintiff’s complaint provided:
The Federal Government also has an absolute privilege to protect military
and state secrets from disclosure. Only the Federal Government can waive that
privilege, which is often called the “state secrets privilege.” . . . In both the Hepting and Terkel cases, the state secrets privilege has been formally asserted by the
Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, and the Director of the
National Security Agency, Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander.
Complaint at 5, 7, Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2006), 2006 WL 2362967; see
also Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2, United States v. Rabner, No. 06-2683 (D.N.J. Oct. 13,
2006), 2006 WL 3037955 (“State Defendants’ expansive discussion of the state secrets
privilege misses the mark. [They] are simply incorrect that the United States must actually invoke the state secrets privilege in order to state a claim for relief. It is beyond
argument that the complaint states a claim . . . .”); Complaint at 7-9, United States v.
Volz, No. 06-00188 (D. Vt. Oct. 2, 2006) (discussing the government’s use of the state
secrets privilege in other cases); Complaint at 7-9, United States v. Palermino, No. 0601405 (D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2006) (citing invocation of the state secrets privilege in Hepting and Terkel ); Complaint at 6, United States v. Adams, No. 06-00097 (D. Me. Aug. 21,
2006) (pointing toward state secrets claims in Hepting and Terkel ); Complaint at 7,
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missed in studies narrowly focused on cases in which government actually invokes the state secrets privilege; yet the approach—treating
related cases as though the state secrets privilege applied, even in the
320
absence of express declaration or any judicial ruling—is not unique.
The telecommunications cases in which state secrets seemingly did
not appear were granted either formal or informal stays pending the
outcome of Hepting—again, suggesting a parallel effect implicit in the
321
invocation of the state secrets privilege.
Hepting itself illustrates the application and influence of the state
secrets privilege; it underscores the importance of looking at the underlying executive branch jurisprudence. On April 28, 2008, the Department of Justice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, issued a Statement of
Interest, saying that it intended to invoke the state secrets privilege
322
Approximately three weeks
and requesting dismissal of the case.
later, on May 13, 2006, the United States formally intervened and
moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of state secrets. The government included declarations by John Negroponte, Director of National
Intelligence, and Keith Alexander, NSA Director, as well as additional
323
The government argued all three grounds laid
classified material.
United States v. O’Donnell, No. 06-02683 (D.N.J. June 14, 2006) (mentioning invocation of state secrets by Negroponte in the Hepting case).
320
In Project on Government Oversight v. Ashcroft, for instance, the government merely
noted that the same information was at issue in the case as that classified under the state
secrets privilege in Edmonds v. Department of Justice, without formally asserting state secrets.
Compare Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege was proper and dismissing the suit), and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Project on Gov’t
Oversight v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01032 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2004), 2004 WL 3628302
(“[D]efendants emphasize that the information POGO desires to disseminate was classified on October 18, 2002, in an original classification of the mosaic of information related to Ms. Edmonds’ employment case . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2004) (involving deposition of Sibel Edmonds in which court granted the government’s July 6, 2004,
refusal to release documents falling under the state secrets privilege exception).
321
AT&T requested the stay, which Chief Judge Walker explicitly granted on
March 14, 2007. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Record Litig., No. 06-01791, at
3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (stipulation and order granting stay in Roe, Campbell, Mahoney, Souder, Trevino, Dolberg, Terkel, Herron, Harrington, Joll, Conner, both Cross cases,
Waxman, Fortnash, Dubois, Chulsky, Hardy, Mink, Roche, and Mayer, but excluding “cases
against non-AT&T Defendants,” “cases in which the United States is a plaintiff,” Clayton, and Hepting).
322
See First Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, 5, Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 06-0672) (noting that the government would
assert the state secrets privilege pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006)).
323
Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
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out in Reynolds: the “very subject matter” of the litigation related to
privileged information; the plaintiffs could not make out a prima facie
case without secret material; and the defendants could not mount a
324
Moreover, because the contract in question had been
defense.
forged between the government and AT&T, dismissal under Totten
325
was warranted.
As related suits rapidly proliferated, Chief Judge Walker announced in June 2006 that in order to ascertain whether and to what
extent state secrets applied, the court would need to review certain
326
classified materials.
He directed the government to produce the
materials for in camera review, explaining:
The court is mindful of the extraordinary due process consequences
of applying the privilege the government here asserts. The court is also
mindful of the government’s claim of exceptionally grave damage to the
national security of the United States that failure to apply the privilege
could cause. At this point, review of the classified documents affords the
327
only prudent way to balance these important interests.

On July 20, 2006, Chief Judge Walker denied the government’s
motion to dismiss, announcing that Totten was not applicable because
the program, and AT&T’s participation in it, was already in the public
328
domain. Moreover, there was simply no precedent for dismissing a
case under state secrets when plaintiffs alleged “ongoing, widespread
329
Based on the public
violations of individual constitutional rights.”
and classified materials, it did not appear that permitting a case to
330
proceed would create a “reasonable danger” to national security. It
was too early in the case’s development to determine whether a prima
331
And unlike the
facie case or a valid defense could be established.

324

Id. at 984.
Id.
326
See Hepting, No. 06-0672, at 1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) (order on access to secret documents), 2006 WL 1581965, at *1 (stating that “this case cannot proceed and
discovery cannot commence until the court examines the classified documents to assess whether and to what extent the state secrets privilege applies.”).
327
Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
328
See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d. at 993 (“[T]he government has disclosed the general contours of the ‘terrorist surveillance program,’ which requires the assistance of a
telecommunications provider, and AT&T claims that it lawfully and dutifully assists the
government in classified matters when asked.”).
329
Id.
330
Id. at 994.
331
See id. (finding that deciding these claims would be “premature,” but that plaintiffs could proceed with some discovery).
325
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court’s decision in El-Masri, no blanket grant would be given to the
executive branch:
[I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has its limits.
While the court recognizes and respects the executive’s constitutional
duty to protect the nation from threats, the court also takes seriously its
constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes that come before it. To
defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy here would be to abdicate that duty . . . . The compromise between liberty and security remains a difficult
one. But dismissing this case at the outset would sacrifice liberty for no
332
apparent enhancement of security.

To afford the plaintiff an opportunity to seek judicial remedy for the
alleged violation of his constitutional rights, discovery would pro333
Chief Judge Walker certified the case for immediate interloceed.
334
cutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
In addition, the court considered the appointment of a special
expert, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to help in determining
whether disclosure of certain evidence would create a reasonable
335
danger to national security. This potential solution echoes a host of
similar judicial efforts over time to balance the national security interests of the government and the interests of the plaintiffs in seeking
redress for their grievances; however, many of these cases, which have
been sealed or unreported, or which do not ultimately turn on the
336
state secrets question, have escaped academic analysis.
In August 2006, as aforementioned, the multidistrict panel began
consolidating and transferring cases to the Northern District of Cali-

332

Id. at 995 (citations omitted).
See id. at 993-94 (observing that, because an alleged violation of constitutional
rights was the state interest at issue, the plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery).
334
Id. at 1011.
335
See id. (ordering the parties to show cause for why the court should not appoint
an expert); see also FED. R. EVID. 706 (permitting a court to appoint an expert witness
on its own motion).
336
See, e.g., In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1287 (4th Cir. 1991) (indicating that a
lower court issued a protective order requiring a deposition to be conducted in a secure facility with government officers present to direct what information could be revealed); Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (2d Cir.
1977) (deeming the appointment of a special master, without parties’ consent, appropriate; applying Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976); and indicating
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) “permits reference to a master on a showing
that some exceptional condition requires it”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,
97 F.R.D. 427, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (upholding a special master’s recommended
procedures for discovery, including having the government submit documents to the
special master for in camera review).
333
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337

fornia. Accordingly, on November 22, 2006, Chief Judge Walker required all parties to “show cause in writing [as to] why the Hepting order should not apply to all cases or claims to which the government
338
assert[ed] the state secrets privilege.” The government moved for a
stay of proceedings, pending disposition of an interlocutory appeal in
339
Hepting. On January 5, 2007, Chief Judge Walker ordered all plaintiffs to prepare, file, and serve consolidated complaints on each tele340
communications defendant.
On July 24, 2007, Walker took steps
similar to those in Hepting, denying without prejudice the government’s motion to dismiss the state cases, as well as denying as moot
341
the state officials’ motions for summary judgment.
What started as the invocation of state secrets doctrine, backed by
executive jurisprudence, morphed into a power struggle between the
branches of government. Four days after the court’s order, President
Bush announced that he had submitted a bill to amend FISA, a statute
that he considered to be out of date and technologically behind the
times: it fit uneasily in a world dominated by mobile phones and In342
ternet-based communications. He requested that Congress pass the
bill before the August 2007 recess, suggesting that any future attacks,
in the absence of new legislation, would be on the backs of the legisla343
A sentence that was deleted from the draft of the broadcast
tors.
explained, “[E]very day that Congress puts off these reforms increases
344
the danger to our nation.”
337

See supra note 316 and accompanying text (describing the challenges inherent
in consolidating cases involving questions of national security).
338
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, at 2 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 22, 2006) (pretrial order scheduling hearings) (emphasis omitted).
339
Motion of United States for a Stay Pending Disposition of Interlocutory Appeal
in Hepting v. AT&T Corp., In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006).
340
See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2007) (order resetting deadlines) (ordering service of “Master Complaints”).
341
See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 2 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (order denying summary judgment) (stating that, as Hepting’s appeal was pending, and as the
court would not address the government’s state secrets argument, both motions would
be denied).
342
See George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Office of the Press Secretary radio
broadcast July 28, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2007/07/print/20070728.html (noting that technology has changed
dramatically in the thirty years since FISA’s passage).
343
See id. (“Congress needs to act immediately to pass this bill, so that our national
security professionals can close intelligence gaps and provide critical warning time for
our country.”).
344
Jim Rutenberg, Wielding the Threat of Terrorism, Bush Outmaneuvers the Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A14.
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On August 3, 2007, in a rough party-line divide, the Senate passed
345
346
Senate Bill 1927 (60-28), and the House its equivalent (227-183).
347
The resultant Protect America Act of 2007 superseded the litigation.
The Act authorized direct communications service providers to help
the federal government acquire foreign intelligence when such acquisitions targeted third persons reasonably believed to be outside the
348
United States. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Attorney General (AG) became empowered to authorize, for up to one
year, “the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning
349
persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States” where
five criteria were met: (a) reasonable procedures were in place to ensure that the target was reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States, (b) acquisitions did not constitute “electronic surveil350
lance,” (c) surveillance would require the help of a communications
service provider, (d) a significant purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence information, and (e) the minimization procedures met the
351
requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h). With a few exceptions, the determination was to be made in the form of a written certification
“supported as appropriate by affidavit of appropriate officials in the
352
national security field.”
The executive branch appears to have quickly issued directives
under the Act to communications service providers, requesting the as-

345

See Roll Call Votes 110th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE (Aug. 3, 2007),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=
110&session=1&vote=00309 (indicating that the Senate passed S. 1927 as amended with
sixty “yeas” and twenty-eight “nays”).
346
See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 836, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Aug.
4, 2007), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/roll836.xml (passing the House with 227
“yeas” and 183 “nays,” with most of the support from Republicans and most of the opposition from Democrats).
347
See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (granting
greater authority to access electronic communications concerning foreign intelligence
related to persons outside the United States), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.).
348
Id. §§ 2–3.
349
Id. § 2.
350
The Protect America Act of 2007 conceived of electronic surveillance as excluding
surveillance of anyone believed to be outside the United States. See id. (“Nothing in the
definition of electronic surveillance . . . shall be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.”).
351
Id.
352
Id.
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353

sistance needed. The legislation required officials to notify the FISA
Court within seventy-two hours of surveillance authorization, allowed
for data monitoring, and removed the foreign-agent requirement that
354
previously had been included in the statute. The Act further limited
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC’s) role to simply
accepting or rejecting the guidelines for targeting individuals for in355
telligence information.
In accordance with the six-month sunset provisions, the new pow356
ers were to expire on February 5, 2008.
Following repeated exten357
sions, however, the existing directives and authorizations remained
in place through the formal repeal of the Protect America Act and its
effective replacement in July 2008, the FISA Amendments Act (FI358
This new legislation removed the warrant requirement for
SAAA).
government surveillance of foreign intelligence targets “reasonably
359
In an unusual move, it
believed” to be outside the United States.
provided retroactive immunity to telecommunications providers for
any past violations of FISA when the attorney general certified to one
of five conditions:
(1) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to an order of
the court established under section 103(a) directing such assistance;
(2) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a certification
in writing under section 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B) or 2709(b) of title 18, United
States Code;
(3) any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a directive under section 102(a)(4), 105B(e), as added by section 2 of the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55), or 702(h) directing such assistance;

353

See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1007 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (“Beginning in
[redacted text] 2007, the government issued directives to the petitioner commanding it
to assist in warrantless surveillance of certain customers . . . .” (alteration in original)).
354
Protect America Act § 2.
355
Id.
356
Id. § 6(c).
357
See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34143, P.L. 110-55, THE
PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007: MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 20 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34143.pdf
(discussing repeated extensions, which failed to allow the powers to sunset).
358
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act of 2008), Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 403, 122 Stat. 2436, 2473-74 (repealing selected sections of the Protect America Act). For continuation of existing orders, see id. § 404(a)(1).
359
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 703, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b) (Supp. II 2009).
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(4) in the case of a covered civil action, the assistance alleged to have
been provided by the electronic communication service provider was—
(A) in connection with an intelligence activity involving communications that was—
(i) authorized by the President during the period beginning on
September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007; and
(ii) designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack, or activities in
preparation for a terrorist attack, against the United States; and
(B) the subject of a written request or directive, or a series of written
requests or directives, from the Attorney General or the head of an
element of the intelligence community (or the deputy of such person) to the electronic communication service provider indicating
that the activity was—
(i) authorized by the President; and
(ii) determined to be lawful; or
(5) the person did not provide the alleged assistance.

360

Efforts to challenge the directives and authorizations through the
FISC met with little success and resulted in the second public opinion
361
The presiding judges in this case
the FISC appellate court issued.
(Judge Royce Lamberth, followed by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly) had
been read into the NSA warrantless wiretap program between January
362
2002 and January 2006. The resulting opinion for In re Directives was
363
In it, the review
published (in redacted form) on January 15, 2009.
court considered the petitioner’s refusal to comply with directives is364
Under threat of civil
sued in 2007 under the Protect America Act.
360

Id. § 802, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a.
See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1007 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (assessing the
“validity of the actions at issue” under the Protect America Act). The first published
opinion followed the initial en banc FISC opinion, In re All Matters Submitted to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (FISA Ct. 2002). See also
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742-45 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that amending
the surveillance requirement for a “significant purpose” into a “primary purpose” was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Note that in dicta in the 2002 case, the
court referred to “the President’s inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance”—again echoing the sentiments of the OLC memos underlying the NSA warrantless wiretapping program. Id. at 746.
362
OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 257, at 17.
363
See In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (No. 08-0001) (order permitting publication of
redacted opinion); see also In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1004.
364
See In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1007-08 (detailing the history of petitioner’s refusal to follow government orders); see also Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-55, 121 Stat. 552, repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amend361
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contempt and with a lack of success in obtaining a stay pending appeal
365
to the FISC court, the petitioner had been forced to comply.
While the FISC case proceeded behind closed doors, the Ninth
Circuit consolidated Al-Haramain and Hepting, with Judges Harry Pregerson, Michael Hawkins, and M. Margaret McKeown hearing argu366
ment in August 2007.
Soon thereafter, the judges severed the cas367
es, and a year later, they ordered the district court to reconsider
368
Hepting in light of the FISAAA.
On September 18, 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued
a certification under FISAAA section 802 to immunize the telecommu369
nications companies for their actions.
Based on Mukasey’s certification, the following day, the Department of Justice filed a motion in rela370
tion to thirty-eight of the consolidated telecommunications cases.
Without specifying which of the five conditions applied, Mukasey stated
that “the claims asserted in the civil actions pending in these consolidated proceedings . . . fall within at least one provision contained in
371
Section 802(a).” The government moved to dismiss all claims against
372
the electronic communications service providers in the MDL.

ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.).
365
In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008.
366
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.
2007), see also id. at 1196 (“We granted interlocutory review and consolidated this appeal with Hepting v. AT&T Corp. . . . .”).
367
See id. at 1196 n.3 (“[W]e are concurrently entering an order stating that the
cases are no longer consolidated for any purpose.”).
368
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (order remanding
the case to district court).
369
Certification of the Attorney General of the United States, In re Nat’l Sec.
Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008); see also
Plaintiffs’ Federal Rule of Evidence Section 1006 Summary of Voluminous Evidence
Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion of the United States Seeking to
Apply FISAAA § 802 (50 U.S.C. § 1885a) to Dismiss These Actions, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2008) (arguing in support of Mukasey’s certification
to immunize the telecommunications companies).
370
See United States’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.
Motion to Dismiss in In re NSA] (moving to dismiss all claims against the electronic communications service providers in a multidistrict-litigation matter brought by individuals against telecommunications companies).
371
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 6 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting
motion to dismiss) (internal quotation marks omitted).
372
U.S. Motion to Dismiss in In re NSA, supra note 370, at 2.
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On December 2, 2008, Chief Judge Walker heard oral argument
373
on the motion to dismiss.
The FISC appellate decision was made
374
Then, on July 21, 2009, Chief Judge
public the following January.
375
Walker formally dismissed Hepting under FISAAA section 802.
Ten
376
days later, the plaintiffs appealed.
D. State Secrets in the Aftermath
With substantial jurisprudence undergirding its assertion of constitutional authority, the executive branch had proven itself willing
and able to prevent a challenge to the wiretapping program. The ensuing battle essentially rendered the invocation of state secrets moot.
So what, then, of the fifty related cases?
377
Two of these cases resulted in voluntary dismissal. The effect of
state secrets on these cases, as in others, was that upon the government’s invocation of state secrets, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their
case. This effect has largely escaped academic analysis. In light of FISAAA, Hepting no longer controlled for the forty-eight remaining cases. On June 3, 2009, Chief Judge Walker issued two orders, dismissing
378
The first order applied to thirtyforty-four of the remaining cases.
eight cases, and stated that the FISA amendments at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1885(a) preempted all claims, granting immunity to the telecom-

373

Civil Minutes, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2008).
See In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (showing text of ruling); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A13 (discussing the unsealing of the opinion several months
after the judgment was handed down).
375
See Hepting v. AT&T Commc’ns, No. 06-0672 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) (rendering judgment in favor of the defendants according to the court’s June 3, 2009, order);
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting motion to dismiss) (noting that the basis for the government’s motion to dismiss was FISA
Section 802); see generally FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 802, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a
(Supp. II 2009).
376
Joint Notice of Appeal of Designated Plaintiffs and Actions, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency,
No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2009) [hereinafter Joint Notice of Appeal in In re NSA].
377
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (order on notice of
voluntary dismissal), dismissing Complaint, Electron Tubes Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns,
No. 06-06433 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 26, 2006); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 22, 2007) (order on notice of voluntary dismissal), dismissing Complaint, Trevino v. AT&T Corp., No. 06-05268 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 2006).
378
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting motion to dismiss), ECF No. 639; In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3,
2009) (order granting motion for summary judgment), ECF No. 640.
374
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379

munications companies.
(All thirty-eight cases are currently on ap380
peal. ) The second order applied to the state cases (i.e., the cases in
which states were subpoenaing documents from telecommunications
companies, with the exception of Clayton, where Clayton is the plain381
The controlling provision for these state cases fell within FItiff).
SAAA’s amendments to section 803 of FISA, codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1885b (a provision which authorizes the federal government to bring
suit to enforce the provisions that deny states the authority to investigate, regulate, or impose administrative sanctions, or to commence a
civil action or other proceeding in regards to disclosure of information
concerning electronic communication service providers’ alleged assis382
tance to the intelligence community). This provision applied to any
action pending on or commenced after the date of the amendment’s
383
enactment. None of the state cases were appealed.
According to the approach taken to date within the academic literature, none of these cases is a state secrets case, as the court did not, in the
end, rule on whether state secrets doctrine applied; rather, FISAAA
preempted the state secrets question. Yet the executive branch jurisprudence underlying the cases, the manner of their development, and
379

See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, at 18 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order
granting motion to dismiss), ECF No. 639 (“[S]ection 802 creates an immunity, albeit
one that is activated in an unusual way.”).
380
Joint Notice of Appeal in In re NSA, supra note 376.
381
See, e.g., Clayton v. AT&T Commc’ns of the Sw., Inc., No. 07-1187 (N.D. Cal.
transferred Feb. 28, 2007) (originating in W.D. Mo.); Complaint, United States v. Volz,
No. 06-0188 (D. Vt. filed Oct. 2, 2006). In 2006, the Vermont Department of Public
Service petitioned the Vermont Public Service Board to open investigations of Verizon
and AT&T. The Board ordered the carriers to respond. On October 2, 2006, the federal government sued to enjoin the investigation. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, at 5-7 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009) (order granting
motion for summary judgment), ECF. No. 640; see also United States v. Palermino, 238
F.R.D. 118, 120 (D. Conn. 2006) (showing intervention by the U.S. government in an
action by a Connecticut agency to compel telecommunications carriers to disclose government information); Complaint, United States v. Adams, No. 06-00097 (D. Me. Aug.
21, 2006) (arguing that the states do not have the authority to access federal government information); Complaint, United States v. Gaw, No. 06-01132 (E.D. Mo. July 25,
2006) (same); Complaint, United States v. Farber, No. 07-01324 (D.N.J. June 14, 2006)
(same); Procedural Order, Nos. 7183, 7192 & 7193 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. July 18, 2008)
(inviting comment on how to proceed in light of FISA amendments significantly limiting the permissible scope of investigation). For the renaming of the cases, see In re
Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2009)
(order granting motion for summary judgment), ECF No. 640.
382
See FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 803, 50 U.S.C. § 1885b (Supp. II 2009)
(providing that states have no authority to investigate these national intelligence matters, and that the United States may bring suit to enforce this provision).
383
Id. § 803(d).
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the impact of state secrets throughout litigation are central to understanding the privilege and how the courts deal with allegations of constitutional violations and national security interests. The battle, moreover, went to the heart of the separation-of-powers principle. The
manner in which the cases unfolded, additionally, sheds new light on
the relationship between FISA and state secrets.
The remaining four cases represent suits brought against governmental entities (as opposed to telecommunication companies in the
first court order and state governments in the second court order). In
regard to the first of these cases, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Obama, in March 2010, Chief Judge Walker ruled that the warrantless in384
terception of an Islamic charity’s telephone calls had violated FISA.
The court said that the plaintiffs had been subjected to unlawful sur385
veillance, making the government liable for civil damages. Plaintiffs
subsequently requested punitive damages of $183,600 for each plain386
tiff. As of this writing, the second case, Center for Constitutional Rights
387
v. Bush, is awaiting motions for summary judgment. The third, Shu388
bert v. Bush, is currently on appeal, following a judgment in favor of
389
defendants.
The fourth, Guzzi v. Bush, was dismissed in March
390
2010. In each of these, the state secrets doctrine has been central to
the case. Careful examination of the related transcripts, memoranda,
and legal documents sheds important light on the manner in which
the executive branch invokes the privilege; how the courts respond to
in camera, ex parte examination of the materials; how the judiciary
treats information already in the public domain; and the relationship
between FISA and state secrets.

384

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Claim for Punitive Damages at 1, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, Nos. 07-010, 06-1791 (N.D.
Cal. May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Claim for Damages in Al-Haramain].
385
Id. The plaintiffs also requested punitive damages. See id. at 1-7 (“Defendants
sought to put themselves above the law, in the manner of a monarch. That is a profound abuse of America’s trust. It calls for strong medicine.”). Cf. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Request for Punitive Damages, Al-Haramain, Nos. 07-0109, 06-1791
(N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010).
386
Plaintiffs’ Claim for Damages in Al-Haramain, supra note 384, at 1.
387
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 0701115 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2010).
388
Brief of Shubert Appellants, Shubert v. Bush, Nos. 10-15616, 06-1791 (9th Cir.
Aug. 13, 2010).
389
Shubert v. Bush, Nos. 07-00693, 06-1791 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2010).
390
See Guzzi v. Bush, No. 06-6225 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (order dismissing case)
(dismissing the case based on the stipulated dismissal by the parties).
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In Al-Haramain, for instance, District Court Judge King decided on
August 18, 2006, to review the documents submitted after the government invoked the state secrets privilege in camera and ex parte, but
he declined to review in kind documents submitted prior to the decla391
He subsequently found that “[a]s a result of these official
ration.
statements and publications, the existence of the Surveillance Pro392
gram is not a secret.” Confirming or denying whether the plaintiffs
had been subject to surveillance would not create a reasonable danger
to national security, at least in regard “to the surveillance event or
events disclosed in the Sealed Document, and without publicly disclos393
The court
ing any other information in the Sealed Document.”
found that disclosure of further surveillance efforts, however, “could
394
But since the government had “lifted the
harm national security.”
veil of secrecy on the existence of the Surveillance Program,” the “very
395
subject matter of the plaintiffs’ action” was not a state secret. Judge
King proved remarkably unwilling “to dismiss this case without first
examining all available options and allowing plaintiffs their constitu396
tional right to seek relief in this Court.” The court drew attention to
the surrounding network of statutory authorities and secondary in397
struments used to prevent information from becoming public.
While the court denied the plaintiff access to the classified material, it
simultaneously shifted the burden to the government to file further
affidavits in camera to show that sealed documents would be required
398
for the plaintiff to make a prima facie case. The court opted to monitor discovery closely in order to allow it to move forward, while denying
399
Although the court sidesplaintiffs’ request to unseal the record.
tepped the FISA question and the attendant constitutional questions,

391

Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1219-20 (D.
Or. 2006).
392
Id. at 1222.
393
Id. at 1224.
394
Id.
395
Id. at 1224-25.
396
Id. at 1227.
397
Id. at 1227-28 (citing National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) (2006); Exec.
Order No. 12,958, § 1.1(b), 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2004)).
398
Id. at 1229.
399
Id. at 1232-33.
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400

the underlying legal documents explored the arguments in detail.
401
Throughout the litigation, the specter of state secrets loomed.
The fifty suits discussed above are not the only ones to come out
of the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program. One of the most im402
portant cases was ACLU v. National Security Agency, an earlier case not
included in the MDL, in which the Director of National Intelligence,
John D. Negroponte, and the NSA’s Signals Intelligence Director, Major General Richard J. Quirk, invoked state secrets and related privi403
The executive branch sought a motion to dismiss or, in the
leges.
404
alternative, summary judgment. Following examination of classified
in camera materials, the lower court rejected the invocation of the
405
state secrets privilege as a bar to the litigation moving forward.
In Jewel v. National Security Agency, the Obama Administration re406
quested dismissal based not only on state secrets but also on sove400

See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Order Compelling Discovery at 5-17, Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, No. 060274 (D. Or. July 2006), 2006 WL 1909808 (contending that FISA abrogates the state
secrets privilege in foreign electronic surveillance cases); Defendants’ Response to the
Oregonian’s Motion to Intervene and to Unseal Records at 9-17, Al-Haramain, No. 060274 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 1465726 (arguing against the unsealing of classified documents).
401
See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order Barring the Deposition of Barbara C. Hammerle at 4, Al-Haramain, No. 06-0274
(D. Or. June 9, 2006), 2006 WL 1716659 (“Defendants are preparing a dispositive motion, based on an assertion of the state secrets privilege, that will demonstrate that this
case should not proceed.”).
402
438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), overruled by ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,
493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
403
See Declaration of John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence at 2,
ACLU, No. 06-10204 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1868157 (asserting the state
secrets privilege); Declaration of Major General Richard J. Quirk, Signals Intelligence
Director, National Security Agency at 2, ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-10204 (E.D.
Mich. May 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1868158 (supporting the assertion of the state secrets
privilege, as well as a statutory privilege); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of a Stay Pending Appeal at 11-15, ACLU, No. 06-10204
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2791162 (referencing depositions).
404
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the United States’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and Defendants’ Motion to Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, ACLU, No. 06-10204 (E.D. Mich.
May 26, 2006), 2006 WL 1868156.
405
See Defendants’ Reply in Support of a Stay Pending Appeal at 1, ACLU, No.
06-10204 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2769326 (explaining the lower
court’s order).
406
See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-1791, 2010 WL 235075, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 21, 2001) (asserting the state secrets privilege first on April 3, 2009); Government
Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D.
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407

reign immunity. The government drew on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions and the surrounding classification statu408
tory framework, similar to its position the Al-Haramain litigation.
The following September, the defendants requested what amounted
to an indefinite stay: that is, an order that they “not be required to
answer or otherwise respond to plaintiffs’ complaint until there is a
final resolution of whether information subject to the state secrets and
409
related statutory privileges is necessary to litigate plaintiffs claims.”
The plaintiffs expressed frustration at the length of time it had taken
for the case to work its way through the courts: “While the NSA’s program of wholesale warrantless surveillance of millions of Americans
has been ongoing for at least eight years, this case, along with multiple
others seeking judicial review of the serious underlying legal and constitutional questions, has essentially languished in preliminary proce410
dural challenges.” The plaintiffs had first brought a case against the
NSA three and a half years prior. Following congressional action, the
plaintiffs brought the current case:
In the over three years that these cases have been pending, despite the
ongoing nature of the harms and the accumulation of a mountain of
pleadings and boxes of evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ claims, the
Government’s strategy of raising and re-raising the same arguments

Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Government Response in Jewel], 2009 WL 2876653
(maintaining that FISA does not preempt the state secrets privilege); Government Defendants’ Statement in Support of Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Relief
from Court Orders at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 2876652
(stating that defendants are barred from revealing information subject to the state secrets
privilege); Government Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for
Summary Judgment at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2009), 2009 WL
1883020 (“As the recently [sic] President made clear, while the state secrets privilege is
necessary to protect national security, the United States will not invoke the privilege to
prevent disclosure of the violation of a law or embarrassment to the government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Government Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 14-16, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. June
3, 2009), 2009 WL 1683967 (“For purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims, FISA preempts the
common-law state secrets privilege.”).
407
See Jewel, 2010 WL 235075, at *1 (noting that the various government defendants
have argued similarly in stating that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity).
408
See Government Response in Jewel, supra note 406, at 3-4 (arguing that FISA
does not preempt the state secrets privilege).
409
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Relief
from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009, at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2009) (citations omitted).
410
Id.
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based on the state secrets privilege and other governmental privileges
411
has successfully limited forward motion toward the merits.

Defendants argued in reply that information potentially protected by
state secrets was required to establish a qualified immunity defense—
making them unable to defend themselves adequately until the state
412
In January 2010, the court
secrets questions had been resolved.
413
ruled in favor of the NSA.
In each of these cases, the government acted as defendant, invoking the state secrets privilege in the process. It is not just the suits related to the NSA’s wiretapping program, though, that have found the
government in this position.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES BROUGHT AGAINST
U.S. OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES
From 2001 to 2009, a range of legal claims against federal officials
and agencies prompted executive invocation of the state secrets privilege. Since the early to mid-twentieth century, as treatises and scholarly works recognized, such assertions have been treated as distinct
from executive privilege, law enforcement evidentiary privilege, and
414
informer’s protection.
The claims in cases where the federal gov411

Id.
See Individual Capacity Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion for Relief from the Court’s Orders of April 27, 2009, and May 8, 2009 at 1, Jewel, No. 08-4373
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2009) (arguing that an order for the individual defendants to respond should be stayed until the privilege issues have been decided). The Individual
Capacity Defendants included George W. Bush, Richard B. Cheney, David S. Addington, Keith B. Alexander, Michael V. Hayden, John D. McConnell, John D. Negroponte,
Michael B. Mukasey, Alberto R. Gonzales, and John D. Ashcroft. Id. at 12. The Government Defendants entered a brief in support of the Individual Capacity Defendants’
Motion. See Government Defendants’ Statement in Support of Individual Capacity Defendants’ Motion for Relief from Court Orders, Jewel, No. 08-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
2009) (arguing for a stay of the order until privilege issues are decided).
413
Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 06-01791, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21,
2010).
414
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1273-76 (explaining the historical development of the privilege in treatises). The relationship between executive privilege and
state secrets, however, continues to be confused in legal documents. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’
Reply to Defendant’s Invalid Assertion of Executive Privilege to Deny Production of
Thousands of Pages of Documents Underlying Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 at 2, Jade Trading,
LLC v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 85 (2005) (No. 03-2164), 2003 WL 25656604 (referring to the defendant’s assertion of “executive privilege” to withhold documents); City
of Miami’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Concerning the MPD FTAA Operational Plan and Motion for Protective Order at 1, Owaki v. City of Miami, 491 F.
Supp. 2d 1140 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 06-20737) (asserting an “official information privilege”); Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendant’s Claims of Privilege Regarding the Tes412
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ernment, as the defendant, invokes the state secrets privilege include

timony of Former Deputy Police Chief Pamela Evans at 2, Lewis v. City of Detroit, 234
F.R.D. 157 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-70667), 2006 WL 1035838 (noting the assertion
of the “executive privilege”).
Notably, the invocation of the “state secrets” privilege has not been differentiated
into the categories that mark federal law. Instead, the privilege appears to be understood broadly, incorporating such varied material as institutional files, prison records,
personnel records, the method of lethal injection, the names of executioners, informer’s identity, and more. See, e.g., Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding a statutory basis for considering prison records to be state secrets); Taylor v.
Nix, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (denying access to prison records on
grounds of state secrets); Pack v. Beyer, 157 F.R.D. 226, 233 (D.N.J. 1994) (finding that
the state secrets privilege applied to prison documents); Beckett v. Trice, No. 08-0029,
1994 WL 319171, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 6, 1994) (deeming information between
witnesses and prosecutor a state secret); Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration by the
District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production
and Further Responses at 3-4, Jadwin v. County of Kern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) (No. 07-00026), 2008 WL 2817302 (arguing that personnel records should
be considered a state secret); Motion for Stay of Execution at 37, Nooner v. Norris, No.
06-00110 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2007), 2007 WL 3224262 (noting that the defendant’s lethal injection method was considered a state secret); Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’
Brief Filed on May 30, 2007, at 5, Press-Citizen Co. v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, No. 07-6443
(D. Iowa June 3, 2007), 2007 WL 6335525 (referring to an informant’s privilege as a
state secret); Response to Non-Party Objection and Motion to Quash Subpoena and
Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena and Notice of Deposition of Representative of the Georgia Department of Corrections Under FRCP Rule 30(b)(6) and Request for an Immediate Order at 11, Graham v. Rich, No. 06-0095 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24,
2006), 2006 WL 1436664 (treating criminal files as a “state secret”); Response to Defendants’ Efforts to Keep Names of Executioners Including One Who Is a Board Certified
Surgeon Secret from Plaintiffs’ Counsel Even Subject to a Protective Order at 8, Taylor
v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2005), 2005 WL 6070480 (“If the name
of the board-certified surgeon were not a state secret, we would see how long he or she
retained that distinction.”); Opposition to Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions at 6, Lott v. Greystar Corp., No. 01-0312 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2001), 2001 WL
34673784 (referring to New Jersey state prisoner files as state secrets).
Even when addressed to criminal matters and executive privilege, such cases may
nevertheless rely on Reynolds, among other things. See, e.g., Pack v. Beyer, 157 F.R.D.
226, 231 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Reynolds for the proposition that “[t]he state secrets privilege protects official information from disclosure if disclosure might otherwise endanger the public interest” (citation omitted)). Like many of the federal cases, they
are often unreported. See, e.g., Brady v. Ocean Farm Ltd. P’ship, No. 2036-S, 2002 WL
259955 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2002). Perhaps even more extraordinary is the situation in
which state governments have invoked the privilege in its national security sense. In
Cedar and Washington Associates, for instance, the state of New York claimed state secrets
as its twenty-fifth defense, arguing that the September 11, 2001, attacks amounted to
an act of war. Amended Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants UAL Corporation
and United Air Lines, Inc. at 22, Cedar & Washington Assoc., LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
& N.J., No. 08-9146 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2009), 2009 WL 1897295; see also Answer with
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim of Defendant Host Hotels & Resorts, Inc. at 17,
Cedar & Washington Assoc., No. 08-9146 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 319560 (asserting the state secrets privilege as a defense).
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constitutional violations (such as Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims
and violations of international law), environmental cases, employment-related suits (such as wrongful termination and unlawful discrimination), libel, and defamation.
Three characteristics of the suits are of note: First, when the government acts as defendant, the executive branch appears more likely
to invoke the state secrets privilege early in the suit than in cases in
which the government is an intervenor. One explanation for this may
be simply that the government is more aware of the suit moving forward than in situations where a corporation is lobbying the executive
to become more involved. It may also be that the type of activities
such suits target is more likely to involve clandestine operations.
Second, the executive branch does not appear to change its position
in a suit once it has invoked the state secrets privilege, even when it
does not appear advantageous for the government to hold its course.
Third, when positioned as a defendant, the government tends to seek
not just suppression of evidence, but dismissal of the case. The proliferation of cases against the government since the September 11, 2001,
attacks may thus partially explain why the government appears to be using state secrets differently than before. As Professor Chesney points
415
out, though, the government has previously sought full dismissal.
What appears to be different now, at least judging from the instant research project, is that there are many visible cases alleging extreme and possibly criminal behavior, as well as constitutional violations, in which the government seeks to dismiss the case as part of its
own defense. The claims are thus different from the more traditional
state secrets cases—that is, those centered on tortious conduct or contractual disputes. Instead, the plaintiffs are alleging constitutional violations and criminal activity. This suggests that a rather different
cost is at stake than contemplated, for instance, by the court in Rey416
The claims also arise within a different context: while in
nolds.
torts, for example, privilege plays into litigation in a number of ways
(e.g., marital privilege and attorney-client privilege); in cases that
reach questions of the separation of powers or constitutional rights,

415

See Chesney, supra note 6, at 1297-98 (identifying twenty-eight cases decided
before September 11, 2001, in which the government sought dismissal of “some or all
claims” under the state secrets privilege).
416
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1953) (weighing the necessity of
the evidence to plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims against the “danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged”).
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privileging an entire class of defendants raises a different set of
(foundational) costs.
A. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations
Fourth Amendment claims similar to those raised with respect to
the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program have previously appeared in
417
The period
a range of lawsuits that challenge federal surveillance.
418
from 2001 to 2009 proves no different.
In such circumstances, the
state secrets privilege invocations may play a role in preventing plaintiffs
from establishing standing, essentially acting as a bar to any litigation.
In 2005, for instance, following repeated detentions in less-thanideal facilities during the course of their travels, the Rahman family,
419
consisting of two parents and two small children, brought suit. The
family alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations in connection
417

See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment allegations, even if true, did not prevent the
government from asserting the state secrets privilege); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ordering reconsideration of the state secrets privilege raised to
protect intelligence collection); United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 854 (3d Cir.
1974) (affirming the state secrets protection in an action involving alleged wiretaps by
the government); Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 512-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding the state secrets privilege validly established in a suit alleging unlawful interception of wire communications); Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 776-77 (D.N.J.
1978) (analyzing assertions of Fourth Amendment protection against FBI seizure of
items in the mail); Kinoy v. Mitchell 67 F.R.D. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (preventing the disclosure of surveillance documents in an action alleging Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment violations); Elson v. Bowen, 436 P.2d 12, 13-14 (Nev. 1967) (finding the
government’s privilege to withhold evidence from plaintiffs alleging illegal surveillance
at hotels to be “subject to the requirement that the government has the duty in seeing
that justice is done”). Such cases often allege multiple constitutional violations. See,
e.g., Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 478 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (noting plaintiff’s allegations
of First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Amendment violations).
418
See, e.g., Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 607 F. Supp. 2d 500, 501
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim that the Treasury Department unlawfully
obtained the plaintiff’s financial information by administrative subpoena). The case
arose when the Bush Administration allegedly served an administrative subpoena (National Security Letter) on a Belgian banking cooperative, requesting that the company
forward private financial data to the United States. Id. at 502. The federal defendants
raised the potential invocation of the state secrets privilege early in the suit to alert the
court to problems of standing that would ensue. Id. The court duly took notice of the
government’s assertion, even as it ruled to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 508-09.
419
Class Action Complaint at 2-3, Rahman v. Chertoff, 244 F.R.D. 443 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (No. 05-3761), 2005 WL 1768574. Defendants, in their official capacities, included Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Robert
C. Bonner, Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Id. at 1.
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with their inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), ad420
ministered by the Terrorist Screening Center.
Approximately one
421
Eight of the
year later, the plaintiffs moved for class certification.
named plaintiffs claimed to have been improperly detained or mistreated because either the TSDB incorrectly identified them as posing a serious threat (the “overclassification” claim) or because they
were mistaken for someone on the list (the “misidentification”
422
claim). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in relation
423
to the travel delays to which they had been subjected.
The court initially concluded that a protective order would be appropriate under the law enforcement and investigatory files privi424
lege.
However, following a memorandum opinion and order on
425
May 1, 2007, which required defendants to produce a range of documents, in July 2007, the government moved for a ruling that state se426
crets privilege barred the discovery of some materials. The government claimed as excluded any information tending to confirm or
deny whether the plaintiff had ever been placed in the TSDB, FBI files
on any plaintiffs who may have been listed in the TSDB, any records in
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) pertaining to
the plaintiffs, and policy and procedure documents containing classi427
fied information about terrorist screening practices.

420

Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2008 WL 4534407, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16,

2008).
421

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 1,
Rahman, 244 F.R.D. 443 (No. 05-3761), 2006 WL 5940391; see also Rahman, 244 F.R.D.
at 452 (adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation on class certification, and granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss).
422
Rahman, 2008 WL 4534407, at *1.
423
Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-3761, 2007 WL 2892972, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28,
2007).
424
See id. at *1 (recounting that the court had initially concluded “the parties had
established good cause to protect information relating to the alleged border stops”).
425
Rahman, No. 05-3761 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2007) (sealed order).
426
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion
for a Protective Order Barring Discovery of Matters Subject to the State Secrets Privilege at 1, Rahman, 244 F.R.D. 443 (No. 05-3761), 2007 WL 5336227.
427
Id. at 3. John P. Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Operations) of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and William S. Heffelfinger III, Deputy Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, filed
affidavits in support of the investigatory law enforcement privilege (not the state secrets privilege). Rahman, 2007 WL 2892972, at *5-6. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney
General; J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence; Gale Rossides, Acting Deputy Administrator (TSA); Andrew Colsky, Director of Sensitive Security Information (TSA); and Robert Jacksta, Executive Director (Traveler’s Security and Facilita-
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On December 4, 2007, the court heard oral argument on the motion and subsequently considered further written supplements to the
428
Strict procedures accompanied court examination of the
record.
documents in camera and ex parte: one copy of the classified materials was brought into chambers, read, and returned—along with any
notes made on the materials—to a secure location outside the court’s
429
Judge Ronald A. Guzmán and Magistrate Judge Sidney I.
control.
Schenkier, who were not permitted to discuss the material with their
staff, concluded that the government would be required to confirm or
deny whether the plaintiffs had ever been listed in the TSDB, but
would not be required to provide FBI files or access to the TIDE database (the bank of information on terrorists that was created by the In430
telligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004).
Upon the government’s interlocutory appeal from district court,
Chief Judge Easterbrook and Circuit Judges Kanne and Tinder heard
oral argument on May 13, 2008, and issued their decision June 26,
431
2008. Before them was neither the district court’s refusal to dismiss
the suit (an interlocutory decision and thus not yet reviewable), nor
the scope of the state secrets privilege, but rather the court’s decision
to certify two nationwide classes (the “Primary Traveler Class” and the
432
On these grounds, the circuit court re“Family Detainee Class”).
versed and remanded the case, but not without noting its discomfort
433
at being forced into the national security realm. Judge Easterbrook
concluded his opinion:
Plaintiffs are entitled to relief that will redress any discrete wrong done
them. That can be accomplished without certifying a class. There is no
risk that the defendants can moot the litigation by offering compromises
to all named plaintiffs. Defendants have shown no inclination to do so,

tion) submitted public declarations in support of the state secrets assertion. Rahman,
2008 WL 4534407, at *2 n.4.
428
Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order
Barring Discovery of State Secrets, Pursuant to the Court’s Order of December 4, 2007,
at 1, Rahman, No. 05-3761 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008), 2008 WL 2810560.
429
Rahman, 2008 WL 4534407, at *2 n.4.
430
Id. at *11; see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 485) (establishing an
“information sharing environment” to facilitate “the sharing of terrorism information”
by “any methods determined necessary and appropriate”).
431
Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2008).
432
See id. at 625 (indicating that the district court had certified two classes in the
case, and that the defendants claimed that plaintiffs’ membership in a given class
could, as the classes were defined, change with every court filing).
433
Id. at 627-28.
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and the strategy could not work, because other travelers could intervene
to carry on. Decisions favorable to particular plaintiffs will have their effect in the normal way: through the force of precedent. If this seems a
modest vision of the judiciary’s role, we answer that modesty is the best posture for
the branch that knows the least about protecting the nation’s security and that
lacks the full kit of tools possessed by the legislative and executive branches. Presidents, Cabinet officers, and Members of Congress can be dismissed by the people if
they strike an unwise balance between false positives and false negatives, between
inconvenience today and mayhem tomorrow; judges are immune from that supervision and must permit those who bear the blame for errors (in either direction) to
434
assume the responsibility for management.

Speaking on behalf of the court, Judge Easterbrook was reluctant to
tread into an area in which he had neither the expertise nor the capacity that those tasked with overseeing national security had.
One of the dangers of Judge Easterbrook’s approach is that, in the
context of official intelligence operations, state secrets—even where
properly invoked—may play a key role in covering up officials’ bad
behavior. Perhaps the best illustration of this danger is a 1993 case involving a DEA employee, a State Department official, and a CIA
435
agent. That case, Horn v. Huddle, has been omitted from most state
secrets analyses, in large part because it was sealed. Recently partially
unsealed, the case illustrates in detail the potential misuse of state secrets to cover officials’ misdeeds. It highlights the deference frequently afforded to the executive branch by the courts, and it reinforces the
idea that successive administrations tend to hold the line once the
state secrets privilege has been invoked. However, the extent to which
Horn v. Huddle is sui generis is unclear.
436
The case began as a Bivens action, in which a former DEA agent
tried to prove that the CIA illegally spied on him to thwart his mission
437
Richard A. Horn, the DEA’s country attaché,
in Rangoon, Burma.
“had a strained professional relationship with the State Department
Chargé d’Affaires, Franklin ‘Pancho’ Huddle, Jr., arising from the dif438
Horn alleged that Huddle
fering policy goals of their agencies.”
434

Id. (emphasis added).
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Note that In re Sealed Case on
remand later became Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009), vacated, 699 F.
Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010).
436
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 391-95 (1971) (finding an implied cause of action for violations by federal officials
of the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure).
437
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141.
438
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 141; see also Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756 (D.D.C.
July 28, 2004) (order granting motion to dismiss) (identifying the plaintiff as a former
435
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sent his superiors in Washington, D.C., a classified State Department
cable transcribing a telephone call Horn had made from his residence
439
in Rangoon on August 12, 1993, to one of his subordinates. During
the call, Horn “expressed concern that Huddle was trying to expel
him from Burma and that DEA might respond by closing its Burma
440
office.” According to the D.C. Circuit opinion, the cable from Huddle, sent the following day, read, “Horn shows increasing signs of evident strain. Late last night, for example, he telephoned his junior
agent to say that ‘I am bringing the whole DEA operation down here.’
441
‘You will be leaving with me . . . . We’ll all leave together.’”
The DEA removed Horn from his post, prompting Horn to bring
a Fourth Amendment claim against the CIA and the State Depart442
ment. The case was originally assigned to Judge Harold H. Greene,
a Johnson (and then Carter) appointee, one of the principal architects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the presiding judge in the
443
In 1997, Judge
case that resulted in the breakup of AT&T Co.
Greene allowed most of In re Sealed Case to proceed, despite a summary judgment motion filed by the government. In early 2000, how444
The case was then assigned to Judge
ever, Greene passed away.
Royce C. Lamberth, former Chief of the Department of Justice Civil
Division and presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
445
Court until May 18, 2002.
In addition to the wiretapping incident, Horn alleged that the
State Department was trying to undermine the DEA in Burma—
including turning over a DEA document with the name of informants
446
to the Burmese government without DEA permission.
On August

U.S. DEA employee bringing suit for actions occurring while he was stationed in Rangoon, Huddle as a State Department employee and Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, and Arthur Brown as a CIA employee in Burma); id. at 2-3 (noting
Horn’s contention that Huddle wanted him removed from Burma in retaliation for
Horn’s sending reports to congressional members that conflicted with State Department reports prepared by Huddle, and noting the CIA’s unauthorized transfer of DEA
documents to the Burmese government); Complaint at 6-10, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (discussing interagency political issues).
439
Complaint, supra note 438, at 10.
440
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 145.
441
Id. at 145-46 (citation omitted).
442
Complaint, supra note 438, at 12.
443
Martin Weil, Harold Greene, AT&T Case Judge, Dies, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2000,
at A01.
444
Id.
445
An Interview with Judge Royce C. Lamberth, THE THIRD BRANCH, June 2002, at 9, 10.
446
Complaint, supra note 438, at 6-7.
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15, 2000, Judge Lamberth held that the CIA’s Inspector General reports of both incidents were protected under the state secrets privi447
He ascertained four categories of information in the reports
lege.
that were protected from disclosure:
(1) information that “would threaten to reveal the identities of certain
covert CIA officers”; (2) information as to the “location of certain covert
CIA installations and activities”; (3) “information as to the organizational
structure and functions of the CIA”; and (4) information on “intelligence gathering sources, methods and capabilities, including liaison re448
lationships with foreign governments.”

Judge Lamberth invited Horn to demonstrate at an August 21,
2000, hearing how the case could possibly proceed after the privilege
449
At that hearing, the court invited parties to submit
had attached.
450
follow-up briefings. Nearly three months later, the government filed
451
Horn did not file an
a classified motion to dismiss the complaint.
opposition to the motion, but he did file several motions to extend the
452
He also requested
time allotted to oppose the motion to dismiss.
that the court order investigations and, if found appropriate, provide
top-secret clearances to plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel’s secretary
(plaintiff’s counsel had been given top-secret clearance earlier in the
453
Judge Lamberth declined: “Having found that the state secase).
crets privilege provides an absolute bar keeping certain information
out of the litigation, the Court finds its interest in having the assistance of plaintiff’s counsel outweighed by the United States’ interest

447

See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting
motion to dismiss) (providing the case’s relevant procedural history).
448
Id. at 9 (quoting Horn v. Albright, Nos. 96-2120, 94-1756, at 11-12 (D.D.C. Aug.
15, 2000) (order sustaining assertion of state secrets privilege), ECF No. 340); see also
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s decision to apply the state secrets privilege to the Inspector General
reports).
449
See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2000) (order directing
plaintiff to address plan for discovery), ECF No. 342 (asking plaintiff to “explain what
non-state secrets evidence he has in support of his remaining claim”).
450
See Transcript of Aug. 21, 2000 Status Hearing at 12, 19, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (requesting that the parties submit further
briefs within thirty days).
451
United States’ Motion to Dismiss Civil Action 94-1756 Based on the State Secrets Privilege, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756).
452
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3-4 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting motion to dismiss).
453
Id. at 3-4.
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454

in national security.” Horn also filed a motion to proceed with dis455
covery under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).
It took nearly four years for the judge to issue an opinion. On July
28, 2004, the court found three independent grounds for dismissal:
(1) the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case absent the pro456
tected material; (2) the state secrets privilege deprived defendants
457
of “information required in their defense”; and (3) the subject matter of the plaintiff’s action was a state secret. As to the last ground, the
court was particularly concerned that “witnesses with knowledge of secret information may divulge that information during trial because
the plaintiffs ‘would have every incentive to probe as close to the core
secrets as the trial judge would permit. Such probing in open court
458
Finally, Judge Lamberth added,
would inevitably be revealing.’”
“the Court cannot and will not adopt CIPA as a mechanism for allow459
ing the case to go forward.”
Horn appealed, and on December 14, 2006, Circuit Judges Rog460
ers, Brown, and Griffith heard the case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case as to Arthur Brown, the CIA operative,
but reversed and remanded the case to district court as to Huddle,
stating that Horn should be given the opportunity to “establish a prima
461
facie case without using the privileged information.”
In January 2008, the case took an unexpected turn. Department
of Justice (DOJ) attorney Paul Freeborne submitted a filing, stating
that the basis for the government’s invocation of the privilege in In re
Sealed Case (that is, the “covert agent” status of CIA agent Arthur
454

Id. at 7-8.
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order denying government’s proposal); see also 18 U.S.C. app. (2006).
456
See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting
motion to dismiss) (stating that Halkin found “dismissal appropriate where state secrets
prevented plaintiffs from making a prima facie case” (citing Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d
977, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).
457
See id. (indicating that Molerio mandated that the case “be dismissed because
[the] court’s evaluation of state secrets privilege revealed existence of valid defense
that defendants could not assert because of privilege” (citing Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d
815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). The Horn court also cited Bareford v. General Dynamics
Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992), for further support of the proposition that
dismissal is necessary where the state secrets privilege deprives defendants of their defense. Id.
458
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8-9 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004) (order granting motion to dismiss) (quoting Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141).
459
Id. at 14.
460
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
461
See id. (affirming that the state secrets provision was properly invoked).
455
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Brown) had been incorrect: “Counsel for the United States recently
learned that in 2002, Defendant II’s cover was ‘lifted’ and ‘rolled back’
462
to his entrance on duty date with the Central Intelligence Agency.”
In short, Brown had listed his employment with the CIA during the
course of a job search, with the CIA’s knowledge and, presumably, its
consent. Horn immediately filed a motion seeking relief from the ap463
He further requested that the judge
pellate judgment against him.
reinstate Brown as a defendant and sanction or hold contempt proceedings against the government attorneys who failed to alert the district court and court of appeals of the change in Brown’s cover sta464
Horn anchored his claim in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
tus.
60(b)(3), which allows the court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), mi465
Although it
srepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.”
had been more than a year since the appellate court had issued its
holding, there was no statute of limitations for fraud on the court (that
is, “‘fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not
fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or
466
perjury’” ).
CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo filed an affidavit in response, stating that he had personally conducted an inquiry into the
matter and that the Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the CIA had
not been put on notice of the change in Brown’s cover status until
467
2005. In January of that year, an attorney within the Litigation Division of OGC had been made aware of the circumstances but had cho462

Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting motion for relief from judgment) (citing the government’s filing on January 31, 2008).
463
See id. at 1-2 (detailing the procedural history leading up to Horn’s motion).
464
Id.
465
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).
466
Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Mgmt., Inc. 98 F.3d 640, 642 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (quoting Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1983)); see also id.
(holding that a Rule 60(c) motion under Rule 60(b)(3) must be made within one year
after the judgment was entered). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3) (indicating that the
above rules “do not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the
court”). The relevant test was laid out in Workman v. Bell, which requires conduct that
is (1) performed “on the part of an officer of the court”; (2) directed against the judicial machinery; (3) “intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or in . . . reckless
disregard for the truth”; (4) a “positive averment or concealment when one is under a
duty to disclose”; and (5) deceptive to the court. 227 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2000).
467
See Declaration of John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency at 2-3, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756) (explaining
why the district court and the court of appeals were not made aware of Brown’s
change in cover status).

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

The Shadow of State Secrets

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

177

sen not to inform his supervisors, the district court, or the appellate
468
court. Two more affidavits accompanied Rizzo’s filing: the first, by
Robert Eatinger, Associate General Counsel of the OGC (saying that
he had not been informed of any change in Brown’s cover status prior
469
to January 2008), and the second by John Radsan, Assistant General
Counsel in CIA’s OGC from April 2002 to July 2004 (saying that, while
he was generally familiar with the case, he did not recall hearing
470
about a change in Brown’s cover status until March 2008).
Accordingly, on January 14, 2009, now–Chief Judge Lamberth entered an opinion censuring the government: the CIA had “lifted”
Brown’s cover in 2002 and “rolled back” his cover to February 19,
1980 (meaning that Brown could publicly admit that he was employed
471
by the CIA from that date forward). According to the court, the CIA
never informed the DOJ, nor was the CIA’s OGC aware of the change
472
The court held that this may qualify as misrein cover until 2005.
presentation, but not fraud on the court, because there had been no
473
But it
false submission “directed to the judicial machinery itself.”
was the conduct of one attorney within the CIA’s office that had “escalated this case from one of simple misrepresentation to fraud on the
474
court.” The OGC advisor to the East Asia Division had deliberately
475
concealed this information from his OGC supervisors and the DOJ.
Chief Judge Lamberth reinstated Brown as the defendant, holding
that the CIA attorney involved in litigation committed fraud on the
court by misleading the Court of Appeals as to the change in Brown’s
cover status and by failing to notify the court of the change in his cov476
er status upon remand. The judge declined to impose sanctions or
to initiate contempt proceedings; instead, he directed the government

468

See id. (recognizing the CIA’s duty to provide notice to the DOJ).
Declaration of Robert J. Eatinger at 4, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No.
94-1756).
470
Declaration of A. John Radsan at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No.
94-1756).
471
See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 4 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting
motion for relief from judgment) (recognizing Brown’s change in cover status).
472
Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2000).
473
See id. (listing the elements of “fraud upon the court”).
474
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2009) (order granting motion for relief from judgment); see also id. (stating that the inaccuracy in Brown’s cover
status had been noted in 2005 by the OGC legal advisor).
475
Id. at 5-6.
476
Id. at 12-13.
469
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to disclose the name of the attorney to the district court’s grievance
477
committee for investigation.
Brown reentered the suit and took the offensive. On January 27,
2009, he filed an affidavit with the court, stating that the “Rizzo Declaration makes two assertions that, based on my personal knowledge, are
478
inaccurate.” The OGC had been informed of the change in his cover
status: “I recall notifying, in person, two attorneys in the Office of
General Counsel (‘OGC’) Litigation Division, A. John Radson [sic]
and Robert J. Eatinger, about the change in my cover status in 2002,
within a few months of the agency’s action” (i.e., rolling back his sta479
Brown further stated that he had no recollection of reviewing
tus).
the draft motion for summary affirmance submitted to the Court of
480
Appeals with an East Asia Division OGC legal advisor.
The judge observed:
If what Brown says is true, the OGC attorneys intentionally misled this
Court even prior to its original 2004 ruling that dismissed the case. His
declaration, if true, indicates that the OGC of the CIA was aware of the
change in Brown’s cover status while the motion to dismiss the case was
481
pending in this Court.

More than one person knowing and hiding the information was
substantially different than the “one bad apple” argument the CIA
had previously put forward.
If multiple attorneys of the OGC within the CIA were aware of the
change in Brown’s cover status, and failed to report it to the Court, it
would be a material misrepresentation to both this Court and the Court
of Appeals. The CIA was well-aware that the assertion of the state secrets
482
privilege as to Brown was a key strategy in getting the case dismissed.

The problem extended to the top of the hierarchy:
The Department of Justice submitted an ex parte, classified declaration
of CIA Director Tenet on February 5, 2000, in support of its motion to
dismiss. In the declaration, Tenet stated that to allow the case to go forward would cause “damage to United States national security” because it
would “identify one or more covert CIA employees. Of obvious concern
477

Id. The name the CIA later disclosed was Jeffrey W. Yeates. Horn v. Huddle,
No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2009) (order staying any referrals of misconduct).
478
Declaration of Arthur M. Brown at 1, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55
(D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756).
479
Id. at 1-2.
480
Id. at 2.
481
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 4 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2009) (order staying any referrals of misconduct).
482
Id. at 5.
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would be the disclosure of Arthur Brown, who remains a covert em483
ployee assigned overseas.”

Chief Judge Lamberth went so far as to invite Horn to file a motion with the court “to reconsider and vacate its ruling denying the
484
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and/or contempt proceedings.” He
ordered a stay on the referral of misconduct on the part of the government attorneys, adding far from subtly in a footnote:
If the plaintiff wishes to file a motion, he should also state, that if he believes contempt proceedings are appropriate, whether he believes the
proceeding should be civil or criminal in nature. See International Union
v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28 (1994) (stating that “a contempt sanction
is considered civil if it is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindi485
cate the authority of the court.”).

The change in administration did little to change the government’s position. In 2009, CIA Director Panetta intervened, invoking
486
Lamthe state secrets privilege and requesting a protective order.
berth objected to continued executive efforts to keep the case sealed—
and to CIA arguments to reclassify some of the material previously dec487
lassified. The judge refused Panetta’s request: “After examining the
motion for a protective order and supporting declarations, the redactions made by the government, and keeping in mind the twisted history
of this case, the Court is not prepared to uphold the government’s renewed assertion of the state secrets privilege without more information
488
from the government.” Pretrial CIPA-like procedures would suffice—
489
an option the D.C. Circuit had left open in 2007.

483

Id. at 5 (quoting Ex Parte Declaration of George J. Tenet ¶ 22, Horn v. Huddle,
647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (No. 94-1756)).
484
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
485
Id. at 6 n.9.
486
See Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 6-7 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying
assertion of state secrets privilege) (recounting the government’s reassertion of the
state secrets privilege).
487
See, e.g., Transcript of Status Hearing at 42-45, Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp.
2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756) (disputing the government’s position that documents in which classified information had been redacted were still subject to the state
secrets privilege).
488
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 3 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying assertion of state secrets privilege).
489
See id. at 11-12 (believing that the CIPA-like procedures would best enable the
parties to argue whether known information is a state secret); see also In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[N]othing in this opinion forecloses a determination by the district court that some of the protective measures in CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app.,
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The government had lost credibility: “The Court does not give
the government a high degree of deference because of its prior misrepresentations regarding the state secrets privilege in this case.
Moreover, the plaintiff has made convincing arguments that the gov490
Lamernment has asserted the state secrets privilege too broadly.”
berth suggested that the fact that the CIA conducts surveillance could
hardly be considered a state secret; quite apart from information readily available through the Internet, the Spy Museum in Washington,
D.C., included a range of eavesdropping equipment historically used
491
Inconsistencies in classified and unclassified governby the CIA.
ment affidavits did not inspire any more confidence in the Executive
492
branch. Chief Judge Lamberth ordered the government “to provide
the Court with justifications for all of the redactions to the documents
and Inspector General reports that have been filed in this case so that
the Court can undertake a meaningful in camera review of the pur493
portedly privileged information.” In the interim, Horn and the defendants were to file motions indicating (1) any relevant information
in regard to which they thought or knew that the government intended to invoke state secrets, and (2) explanations or other evidence
494
as to why that information was not a state secret.
Four days after issuing his Memorandum Opinion, Lamberth issued a Memorandum and Order partially unsealing the case: “Although this case has been sealed since its inception to protect sensitive information, it is clear from reading the Court of Appeals’s 2007
public opinion in this case and seeing the unclassified appendix that
495
was filed on appeal that many of the issues are unclassified.”
The
judge ordered the government to file with the court unclassified versions of every document; the unclassified documents were given a
496
June 9, 2009, date of filing.
which applies in criminal cases, would be appropriate, as Horn urges, so that this case
could proceed.”).
490
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying assertion of state secrets privilege).
491
See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order denying government’s proposal) (referencing an eavesdropping device that was “publicly
available” since it was present at the Spy Museum).
492
See id. (indicating that the government’s declarations were inconsistent).
493
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 13 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009) (order denying assertion of state secrets privilege).
494
Id.
495
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 1 (D.D.C. July 20, 2009) (order to partially
unseal case).
496
Id.
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Continued efforts by the executive branch to get the judge to re497
consider his opinion hit a stone wall. If anything, such attempts appear to have made him angrier:
If the intention of the government’s continued obstinance in this case is
to demonstrate to the Court that this case is simply impossible and cannot proceed in light of sensitive national security concerns and the interconnectedness of privileged and nonprivileged information, the gov498
ernment should save its theatrics for the Court of Appeals.

It was unlikely, though, that the government would find much
support from above: it was the Court of Appeals that had reversed the
499
case in the first place. According to the district court, the executive
branch itself was responsible for the court’s unwillingness to entertain
further invocations of the state secrets privilege:
The government apparently laments the fact that the Court required it
to reassert the privilege upon remand following the discovery that the
government had committed fraud on the Court and the Court of Appeals. Of course, the government has no one to blame but itself for the
Court’s reexamination of the assertion of the state secrets privilege. The
government committed fraud on the Court and the Court of Appeals by
knowingly failing to correct a declaration of Director Tenet . . . [and,
further, the government] represented to the Court of Appeals that
Brown’s identity was covert, in an action that can only be construed as an
attempt to dishonestly gain dismissal. . . . The fraud . . . diminished the
government’s credibility and led the Court to believe that perhaps the
500
government had misrepresented other facts in the litigation.

The judge then went one step further, ordering the government to
provide justifications for every redaction in the Inspector General re501
ports by September 4, 2009. Additionally, within ten days of the ruling, “the Executive must grant counsel for plaintiff and defendants,
who have been favorably adjudicated for access to classified information, security clearances commensurate with the level of information
502
On September 2, 2009, the government
known by their clients.”
moved for an emergency motion for a stay, pending appeal of the
497

See, e.g., Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 8 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009) (order denying government’s proposal) (noting that the motion filed by the government was
inconsistent with the district court’s earlier order, “misconstrues or misunderstands
what the Court has already done in this case,” and “fails to address the Court’s fundamental concerns”).
498
Id. at 3 n.2.
499
Id.
500
Id. at 4 n.3 (citations omitted).
501
Id. at 18.
502
Id.
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503

Court’s August 26, 2009, order.
Two days later, Chief Judge Lam504
berth denied the motion.
He noted that “[t]he practical effect of
such a stay would . . . bring all proceedings in this already protracted
505
The judge focused on the already
litigation to a halt once again.”
lengthy time period of the case (fifteen years) and noted that further
delays, far from amounting to simply a minor delay, “could have major
consequences as any further delay now has the real possibility of forever depriving the plaintiff of evidence and testimony which may de506
cide whether he prevails on his claims.” In the judge’s view, “[t]his
case ha[d] already been delayed long enough by the government’s
507
failure to disclose information that had long been unclassified.”
508
The government appealed the order, winning a stay of proceedings.
509
Appeal was expedited, with briefs due in October 2009.
On November 3, 2009, the parties filed a Settlement Agreement, a
Stipulated Dismissal With Prejudice, and a Proposed Court Order to
510
dismiss the case.
According to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, within two days of the court entering the order dismissing the
case with prejudice, the United States would request that $3 million
be paid to Horn and his attorneys for damages, attorneys’ fees, and
511
On March 30, 2010, the court dismissed the case
litigation costs.
503

United States’ Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Horn v. Huddle,
647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 94-1756). The motion was made under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c). See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (indicating that a “court may
suspend, modify, restore or grant an injunction” while an appeal to a grant, dissolution, or denial of an injunction is pending). On April 26, 2010, the court entered an
order dismissing the appeal. Horn v. Brown, Nos. 09-5311, 94-1756 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26,
2010) (order dismissing case), 2010 WL 2160013, dismissing Horn v. Huddle, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009).
504
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 7 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2009) (order denying motion for stay).
505
Id. at 1.
506
Id. at 2.
507
Id. at 3.
508
Horn v. Huddle, No. 94-1756, at 1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10, 2009) (order granting
stay of appeal).
509
Id. at 2.
510
Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed Request for the Court to Promptly Execute the
Order Dismissing This Case with Prejudice So That the Government’s Obligation to
Pay the Monetary Settlement Amount is Triggered, and Whereby the Court Can Retain Jurisdiction to Issue Orders, Decisions and Rulings Regarding the Other Issues
and Motions Pending Before the Court in This Case at 5, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F.
Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 94-1756) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed
Request in Horn].
511
Settlement Agreement at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C.
2010) (No. 94-1756).
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with prejudice, vacating the earlier decisions in accordance with the
512
terms of the Settlement Agreement.
In his memorandum accompanying the order, Chief Judge Lamberth suggested that the earlier
decisions would be vacated. Nonetheless, he also noted:
Since the July and August opinions have already been published in the
Federal Supplement, the only consequence of an order vacating them is
the possibility that they may be considered somewhat less persuasive
when the vacating order appears with the citation. The reasoning is un513
altered, to the extent it is deemed persuasive by anyone.

The decision, moreover, gave Lamberth pause. He wrote, “[I]t is
514
not without some misgiving that the Court reaches this decision.”
He continued:
Another member of this Court last year approved the settlement of
another case (involving the FBI’s investigation of the anthrax mailings in
late 2001) which involved payment to an individual plaintiff of almost
$6,000,000 by the United States. It does not appear that any government
official was ever held accountable for this huge loss to the taxpayer.
Now this Court is called upon to approve a $3,000,000 payment to an
individual plaintiff by the United States, and again it does not appear
that any government officials have been held accountable for this loss to
515
the taxpayer. This is troubling to the Court.

Chief Judge Lamberth found it “encouraging” that Attorney General Eric Holder had circulated a memorandum on “Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege”; indeed,
516
he attached a copy of the guidelines as an appendix to the decision.
He also formally requested that the United States “advise the Court as
to whether it will, in this case, make the referral to the Inspectors
General and provide the notifications to the oversight committees of
Congress” as required under the guidelines, specifically in regard to
the behavior of both State Department and CIA attorneys in relation
512

Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236, 243 (D.D.C. 2010) (approving stipulated
dismissal); see also Plaintiff’s Notice of Renewed Request in Horn, supra note 510, at 5
(attempting to persuade the court to act upon the plaintiff’s previous request for dismissal); Plaintiff’s Notice of Request for the Court to Promptly Execute the Order
Dismissing This Case with Prejudice So That the Government’s Obligation to Pay the
Monetary Amount in the Settlement Is Triggered, Regardless of the Other Issues Pending Before the Court on This Case at 2, Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C.
2010) (No. 94-1756) (urging the court to dismiss the case with prejudice so that the
plaintiff could begin receiving the settlement payments promised to him).
513
Horn v. Huddle, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 238 (footnote omitted).
514
Id.
515
Id. (citation omitted).
516
Id. at 239.
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517

to the case at hand.
If such executive action were taken, then the
court would find it appropriate to terminate the actions underway by
518
the court’s Grievance Committee.
B. Due Process, Torture, and Detention Without Trial
Precedent, albeit limited, exists for the invocation of the state se519
During the
crets privilege in the context of cases alleging torture.
period from 2001 to 2009, there does seem to have been an increase
520
in the number of such instances. Unlike most of the cases discussed
thus far, suits against U.S. officials alleging rendition, torture, and indefinite detention have received considerable public and academic
521
attention. Thus, only a brief discussion of these cases is warranted.
One of the most prominent civil suits was brought by Khaled ElMasri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, who brought an action
522
523
under Bivens, the Alien Tort Statute, and international legal norms,
against ten unnamed CIA agents, three private companies, and ten em524
ployees. El-Masri alleged that, in 2003, he was detained for more than
three weeks in Macedonia and then sent to Afghanistan, where he was
subject to torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,

517

Id.
Id.
519
See, e.g., Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding
the decision of the court below to grant the state secrets privilege); Linder v. Nat’l Sec.
Agency, 94 F.3d 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183
F.R.D. 314, 325 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding the state secrets privilege to be properly invoked in a case of alleged torture).
520
This observation is based upon the author’s research of the case law during
this period.
521
See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 6, at 1254-63 (detailing “extraordinary rendition”
and subsequent litigation related to El-Masri); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The
Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (“identif[ying] the legal principles
that guide extradition, rendition, and kidnappings,” and explaining the changes in
those principles after 9/11); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets
Privilege: Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 630
(2008) (“discuss[ing] the use of the state secrets privilege in the context of civil suits
brought against the United States government and private contractors working for the
federal government”). For a detailed discussion of rendition, see Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
522
See supra note 436 (explaining Bivens actions).
523
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
524
El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 2006).
518
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525

for five months.
El-Masri further alleged that he was subsequently
flown to and abandoned in Albania, where he then had to make his way
526
In December 2005, he sued in the U.S. District
back to Germany.
527
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
District Court Judge Ellis granted the government’s motion to
528
dismiss on state secrets grounds.
State secrets stood as “a privilege
529
of the highest dignity and significance.”
El-Masri’s personal interests, the court held, must give way to the national interest:
In times of war, our country, chiefly through the Executive Branch, must
often take exceptional steps to thwart the enemy. Of course, reasonable
and patriotic Americans are still free to disagree about the propriety and
efficacy of those exceptional steps. But what this decision holds is that
these steps are not proper grist for the judicial mill where, as here, state
530
secrets are at the center of the suit and the privilege is validly invoked.

On March 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling below, determining that the privilege applied to the
information El-Masri sought, rendering the defendants unable to
531
mount a proper defense. Judge King, writing for the court, emphasized the constitutional underpinnings:
Although the state secrets privilege was developed at common law, it
performs a function of constitutional significance, because it allows the
executive branch to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its
military and foreign-affairs responsibilities. Reynolds itself suggested that
the state secrets doctrine allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional
conflict that might have arisen had the judiciary demanded that the Executive disclose highly sensitive military secrets. In United States v. Nixon,
the [Supreme] Court further articulated the doctrine’s constitutional
dimension, observing that the state secrets privilege provides exceptionally strong protection because it concerns areas of Art. II duties [in
which] the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Pres532
idential responsibilities.

In another case, Syrian-born Canadian citizen Mahar Arar was arrested on September 26, 2002, when he changed planes in New York

525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532

Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 540-41.
El-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 303 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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533

en route to Canada. After being held incommunicado for thirteen
days, he was flown to Washington, D.C., and then finally, Amman,
534
Jordan, whence he was driven to Syria. Arar stated that he was tortured and that he had confessed to a number of crimes before being
535
released without charge in October 2003.
On January 22, 2004,
Arar brought suit in the Eastern District of New York, alleging viola536
tions of the Torture Victim Protection Act and a violation of subs537
tantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. Arar sought a declaration on the unconstitutional nature of the acts done to him, as
538
well as compensatory and punitive damages.
On January 18, 2005, the United States invoked state secrets privi539
lege. Affidavits submitted by Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and Deputy Attorney General James B. Com540
ey (as the Acting Attorney General) accompanied the invocation.
Because he was being sued in his individual capacity, Attorney General
Ashcroft recused himself from the consideration of whether to invoke
state secrets privilege; thus, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 508(a), the
541
The deDeputy Attorney General assumed the authority to do so.
fendants individually also filed motions to dismiss based on state se542
Although subsequent memoranda focused on
crets considerations.
533

Complaint at 10-11, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No.
04-0249).
534
Id. at 11-16; see also Mayer, supra note 521, at 106 (observing that Arar had been
flown to Washington, D.C., Portland, Maine, and Rome, Italy, before finally landing in
Amman, Jordan).
535
Complaint, supra note 533, at 16-19.
536
See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (providing a private right of action in tort
against those who commit torture or extrajudicial killings).
537
Complaint, supra note 533, at 20-24.
538
Id. at 3-4.
539
Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 04-0249), 2005 WL
2547997.
540
Id. at 3.
541
Id. at 8 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) (2006) (outlining the Deputy Attorney
General’s duties in the event of the Attorney General’s absence).
542
See, e.g., Notice of Partial Motion to Dismiss the Claims Against Defendant John
Ashcroft in His Individual Capacity Encompassed by the Claims of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249) [hereinafter Notice of Partial
Motion to Dismiss in Arar], 2005 WL 6140592; Notice of Motion of Defendant James
Ziglar to Dismiss Complaint Based on State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249) [hereinafter Notice of Ziglar], 2005 WL 6140593; Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against
Defendant McElroy in his Individual Capacity, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(No. 04-0249), 2005 WL 6140582; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defen-
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543

the claim, the district court eventually determined that Arar lacked
544
standing for declaratory relief in relation to his constitutional claims.
Judge Trager held that Arar failed to “meet the statutory requirements
545
And while the Immigration
of the Torture Victim Protection Act.”
and Nationality Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not foreclose
a Bivens claim, a remedy under Bivens was foreclosed because of na546
These determinational security and foreign policy considerations.
547
tions made moot the assertion of state secrets.
C. Environmental Regulations
Like the other areas examined in this Article, the invocation of
state secrets privilege in the face of environmental disputes predates
548
And similar to the other contexts, here,
the Bush Administration.
too, state secrets may fail to appear in the final judicial opinion, yet
they nevertheless may play a key role in the evolution of the suit.

dant Larry D. Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(No. 04-0249), 2005 WL 6140586.
543
See, e.g., Notice of Partial Motion to Dismiss in Arar, supra note 542; Reply of
United States of America to Plaintiff’s Opposition to United States’ Invocation of the
State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (No. 04-0249); Notice of
Ziglar, supra note 542.
544
See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59 (holding that Arar failed to show
that his claimed “bar to reentry” injury would be “redressed by a favorable decision”).
545
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
546
See id. at 259-60, 280-83 (considering the appropriateness of the remedy, given
the lack of “explicit direction” by Congress).
547
See id. at 287 (noting the mootness of consideration of the state secrets privilege, given dismissal of the statutory and constitutional claims); see also Arar v. Ashcroft,
585 F.3d 559, 582 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming decision below).
548
See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1998) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (noting the majority found “a class of information” created under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that may receive state secrets privilege); see also
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421-22 (2d Cir.
1989) (discussing the Navy’s invocation of the privilege to avoid disclosure of the environmental impact of an alleged proposal to deploy nuclear weapons); Fitzgerald v.
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242-44 (4th Cir. 1985) (permitting invocation of
the state secrets privilege in a challenge of the Navy’s use of dolphins in military operations, submarine warfare, and intelligence gathering); Frost v. Perry, 919 F. Supp.
1459, 1464-66 (D. Nev. 1996) (permitting the Air Force to assert privilege to avoid disclosure of environmental data); Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 440 (D. Nev. 1995)
(finding that military defendants satisfied requirements for invocation of privilege for
claims related to government disposal of hazardous waste); Doe v. Browner, 902 F.
Supp. 1240, 1248-49 (D. Nev. 1995) (noting that, while the government’s privilege
precluded plaintiffs’ discovery of environmental information, the court was permitted
to access such information and evaluate plaintiffs’ argument).
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One of the most interesting environmental suits to arise over the
past eight years follows this pattern precisely. The suit centered on
the U.S. Department of the Navy’s use of “high-intensity ‘active sonar’
systems,” which complainants alleged “cause the death and injury of
549
whales, porpoises and other marine species.” On October 19, 2005,
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the International Fund for
Animal Welfare, the Cetacean Society International, the League for
Coastal Protection, the Ocean Futures Society, and Jean-Michel Cous550
teau brought suit. The complaint alleged that:
For decades, the Navy has conducted extensive testing and training
using active sonar systems without complying with the requirements of
United States environmental law. This action challenges the Navy’s conduct of certain individual sea exercises and training activities in disregard of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”), and the En551
dangered Species Act (“ESA”).

On February 17, 2006, the government moved to dismiss the suit
552
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. It was not until March
16, 2007, however, that Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter formally invoked state secrets “to avoid complying with the Discovery Or553
der.” On April 19, 2007, the court ordered plaintiffs and defendants
to meet, discuss the dispute, “and set a schedule for the filing of dis554
Just over a
covery motions relating to the state secrets privilege.”
month later, on May 30, 2007, the litigants filed a Joint Notice of
Agreement Resolving Jurisdictional Discovery Dispute over Invocation
555
Over the following
of the Military and State Secrets Privilege.
months, the Navy provided more than 400,000 pages of documents,

549

First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Natural
Res. Def. Council v. England, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006), 2006 WL 1525611.
550
Id. at 3-6.
551
Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
552
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 8, Natural
Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2006), 2006 WL 1525597.
553
Joint Stipulation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses at 29, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2008),
2008 WL 2937122. Donald C. Winter replaced Gordon R. England and became the
74th Secretary of the Navy on January 3, 2006. US Navy Biographies—The Honorable Donald C. Winter, U.S. NAVY, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioid=325
(last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
554
Joint Stipulation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, supra note 553, at 29.
555
Id.
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556

the contours of which were shaped by the state secrets discussions.
The parties settled on December 26, 2008, without the court ruling on
557
whether the state secrets privilege applied.
D. Employment Suits
Employment-related suits in which state secrets plays a role also
558
The period from 2001 to 2009 eviare not a novel phenomenon.
dences a continuation of this phenomenon. Some of these suits center
559
on racial or religious discrimination or defamation.
For the most
part, the government prevails.
560
Defamation suits in which state secrets arise have a long history.
The 1999 investigation of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a U.S. Department of
Energy scientist accused of mishandling sensitive nuclear weapons

556

Id. at 30.
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to F. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii),
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 05-7513 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2008).
558
See, e.g., Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that the state secrets privilege was an independent ground for dismissal
of a sexual orientation discrimination case); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (finding that the state secrets privilege properly precluded disclosure of the
reason for which a prospective employee was denied employment); Tilden v. Tenet,
140 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that the state secrets privilege was
“properly invoked” by the CIA Director in a case of sex discrimination).
559
See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-44, 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (considering the CIA’s invocation of state secrets privilege to prevent disclosure of employment details, in a case involving an African American ex–CIA operative’s racial discrimination claim).
560
In 1880, for instance, action was brought against the superintendent of the Naval Academy upon the resignation of a professor. Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 25458 (1880). In 1893, a New York court held that absolute immunity applies to words
spoken by “military officers in reports or statements to their superiors and all acts of
state.” Hemmens v. Nelson, 34 N.E. 342, 344 (N.Y. 1893). By the early twentieth century, “[t]he rule [of privilege from disclosure] ha[d] been applied . . . in actions
against officials for defamatory reports and other communications, thereby conferring
immunity by refusing the means of proof.” Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in
Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 145 (1910).
During the Cold War, this type of action became particularly salient: “In the real
world,” one legal scholar explained, “intelligence agents often strike not with guns but
with words—allegations that destroy reputations, families, careers.” Comment, Spying
and Slandering: An Absolute Privilege for the CIA Agent?, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 752, 752
(1967). Cases like Heine v. Raus thus raised the question of whether actions for defamation within the national security realm would gain ground. See Heine v. Raus, 261 F.
Supp. 570, 570-71 (D. Md. 1966) (examining a claim of slander against the CIA in which
the defendant asserted “absolute privilege”); see also Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd.,
776 F.2d 1236, 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985) (outlining elements of the defamation claim
about espionage and concluding that the subject matter of the suit was a state secret).
557
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561

documents, gave rise to yet another legal action alleging slander. In
this particular instance, Notra Trulock, III, a former Department of
Energy official, sued Lee and two other federal officials for statements
they made suggesting that racial bias motivated Trulock’s role in the
562
In May 2001, the government “filed a stateinvestigation of Lee.
ment of interest and sought a protective order against discovery of
563
classified documents.” The government subsequently intervened in
the case, and CIA Director George Tenet invoked the state secrets pri564
vilege. In March 2002, the district court ratified the protective order
565
and granted the motion to dismiss. In June 2003, the appeals court
566
affirmed the dismissal of the suit on state secrets grounds.
With judicial relief precluded, plaintiffs at times try to engage
Congress to redress their grievances. However, these efforts rarely
produce the sought-after relief. On October 14, 1998, for instance,
David Aaron Tenenbaum, an employee of the United States Army
Tank-Automotive Armaments Command (TACOM), and his wife,
Madeline Gail Tenenbaum, sued the United States for ethnic and re567
Tenenbaum alleged that, as a result of his
ligious discrimination.
relationship with the Israeli liaison officer to TACOM, he had been
subjected to more stringent scrutiny than normal during his efforts to
568
obtain a higher security classification. Tenenbaum brought a Bivens
claim for Fourth Amendment violations, a common law conspiracy
claim for unlawful investigation, and claims for false attribution of
569
confessions, defamation, gross negligence, and loss of consortium.
In June 2001, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Director of the
National Security Agency, invoked the state secrets privilege, stating
that any further progress of the suit would endanger national securi-

561

See Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App’x 472, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing two actions
in which Trulock accused federal officials of racially motivated defamation in the Eastern District of Virginia).
562
Id.
563
Id. at 475.
564
Brief for the Intervenor United States of America at 13-15, Trulock, 66 F. App’x
472 (Nos. 02-1476, 02-1477), 2002 WL 32737348, at *13-15.
565
Trulock, 66 F. App’x at 475.
566
Id. at 478.
567
Tenenbaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL 2222933, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.
July 23, 2009).
568
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, No. 98-74473, at 2-3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2002) (order denying plaintiff’s motion to strike and granting defendants’ motion for summary
judgment).
569
Id. at 8-11.

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

The Shadow of State Secrets

191

570

ty.
Just over one year later, the district court dismissed the suit—a
571
judgment upheld by the Sixth Circuit on May 19, 2004.
Tenenbaum, denied a judicial forum, pursued a political solution:
on March 14, 2006, Senator Carl Levin wrote on Tenenbaum’s behalf
to the Department of Defense, requesting an investigation into the al572
legations. The Department of Defense investigated, and in a July 13,
2008, report, it found that Tenenbaum’s race and ethnicity had in573
The
deed “contributed to the unusual and unwelcome scrutiny.”
plaintiffs initiated a second case against the same defendants in the
first suit, and as well as against former Attorney General John Ashcroft, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and former
574
Army Litigation Division Chief and General Counsel Uldric Fiore.
Tenenbaum alleged a false invocation of state secrets doctrine, depriv575
The court, however,
ing him of his right of access to the courts.
576
found the case barred by the procedural hurdle of res judicata.
Outside of discrimination and defamation, loss of employment
following whistleblower activity also gives rise to the defendant’s invo577
cation of state secrets.
One such case, which lends further insight
570

Tenenbaum v. Simonini, No. 09-10612 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 14, 1998) (listing
a “Declaration of Keith B. Alexander” as filed on June 21, 2001, on the docket, but under seal and unavailable on PACER).
571
The opinion stated:
Having reviewed the materials Defendants produced under seal, we agree
with the district court that the state secrets doctrine applies because a reasonable danger exists that disclosing the information in court proceedings would
harm national security interests, or would impair national defense capabilities,
disclose intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, or disrupt diplomatic
relations with foreign governments.
We further conclude that Defendants cannot defend their conduct with respect to Tenenbaum without revealing the privileged information. Because the
state secrets doctrine thus deprives Defendants of a valid defense to the Tenenbaums’ claims, we find that the district court properly dismissed the claims.
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1000 (2004).
572
Tenenbaum v. Ashcroft, No. 09-10612, 2009 WL 2222933, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July
23, 2009).
573
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
574
Id.
575
Id.
576
Id. at *9.
577
For example, in 1994, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo)
employed Forrest Darby as an electrician. Verified Complaint at 2-3, Darby v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. May 19, 2000), 2000 WL 34598769. Concerned about the safety procedures in place at the Tonopah Test Range, Darby and
twelve coworkers met with U.S. Congressman James Bilbray in March of that year. Id.
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into the public and parallel dimensions of the privilege, involved Sibel
Edmonds, originally from Turkey, who moved to the United States in
578
In September 2001, Edmonds became a translator for the
1988.
579
FBI.
She later alleged that one of her colleagues, Melek Can Dick580
erson leaked information to subjects of FBI investigations.
Edmonds reported that Dickerson told her not to translate certain documents on grounds that they did not contain any new information,
thus distorting the information available and hurting the investiga581
tion. Edmonds further stated that her signature was forged on some
documents, but that when she objected, Dickerson responded by
582
overtly threatening her.
Efforts to draw attention to Dickerson’s

Soon thereafter, REECo’s Project Manager informed Darby that if he had spoken to
the congressman, Darby could be terminated. Id. at 3. Darby claimed that Bilbray
took steps to prevent this from happening, but that in November 1997, the U.S. Air
Force “deaccessed” Darby from his assigned work location, even though he had a topsecret Q clearance. Id. This action caused his termination since he effectively could
not work. Id. On May 19, 2000, Darby brought suit, claiming the termination was in
retaliation. Id. The government asserted state secrets as its first defense. Answer to
Amended Complaint at 2, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2001), 2001 WL
34878033. The government’s motion for summary judgment suggested that the information sought related to at least one of the following: military plans, weapons, and
operations; vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems or plans; intelligence sources and
methods; scientific, technological, or economic matters; and foreign government information. Defendants’ Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and for Summary Judgment, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev.
Aug. 31, 2001), 2001 WL 34877013; see also Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege, in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Discovery at 7, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D.
Nev. Nov. 16, 2001), 2001 WL 34877016 (noting the government had properly asserted
a claim of privilege). On March 4, 2002, the court granted summary judgment and
dismissal on state secrets grounds. See Plaintiff’s F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration at 1, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2002), 2002 WL 32976565 (responding to the court’s summary judgment order).
For continued discussion of state secrets in the context of the suit see, for instance,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Reply Memorandum at 1-2,
Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 2002), 2002 WL 32976567; see also Defendants’
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Apr. 5,
2002), 2002 WL 32976566; Plaintiff’s F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) Motion for Reconsideration
at 5-7, Darby, No. 00-0661 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2002), 2002 WL 32976565.
578
Complaint at 2, Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2006)
(No. 05-00540), 2005 WL 919242.
579
Id. at 3.
580
Id. at 4-5.
581
Id.
582
Id.
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583

behavior inside the FBI allegedly failed.
In March 2002, the FBI
584
dismissed Edmonds from her post.
As in Sterling v. Tenet, the plaintiff in Edmonds v. United States
sought congressional assistance in mounting a political response. On
June 19, 2002, Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley requested
that the FBI’s Office of Inspector General investigate Edmonds’s alle585
gations—a request repeated on July 9, 2004.
In the interim, Edmonds brought suit in the District Court for the
586
District of Columbia, claiming violations of the Privacy Act, Adminis587
588
She
trative Procedure Act, and the First and Fifth Amendments.
sought damages, reinstatement to her job, and an order prohibiting
589
retaliation against her or her family. On October 18, 2002, Ashcroft
590
invoked state secrets and moved to dismiss the case.
The parallel effect noted in the NSA wiretapping cases emerged
here, as well: Ashcroft’s effort to restrict Edmonds extended to a
second case working its way through the court. In Burnett v. Al Baraka
Investment & Development Corp., survivors of 9/11, who had filed suit
against Saudi Arabia and some Saudi corporations, sought to depose
591
Edmonds. In April 2004, Ashcroft intervened, once again invoking
592
state secrets.
The following month, Ashcroft allegedly retroactively
classified all Senate Judiciary Committee materials related to Ed-

583

Id.
Id. at 10-11. For further discussion of this case, see also Rapa, supra note 6, at
233-35, 262-71.
585
Letter from Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley, U.S. Senators, to John Ashcroft,
U.S. Attorney Gen., Robert S. Mueller, III, FBI Director, and Glen A. Fine, Inspector
Gen. ( July 9, 2004), available at http://www.justacitizen.com/articles_documents/
Leahy_Grassley_Letter_to_Ashcroft_7-9-04.pdf.
586
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
587
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–552, 701–706.
588
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damage at 2-3, Edmonds
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 02-01448), 2002 WL
32969560; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I, V.
589
Id. at 19. Edmonds simultaneously filed suit against the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42
(D.D.C. 2003).
590
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
591
See Statement of Interest of the United States of America in Support of Emergency Motion to Quash Deposition of Sibel Edmonds, or For Protective Order at 1-7,
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 039849) (explaining and opposing the plaintiffs’ subpoena demands).
592
Burnett, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 82. Ashcroft successfully asserted state secrets more
broadly in the case as well with respect to information that, if revealed, might jeopardize U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Id. at 83.
584
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monds’ case, including information on Senators Leahy and Grassley’s
593
websites. The DOJ reportedly backed off when the Project on Gov594
ernment Oversight filed suit.
Edmonds challenged the executive branch’s invocation of state
secrets, saying that Ashcroft had not personally considered the in595
formation that was privileged and that he had failed to be specific.
596
The court rejected this argument.
Having examined the documents in camera, the court concluded that Edmonds could not build
a prima facie case without the information properly covered by state
597
The court recognized that such a step was extreme:
secrets.
“[D]ismissal of a suit, and the consequent denial of a forum without
giving the plaintiff her day in court . . . is indeed draconian. Denial
of the forum provided under the Constitution for the resolution of
598
But on
disputes is a drastic remedy that has rarely been invoked.”
the same day, the court permitted use of only nine of the thirty-one
599
proposed questions in Burnett.
Importantly, it was not the actual information sought that was of
concern, or even the potential construction of a mosaic based on specific documents—arguments that have previously been considered in
the course of legal scholarship on state secrets. Instead, the court in
Burnett grounded its decision on the potential that further information would emerge in the course of cross-examination that would
600
threaten national security.
This line of reasoning—essentially a
floodgates argument—is distinguishable from both the instant suppression of evidence during discovery (on the grounds that it would
593

Press Release, Project on Gov’t Oversight, Justice Department Caves In: Allows
Publication of Retroactively Classified Information; Lawsuit Challenged Classification
of Public Information (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.pogo.org/pogofiles/alerts/government-secrecy/gs-oc-20050222.html.
594
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Project on Gov’t Oversight v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01032 (D.D.C. June 23, 2004); see also Sibel Edmonds, Gagged,
But Not Dead, JUST A CITIZEN (May 14, 2005), http://www.justacitizen.com/
articles_documents/May14-05-Gagged%20but%20not%20Dead.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2010) (discussing removal of documents from the senators’ websites).
595
Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 73 (D.D.C. 2004).
596
Id. at 75-76; see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the plaintiff’s argument that the entire regulatory matter of a Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act enforcement cannot be a state secret and challenging
the application of state secrets on a rolling basis).
597
Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 78-79.
598
Id. at 81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
599
See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 84 (D.D.C. 2004)
(prohibiting asking certain questions of an official during deposition).
600
Id. at 83.
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be dangerous when released in the public domain), as well as from
the potential connection between seemingly disparate pieces of information. It also gives rise to due process considerations.
Under pressure from Congress, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) published the final report on Edmonds in July 2004, which
601
Ashcroft had classified. An unclassified version was made public in
602
January 2005. The Inspector General found that “Edmonds’ assertions regarding the coworker, when viewed as a whole, raised substantial questions and were supported by various pieces of evi603
In the OIG’s opinion, the FBI had not been able to
dence.”
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Edmonds would
have been terminated without her allegations, and the FBI’s investi604
gation of her claims had been inadequate.
While the report did not obtain relief for Edmonds, it did have
some administrative effect, suggesting that perhaps a congressional
role in state secrets instances is not to be dismissed out of hand. The
605
report recommended new translation procedures within the bureau.
It also highlighted the precarious position of attempted whistleblowers and contributed to support for the bill for the Executive Branch
Reform Act of 2006, which would limit the application of state secrets
606
in such suits.
Nevertheless, the report did not bring immediate legal relief to
Edmonds. To the contrary, the courts continued to protect the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege, going even beyond
the executive’s wishes. For example, although the government had
already agreed to public argument on appeal, the day before the argument, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit announced that
607
the press would be barred from the courtroom. In May 2005, in a
one-sentence opinion, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s

601

Edmonds, supra note 594.
OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & REVIEW, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY
CONTRACT LINGUIST SIBEL EDMONDS: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf.
603
Id. at 11.
604
Id. at 30, 34.
605
Id. at 32-34.
606
Executive Branch Reform Act of 2006, H.R. 5112, 109th Cong.
607
Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 04-5286 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2005) (order
denying motions to open oral argument).
602
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608

ruling. Six months later, the Supreme Court denied Edmonds’ writ
609
of certiorari.
At the most general level, cases that center on espionage contracts
610
receive short shrift in court. In 2005, for example, the wife and children of a former covert-status CIA agent sued the CIA for termination of
611
Allegedly denied medical insurance, the former agent
employment.
and his family left the country to seek medical care. The family stated
that they could not leave the country where they were located, that they
were afraid of detection, and that the former agent could not obtain
the appropriate psychiatric counseling he needed because of nondis612
closure requirements. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages, claiming violations of the Admin613
614
istrative Procedure Act, the Privacy Act, and the Federal Tort Claims
615
616
In reAct, as well as the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
sponse, Porter Goss, Director of the CIA, invoked the state secrets privi617
The government, acknowledging the breadth of material covlege.
ered by its state secrets invocation and motion to dismiss, argued that
plaintiffs should not be allowed access to secure facilities to prepare
618
their arguments. In its unreported decision, the Southern District of

608

Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 161 F. App’x 6, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g 323 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004).
609
Edmonds v. Dep’t of Justice, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005), denying cert. to Edmonds, 161
F. App’x 6; see also Edmonds v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D.D.C. 2008) (relating to a subsequent suit in which Edmonds sought relief under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006), for her alleged loss of personal property
when she was fired).
610
For a brief overview of similar cases, see Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2005).
See also Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1150-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to dismiss a
breach of contract claim by former CIA spies), rev’d, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a
lower court’s approval of the invocation of state secrets privilege and vacating on other
grounds); Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 324, 329 (1996) (denying discovery to plaintiffs based on the CIA’s invocation of the state secrets privilege), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
611
Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939, 2007 WL 30099, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007).
612
Id.
613
5 U.S.C. § 701–706 (2006).
614
5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
615
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
616
Doe v. CIA, 2007 WL 30099, at *1.
617
Id. at *2.
618
Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Government’s Assertion
of the State Secrets Privilege and Motion to Dismiss This Action, Doe v. CIA, No. 057939, at 15-17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006), 2006 WL 2588099.
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619

New York dismissed the case on state secrets grounds. The Court of
620
Appeals upheld the decision. Judge Sack wrote, “The plaintiffs have
no right to use material that is alleged by the government to contain
state secrets in order to participate in the district court’s review of the
621
bona fides of the government’s allegation.”
E. State Secrets as a Tactical Advantage
At times, the executive merely threatens the potential application of
state secrets without formally invoking the privilege. For example, in
Stevens v. United States, a civil suit brought in the context of the anthrax
investigations, the government requested a stay to “provide a reasonable opportunity for the United States to review the national security information implicated by Plaintiff’s allegations and to decide what must
622
be protected by the state secrets privilege.” In Stillman v. Department
of Defense, the CIA argued throughout nine months of briefing that
more time was needed to determine whether the state secrets privilege
623
The Agency followed a similar course in Lee v. CIA, a First
applied.
624
Amendment case centered on the public release of a screenplay. In
625
none of these cases did the government invoke the privilege.

619

Doe v. CIA, 2007 WL 30099, at *3.
Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95, 108 (2d Cir. 2009).
621
Id. at 97.
622
Defendant United States of America’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion to Stay Proceedings at 10, Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
5, 2004), 2004 WL 3705982; see also Defendant United States of America’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Stay Proceedings app. at 1-9, Stevens v. United
States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2004) (declaration of Richard L. Lambert),
2004 WL 3705981 (submitting an FBI declaration in support of the stay to consider the
implications with regard to bioterrorism).
623
See Stillman v. Dep’t of Def., No. 01-1342, at 3 (D.D.C. June 10, 2002) (recounting how Stillman “engaged in ongoing negotiations with defendants over the classification determination” from October 2000 until June 2001).
624
See Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Ex-Parte Motion for Expedited Proceedings at 5 n.5, Lee v. CIA, No. 03-0206 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2003), 2003 WL
24251637 (noting that the CIA never acted on its threat to invoke state secrets).
625
The pattern here is not that state secrets is couched as an affirmative defense
(and thus subject to some modicum of reasonableness), but rather that the doctrine is
merely mentioned as possible grounds for a formal stay of proceedings. In the Stevens
case, the United States did, however, enter a motion for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which the court granted on December 14, 2009.
Stevens v. United States, No. 03-81110 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009) (order granting motion for protective order).
620
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The threatened use of state secrets is not a new phenomenon. It
takes time for executive agencies to ascertain whether the privilege
ought to apply. It may not be immediately clear, at the outset, whether the state secrets privilege is implicated. Classified material is,
moreover, compartmentalized and difficult to evaluate. Plaintiffs also
should have early warning that the subsequent suit may be stalled because of the presence of classified information.
At the same time, the advantages that may accompany even the
threatened applicability of state secrets should not be discounted.
627
Similar to the contractors discussed in Part I of this Article, the consequent delays in litigation may make it difficult for plaintiffs with
access to limited resources to stay the course. They may be reluctant
to proceed where little may ultimately come of their efforts—particularly where precedent may exist for the dismissal of similar cases. A latent conservatism may thereby attach to the proceedings.
When the state secrets privilege is actually invoked and upheld,
even where suits are not dismissed, it may have a profound effect on
motions and related responses, attorneys’ correspondence with their
clients, and the manner in which discovery unfolds. Such considerations extend beyond counsel being unable to ascertain exactly what
information is secret, forcing them to make assumptions on issues
628
central to their clients’ defense.
Consider Sterling v. Tenet, a state secrets case argued before the
Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Virginia, and
629
the Fourth Circuit. Attorney for the plaintiff, Mark Zaid, drafted an
opposition brief to the CIA’s invocation of the privilege, arguing that
the information was not classified and, therefore, was inappropriate

626

See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order at 3, Nat’l Westminster Bank,
PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999) (No. 95-0758), 1996 WL 34427440 (asserting that information that would be responsive to the plaintiff’s requests might be privileged and that evaluating such information is burdensome).
627
See supra Part I (suggesting that the affirmative defense of state secrets draws
out litigation and may scare off litigants when the outcome of a multiyear court battle
is uncertain).
628
See, e.g., Complaint, Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C.
2005) (No. 05-00540), 2005 WL 919242.
629
Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Improper Venue or
in the Alternative to Transfer Venue at 14-17, Sterling v. Tenet, 01-8073 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
18, 2002) (arguing that the state secrets privilege compels either dismissal for improper
venue or transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia for reasons of national security).
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630

for state secrets designation. The Southern District agreed with Zaid and denied the CIA’s motion; however, the CIA subsequently classified Zaid’s brief and accused him of having violated his secrecy
agreement for having created a classified document on his work com631
puter. Thus, Zaid no longer had access even to his own arguments
for the balance of the litigation. The CIA reportedly confiscated the
632
judicial opinion, which had been faxed to Zaid’s office. Zaid stated
that eight months later, he received a heavily redacted document in its
633
place. Zaid’s alleged violation of the secrecy agreement apparently
became appended to his clearance file, with the possibility of being
634
used in the future for an adverse determination.
According to Zaid, at the heart of the CIA’s position was the concern that he had been granted a limited security approval and had
subsequently signed a secrecy agreement, but then had not used se635
cure facilities to write the legal document.
The secrecy agreement
explained: “[Y]ou may only review, create, store, and/or otherwise
636
work with or handle classified information in an Agency secure area.”
The CIA would provide “paper and pens/pencils, stand-alone information processing equipment (e.g., a personal computer), and storage facilities,” and “[o]nly Agency-provided equipment and facilities may be
637
The
used to create documents containing classified information.”
document emphasized: “You may neither create classified documents
630

E-mail from Mark Zaid, esq., to author ( Jan. 6, 2010, 14:04 EST) (on file with
author).
631
Id; see also Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, Managing Partner, Mark S.
Zaid., P.C. ( Jan. 12, 2010).
632
Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 631.
633
Id.
634
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment (“Secrecy/Non-Disclosure
Agreement”) (on file with author).
635
Telephone Interview with Mark Zaid, supra note 631. Marilyn A. Dorn, Information Review Officer for the National Clandestine Service of the CIA, described the
procedure and scope of a limited security approval:
A limited security approval is not a security clearance. Rather, a limited security approval is based on a CIA determination that the attorney has a need-toknow some limited classified information, has had a favorable eligibility determination based upon a background investigation that is more limited in
scope than the background investigation required for a security clearance,
and has signed a non-disclosure agreement specific to his or her representation of an individual employee.
Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn at 4, Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006).
636
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment at 2 (“Security Guidance for
Representatives”) (on file with author).
637
Id.
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at your office, nor may you reconstruct classified documents from re638
dacted, unclassified documents stored at your office.”
What happens, though, when the CIA denies access to its facilities? How, then, is an attorney supposed to mount his or her case? In
the recent Second Circuit decision in Doe v. CIA, the agency refused to
allow Zaid to use its facilities to submit a classified opposition to its
639
state secrets motion.
“The limited security approval,” the CIA argued, “does not authorize Mr. Zaid to have access to classified documents, draft classified documents, or file classified information with
the Court, nor does it entitle him to use CIA facilities to communicate
640
The district
classified information or create classified documents.”
court did not require the CIA to provide access to classified facilities:
Plaintiffs’ arguments that denial of an opportunity for them to present
classified information currently in their possession to the Court, and that
the Government’s classification determinations and procedures have
denied them meaningful access to the courts, were answered by the Supreme Court in Reynolds: “even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
641
that . . . secrets are at stake.”

In essence, the district court’s ruling prevented plaintiff’s counsel
from responding to the CIA’s arguments without violating the secrecy
642
agreement.
638

Id.
576 F.3d 95, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2009).
640
Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn, supra note 635, at 5. Joseph H. Holthaus provided the following statement:
639

In sum, this process does not provide counsel with a “security clearance,”
but provides counsel with a “security approval” for a specific case involving a
specific client and grants that counsel access to a limited amount of classified
information relating solely to the client’s identity and the client’s affiliation
with the CIA, if an appropriate Agency official has first determined he has a
need-to-know. This process does not provide a blanket approval to view classified SECRET information.
Declaration of Joseph H. Holthaus at 5, Lee v. CIA, No. 03-00206 (D.D.C. Mar. 17,
2003).
641
Doe v. CIA, No. 05-7939, 2007 WL 30099, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007) (quoting
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
642
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630. The same attorney now faces a similar
issue in Peter B. v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2009), which is not yet a state secrets
case but may well become one. When Zaid requested use of secure facilities, the CIA
responded:
The Security Guidance for Representatives is a generic document which covers a variety of different legal matters involving the Agency and our personnel.
The provision of an office-like area for discussions with your client and a
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Even where access to facilities is granted, as a purely practical matter, it may be difficult to integrate classified and unclassified information into legal documents. The CIA, for instance, directs attorneys
who have obtained clearances:
Do not bring into Agency buildings items capable of storing or otherwise
recording classified information, such as personal computers, tape recorders, or data storage media, and items capable of transmitting such
information, such as telephones, modems, or facsimile equipment. . . .
If you need to transfer unclassified information from your office’s information processing equipment other than Agency-provided information processing equipment, please contact your designated Agency secu643
rity officer to make arrangements.

There are important reasons for these precautions. For instance,
the agency has a vested interest in protecting classified materials, especially those that pertain to its employees. There is a risk that individuals may take information out of the building and use it in an inappropriate manner, threatening the well-being—and possibly the
lives—of those who work there.
At the same time, such provisions burden opposing counsel. Attorneys may be reluctant to bring in too much information: “Depending
upon the items and the manner in which they are used, if brought into
Agency facilities, these items may have to remain under Agency con644
trol.”
An obvious associated question thus arises in relation to attorney-client privilege: to what extent is the privilege affected by these
measures? The security agreement states, “[a]ppropriate arrangements
will be made to ensure that attorney-client privilege is preserved during
645
the Agency’s review of documents for classification purposes.” Exactly
how this is to be done, however, is not clear.
The presence of state secrets also may play a role in eliminating or
shaping the manner in which depositions are performed—even years
into a suit and on a broad range of evidence. One breach of contract
case that came to fruition during the Bush Administration immediately
stand-alone computer applies to those cases in which classified information is
integral to the proceeding. It is my understanding that, given the protection
of your client’s identity (by calling him Peter B.) other pertinent case facts are
(or can be re-worded to be) unclassified. Furthermore, CIA will not provide
nor allow the use of classified information in a civil proceeding.
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630 (quoting the CIA’s response to his request).
643
E-mail from Mark Zaid, supra note 630, attachment at 3 (“Security Guidance for
Representatives”).
644
Id.
645
Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
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comes to mind. An Air Force contractor working on a missile system
sued the United States for breach of contract and demanded millions
646
In May 2006, the executive branch invoked the
in remuneration.
647
state secrets privilege.
Although the parties tried to come to an
agreement on their own in regard to the questions that could be posed
to Darleen Druyun, the Air Force’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Air Force Acquisitions and Management, their failure to do so led to
648
a court opinion heavily laden with state secrets considerations.
Other, less visible advantages may accrue in state secrets cases, tilting the scale towards the government. The privilege’s invocation, for
example, may give the state access to opposing counsel’s confidential
files. The clearest example comes from the eTreppid line of cases,
which began on January 19, 2006, when eTreppid filed a complaint in
a California state court against Dennis Montgomery, claiming that he
649
In
had taken trade secrets with him when he left the company.
March 2006, the case was removed to federal district court in Neva650
da. On January 31, 2006, Montgomery filed a parallel action, alleging copyright infringement and related claims against eTreppid, War651
ren Trepp, and the U.S. Department of Defense. In both cases, the
district court granted plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Michael James Flynn,
pro hac vice applications on the grounds that he was licensed in Massa652
chusetts but residing in California. Director of National Intelligence
653
The
John Negroponte invoked military and state secrets privilege.
Nevada district court issued sealed search warrants for Montgomery’s
654
home and storage units. When Flynn filed a motion with the court to
unseal the search warrants, the government challenged Flynn’s representation of Montgomery in the search warrant proceeding, saying that
655
Flynn had only been admitted pro hac vice for civil proceedings.
646

See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 38, 38-40 (2004)
(describing the facts of the dispute).
647
Notice of Filing Classified, In Camera, Ex Parte Declaration, Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, No. 96-0760 (Fed. Cl. May 12, 2006).
648
See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 761, 766-67
(2007) (deferring to the Department of Defense’s position in denying plaintiff’s request to use classified documents to depose Druyun).
649
Montgomery v. eTreppid Tech., LLC, No. 06-0056, 2009 WL 910739, at *1 (D.
Nev. Mar. 31, 2009).
650
Id.
651
Id. at *3.
652
Id. at *2.
653
Id. at *4.
654
Id. at *3.
655
Id. at *4.
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The government, however, did not stop with procedural considerations. It also challenged the validity of Flynn’s pro hac vice application,
656
saying that Flynn regularly practiced law in California. Flynn retorted
that he was being challenged because he was successful in getting the
warrant partially unsealed and because the case was linked to political
corruption (also at issue in the case was the alleged transfer of money to
657
the state governor to secure a Department of Defense contract).
On July 9, 2007, Flynn and his cocounsel, Carla DiMare, moved to
658
withdraw as counsel.
The government responded that because the
state secrets privilege had already been invoked, withdrawal of counsel
was not routine; therefore, the government would impose conditions
659
regarding documents in their client’s file. The plaintiff’s new attorneys evinced concern that under the guise of state secrets, the government was gaining access to privileged attorney-client materials that
660
Unlike many jurisdictions (inwould substantially affect their case.
cluding California), Nevada law allows attorneys to file a retaining lien
661
over client files until outstanding fees or bonds have been paid. On
August 21, 2007, Flynn filed a motion for attorneys’ fees; eight days
later, the district court issued a protective order, which Negroponte’s
662
Bedeclaration invoking the state secrets privilege had supported.
663
cause of the invocation, Nevada retained control of the client files.
Efforts to get the files through other means outside of Nevada met
664
with legal sanctions against the new attorneys.
In sum, the use of the state secrets privilege may tip the scale towards the government throughout the litigation. Because the scholarly analysis of state secrets, however, has largely focused on final
judicial opinions, the type and number of suits in which the state secrets doctrine has arisen, and the manner in which state secrets has
influenced these suits, have gone largely unexplored.

656

Id.
See Motion to Dismiss/Stay Pursuant to CCP §§ 410.30(a), 418.10(a)(2) (Forum
Non Conveniens) at 3-4, Montgomery v. Flynn, No. BC-375335 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29,
2007), 2007 WL 4680291 (explaining Nevada’s special interest in hearing the case,
since it involved allegations of political corruption against its governor).
658
eTreppid, 2009 WL 910739, at *6.
659
Id.
660
Id.
661
Id. at *7.
662
Id. at *9.
663
Id. at *19-20.
664
Id. at *34-35.
657
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In each of the foregoing cases, the executive branch found itself
in the position of defendant to a civil action, and either threatened to
invoke or actually invoked the state secrets privilege. But what about
when the state finds itself in the position of prosecutor? Notwithstanding Judge Learned Hand’s admonition in United States v. Andol665
schek, between 2001 and 2009 the executive branch benefitted from
the state secrets doctrine in the criminal context as well.
IV. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process
666
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” This right extends to documen667
tary as well as oral evidence. Thus, although the executive branch has
the authority to suppress documents, even when the documents would
contribute to settling controversies between third persons, the suppression of the same in criminal prosecutions, “founded upon those very
dealings to which the documents relate, and whose criminality they
668
will, or may, tend to exculpate” presents a different matter. In United
States v. Andolschek, Judge Learned Hand explained:
So far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess; it
must be conducted in the open, and will lay bare their subject matter.
The government must choose; either it must leave the transactions in the
obscurity from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully.
Nor does it seem to us possible to draw any line between documents
whose contents bears [sic] directly upon the criminal transactions, and
those which may be only indirectly relevant. Not only would such a distinction be extremely difficult to apply in practice, but the same reasons
which forbid suppression in one case forbid it in the other, though not,
669
perhaps, quite so imperatively.

665

See United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (“While we
must accept it as lawful for a department of the government to suppress documents, . . . we cannot agree that this should include their suppression in a criminal
prosecution . . . .”).
666
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
667
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (stating that it
is sufficient to request documents that may be material); see also Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (“The right to resort to means competent to compel
the production of written, as well as oral, testimony seems essential to . . . common
law.” (citation omitted)).
668
Andolschek, 142 F.2d at 506.
669
Id. Indeed, such sentiments reach back to the founding of the Republic. In
United States v. Burr, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice in the trial of for-
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Two years later, the court in United States v. Beekman echoed this
sentiment, stating that “when the government institutes criminal proceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a statute or
regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons the privi670
Subsequent cases reinforced the executive’s duty either to
lege.”
671
The Reyproduce the relevant information or to suffer dismissal.
nolds court distinguished the civil suit before it ruled precisely on
these grounds:
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its
governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might
672
be material to his defense.

With the exception of Reynolds, each of these cases dealt with official information or informer’s privilege. Throughout the twentieth

mer Vice President Aaron Burr, who was charged with treason and high misdemeanor,
addressed a defense motion for the court to order a subpoena duces tecum to compel
production of a letter in the custody of President Thomas Jefferson. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at
187-88. Granting the motion, Justice Marshall observed
it is a very serious thing, if such letter should contain any information material to the defence, to withhold from the accused the power of making use
of it. . . . The only ground laid for the court to act upon is the affidavit of
the accused; and from that the court is induced to order that the paper be
produced . . . .
Id. at 192.
670
United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946); see also United
States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1944) (discussing when privilege to
suppress communications is abandoned).
671
See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 55 (1957) (counting as reversible
error the lower court’s refusal to require the government to reveal an informer’s identity where it would have been relevant and helpful to the accused); Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (“If such evidence is under the control of
a department of government charged with the administration of those laws for whose
violation the accused has been indicted, and its production is refused, or it is excluded,
the courts . . . have held a conviction will not be permitted without the evidence.” (citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 345 U.S. 947 (1953); United States v. Grayson,
166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948) (reiterating that when the evidence in question is under the control of the agency in charge of enforcing the allegedly broken law, the
agency must produce the evidence in order to prosecute the charge successfully);
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 738 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (saying the government must decide if public policy against disclosure is strong enough to warrant
not prosecuting the defendant, but if it prosecutes, it must disclose relevant documents). But see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-56 (1959) (discussing circumstances in which the government should disclose evidence and concluding a prior
statement used against the defendant need not be disclosed).
672
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).

DONOHUE FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

206

11/18/2010 11:10 AM

[Vol. 159: 77

century, the courts refrained from ever directly holding that the state
673
secrets privilege could not be invoked in criminal prosecution.
Moreover, where the possible evidentiary value of a document to the
defense was “clearly negligible,” the courts openly stated that national
674
Perhaps not
security concerns could trump the accused’s defense.
surprisingly, this scenario appeared to be particularly common in
times of war.
For instance, one of the first reported cases to raise the state secrets privilege in the criminal realm, United States v. Haugen, centered
on a World War II subcontractor who had agreed to furnish meals to
675
workers at a plutonium plant. In the context of the prosecution for
forging meal tickets, the court recognized that “[t]he right of the Army
to refuse to disclose confidential information, the secrecy of which it
676
Twenty years
deems necessary to national defense, is indisputable.”
later, Professor Zagel explained that “[t]he judicial temper is sympathetic to claims of privilege based on national security during wartime,
677
and Haugen was explicitly grounded on the existing state of war.”
Outside of wartime, though, questions related to secrecy continued
to plague the status of state secrets in criminal law. In 1952, for instance, addressing reports by a prosecution witness to the FBI, a court
held that the defendant was entitled to official information as a matter
678
of right.
In United States v. Coplon, the court acknowledged that the
executive possessed a privilege against disclosing state secrets, but that
this privilege could not prevent a defendant from accessing evidence
679
to which she had a constitutional right. In a later prosecution for espionage, the government dropped its case to avoid revealing its infor680
By the mid-1960s, Professor Zagel observed that
mer apparatus.
673

Zagel, supra note 9, at 904.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. at 736 (citing Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) (holding that an informer’s identity can be withheld from the defense when its
evidentiary value is negligible)); cf. Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D.
Haw. 1947) (denying that national security is an overriding policy consideration great
enough to justify withholding information from a defendant).
675
See United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436, 437-38 (E.D. Wash. 1944) (discussing the issue of the Army’s disclosure of state secrets).
676
Id. at 438 (citations omitted).
677
Zagel, supra note 9, at 904.
678
See Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. at 738 (holding that any government privilege to
withhold reports from inspection have been waived).
679
See United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[T]he refusal to
allow the defense to see [the evidence] was . . . a denial of their constitutional right . . . .”).
680
See David Anderson, U.S. Drops Trial of 2 in Spy Case; Cites ‘Security,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1964, at 1 (noting that the government dropped the case because “the price of
674
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“[c]onsidering these cases, it is impossible to state with precision the
681
current status of the state secrets privilege in criminal prosecutions.”
The lack of clarity in the law and the possibility that individuals
accused of crime could turn around and require classified information for their defense (thus forcing the government either to reveal
the information or to drop the prosecution), provided the impetus for
682
the creation of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).
conviction may have been too high”). Through the mid-twentieth century, the most
common criminal cases where state secrets arose came under prosecutions for violation of the Espionage Act. See Zagel, supra, note 9, at 905 (“Most criminal cases involving state secret claims arise under espionage laws . . . .”); Note, Secret Documents in Criminal Prosecutions, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1356, 1357 (1947) (“In the past[,] prosecution has
usually been brought under the Espionage Act of 1917.”); see also generally Espionage
Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1948).
681
Zagel, supra note 9, at 904.
682
See Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
app. (2006)). For the history that motivated CIPA, see S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 1-3
(1980). See also United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that Congress enacted CIPA in 1980 to address what to do when a criminal defendant threatens to reveal classified information); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d
959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Congress passed CIPA to prevent . . . ‘graymail,’ where defendants pressed for the release of classified information to force the government to
drop prosecution.”); United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting
CIPA was enacted to respond to “graymail”); Matthew N. Kaplan, Who Will Guard the
Guardians? Independent Counsel, State Secrets, and Judicial Review, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1787,
1814 (1993) (discussing graymailing); Richard P. Salgado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L. J. 427 (1988) (elaborating on
the complications of balancing secrecy with defendants’ rights under CIPA). For examples of such graymail attempts, see SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., REP. ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12-16 (Comm. Print 1978), discussing cases of greymailing in various government institutions, and Classified Information Procedures Act,
126 Cong. Rec. S28,811 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Biden). See also
United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding the district court
did not err in quashing overly broad subpoenas which the government viewed as a harassment tactic); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 975-76 (4th Cir. 1983) (declining to find that the “exclusion of classified information . . . deprived the appellant of a
fair opportunity to mount his defense”); United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424 (E.D.
Va. 1984), vacated and remanded, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding the
district court erred in failing to consider the government’s privilege when ordering
disclosure of classified information); United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 101317 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing CIPA in relation to Wilson’s case and holding that he
could testify that he worked in the intelligence community but could not testify about
the covert operations); United States v. Irish People, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 63, 67 (D.D.C.
1980) (upholding request to produce classified information for defense), rev’d on other
grounds, 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982); H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1 at 8-10 (1980) (discussing cases in which the choice had to be made between disclosure of confidential
information or dismissal of the case); Anthony Marro, Helms, Ex-CIA Chief, Pleads No
Contest to 2 Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1977, at 1 (regarding the case of Richard
Helms, a former director of the CIA, in which the Department of Justice accepted his
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This statute, introduced in 1980, establishes procedures for handling
683
classified information in criminal prosecutions.
It seeks to “protect[] and restrict[] the discovery of classified information in a way
684
that does not impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Section 4
of CIPA establishes special procedures for discovery:
The [district] court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the
United States to delete specified items of classified information from
documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of
the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend
to prove. The court may permit the United States to make a request for
such authorization in the form of a written statement to be inspected by
685
the court alone.

In 1998, in United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, the Ninth Circuit interpreted CIPA section 4 as a requirement for the government to first
686
Assistant Attorney General David S. Kris and
invoke state secrets.
Assistant U.S. Attorney J. Douglas Wilson speculate that the possible
premise underlying the Circuit’s decision is that the government is
not allowed to withhold otherwise discoverable documents absent the
invocation of a privilege:
In other words, CIPA, standing alone, does not provide sufficient authorization to allow the government to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant
through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents,
or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified in687
formation may tend to prove.

Kris and Wilson, sharply critical of the decision, wrote, “No other
court has accepted the Ninth Circuit’s view, and there is little to

plea of nolo contendere to two misdemeanor counts for failing to provide full testimony to the Senate, because of concern about disclosure of classified information).
683
“Classified information” is defined by the statute as “information or material
that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive
order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security.” 18 U.S.C. app. § 1(a) (2006).
684
United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2002).
685
18 U.S.C. app. § 4.
686
See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In
order to show that material is classified, the government must make a formal claim of
state secret privilege.”).
687
DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS § 24:8 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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688

commend it.” In contrast to the utmost deference required in state
secrets cases, CIPA requires that the government make a sufficient
689
Unlike
showing that classified information cannot be disclosed.
state secrets, where only the director of an agency can invoke the pri690
vilege, CIPA allows any prosecutor to request section 4 procedures.
And where the privilege presents an absolute bar, CIPA contemplates
a balance between the defendant’s right to mount a defense and the
691
government’s right to secrecy.
Kris and Wilson say:
The absolute protection provided by the state secrets privilege is also in
tension with the defendant’s right under Brady v. Maryland to information necessary to obtain a fair trial. Applying the state secrets privilege to
criminal cases would create the very problem that Congress sought to
address by enacting CIPA: forcing the government to decide between
producing to the defendant sensitive classified information in discovery
or invoking the privilege and preventing all disclosure of classified in692
formation . . . .

Between 2001 and 2009, a number of cases arose that pushed on
the relationship between CIPA and state secrets. On August 5, 2004,
for instance, the FBI arrested Yassin Aref and Mohammed Hossain in
a sting operation centered on the sale of surface-to-air missile launch693
ers to terrorist organizations. The thirty-count indictment charged,
inter alia, conspiracy, attempt to commit money laundering, and ma694
terial support to a designated terrorist organization. The case, United States v. Aref, which involved top-secret code-word filings, affirmed
the state secrets privilege’s applicability to CIPA cases in the criminal
context. The court explained: “It is important to understand that CIPA section 4 presupposes a governmental privilege against disclosing
classified information. It does not itself create a privilege. Although
Rule 16(d)(1) authorizes district courts to restrict discovery of evidence in the interest of national security, it leaves the relevant privi-

688

Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). Note, however, that the quotation referenced in Nixon is dicta.
690
Id.
691
Id.
692
Id.
693
Brendan Lyons, Suspects Raise Domestic Spy Issue, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan. 5,
2006, at A1, available at http://albarchive.merlinone.net/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?
oneimage&imageid=6376980.
694
United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008).
689
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695

lege undefined.” The court stated that “[t]he most likely source for
the protection of classified information” was the common law state se696
This meant that the “classified information at issue
crets privilege.
697
in CIPA cases fits comfortably within the state-secrets privilege.”
The court flatly disagreed with the House of Representatives Select
Committee on Intelligence, which had reported in its treatment of
698
“That
CIPA that state secrets did not apply to the criminal realm.
699
statement,” the court wrote, “simply sweeps too broadly.”
On the
contrary, consistent with Klimavicius-Viloria, the court held the state
secrets privilege applied:
Reynolds, Andolschek, and Coplon make clear that the privilege can be
overcome when the evidence at issue is material to the defense. This
standard is consistent with Roviaro v. United States, where the Supreme
Court held in a criminal case that the Government’s privilege to withhold
the identity of a confidential informant “must give way” when the information “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Indeed, we have interpreted “relevant and helpful” under Roviaro to mean “material to the defense.” We
have also noted that the government-informant privilege at issue in Ro700
viaro and the state-secrets privilege are part of “the same doctrine.”

Consistent with other circuits, the court thus “adopt[ed] the Roviaro standard for determining when the Government’s privilege must
701
In this case, the court assumed that the
give way in a CIPA case.”
695

Id. at 78 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 (1980)
(noting that CIPA “is not intended to affect the discovery rights of a defendant”).
696
Aref, 533 F.3d at 78 (citing Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544,
546 (2d Cir. 1991)).
697
Id. at 79.
698
See H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 15 n.12 (1980) (“[T]he common law state
secrets privilege is not applicable in the criminal arena.”).
699
Aref, 533 F.3d at 79.
700
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1957), United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1073 (2d Cir. 1988), and United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950)).
701
Id. at 79-80; see also United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that information must be disclosed if it would materially alter
the result of the proceeding); United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a declassified summary of evidence was sufficient because none of the
redacted material would have helped the defendant’s case); United States v. Yunis, 867
F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that a defendant is entitled to information helpful to his defense); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107-10 (4th Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (balancing the interests of the public against those of the defendant); United
States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that protective orders were appropriate because the information in question was neither relevant to the
case nor “helpful to the defense”).
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classified information was discoverable, and it “agree[d] with the district court that the Government had established a reasonable danger
702
The undisthat its disclosure would jeopardize national security.”
703
closed information, however, was not material to the defense.
Extraordinarily, the court did not require that the head of the department with control over the information formally invoke the privilege: “We have previously excused the Government’s failure to comply with this formality where involvement of the department head
would have been ‘of little or no benefit’ because disclosure of classi704
fied information was prohibited by law.” The court warned: “Based
on our holding today, however, we trust that this issue will not arise in
705
future CIPA cases.”
Another case, against attorney Lynn Stewart, United States v. Stewart, arose from charges related to unauthorized contact with and behavior relating to Shiekh Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, who was
serving a life sentence for “seditious conspiracy, solicitation of murder,
solicitation of an attack on American military installations, conspiracy to
706
murder, and a conspiracy to bomb.” The Second Circuit, in deciding
this case, followed the court’s reasoning in Aref: “CIPA,” the court
wrote, “does not itself create a government privilege against the disclo707
sure of classified information; it presupposes one.” Roviaro provided
708
guidance on the application of state secrets to the criminal realm.
Once again, the executive branch had not actually invoked the
state secrets privilege—nor did it need to do so:
We note, as we did in Aref, which postdated the district court’s order
here, the absence of a formal public “claim of privilege[] lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that officer.” As in Aref, we conclude that in
the pre-Aref context, such a flaw “is not necessarily fatal,” and that “[i]t
would ‘be of little or no benefit’ for us to remand for the purpose of hav-

702

Aref, 533 F.3d at 80.
See id. at 80-81 (finding that the district court did not deny any material evidence to the defendant).
704
Id. at 80.
705
Id.
706
United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2009). Rahman had been subject to “Special Administrative Measures” restricting his communications. Id.
707
Id. at 130.
708
Id. at 131.
703
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ing the department head agree that disclosure of the classified informa709
tion would pose a risk to national security here.”

The court stated: “[T]he absence of the formal claim is not a trivial matter. We do not demean it. . . . We expect . . . we will not need
to address [these omissions in the future] as the government is now
710
well-informed of this obligation.” Other courts are beginning to fol711
low Aref in the conduct of criminal trials.
Both Aref and Stewart center on activity linked to more traditional
areas of national defense. But criminal cases from 2001 to 2009, dealing with a variety of industries, similarly implicated state secrets. In
2005, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought
charges against former officers of Qwest Communications Interna712
tional for securities fraud.
“[T]he company ha[d] classified con713
tracts with U.S. intelligence agencies.”
Four defendants requested
discovery of classified information related to U.S. intelligence, and
one of the defendants who already had classified information in his
possession wanted to use it in his defense to demonstrate that, far
from misleading shareholders, the company had based its estimates
714
They claimed that
on expected classified government contracts.
the NSA had “withheld the promised contracts as punishment after
Qwest declined to help the NSA with a [sic] unspecified project that
715
Nacchio believed was illegal.” Redacted versions of Nacchio’s argument, released in October 2007, suggest that the NSA had asked
Qwest “to monitor and data-mine traffic on its own domestic network” in February 2001 (seven months prior to the September 11th
attacks), and that, after the attacks, the NSA had requested access to
716
On November 19, 2007, J. Michael McConcall-record databases.

709

Id. at 132 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Aref, 533 F.3d

at 80).
710

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Hamama, No. 08-20314, 2010 WL 330375, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 21, 2010) (noting that “[t]he Second Circuit’s analysis [in Aref] is instructive”).
712
SEC v. Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166-67 (D. Colo. 2009).
713
Declaration and Formal Claim of State Secrets and Statutory Privileges by J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No.
05-0480).
714
Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
715
Ryan Singel, Feds Invoke Secrets Privilege to Limit Qwest CEO Defenses in Civil Suit,
WIRED (Nov. 21, 2007, 9:42 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/fedsinvoke-sec.
716
Id.
711
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717

nell, Director of National Intelligence, invoked state secrets.
“On
May 1, 2008, the Court extended the State Secrets Protective Order,”
718
stating that it would remain in place until lifted by the court.
It may be that where the government wants to invoke the protections of CIPA in order to protect classified information, it is necessarily making a claim that the classified information is privileged from use
in litigation—that is, that the state secrets privilege applies. But this
fact does not mean that the privilege can then trump the criminal defendant’s constitutional rights to gain access to information relevant
to the defense. Here CIPA and state secrets depart: while the latter
might be said to overcome a civil litigant’s discovery interests, CIPA
does not then trump a defendant’s right to mount a defense. In other
words, CIPA does not side with state secrets; rather, it instructs the
judge to impose a sanction, which may include dismissal of the
charges. Perhaps the salient point, if the Ninth Circuit’s position is
accurate, is that CIPA cases need to hold the government to the Reynolds formalities—a position that does not appear to reflect the current practice.
V. THE LONG SHADOW
The cases addressed in this Article represent some, but not all, of
719
the state secrets cases to emerge from 2001 through 2009.
Collectively, they present a formidable challenge to analyses that narrowly
base their conclusions about state secrets on published judicial opinions specifically ruling on the privilege. They suggest that the shadow of state secrets is much longer than previously realized—indeed,
that the state secrets doctrine has expanded well beyond the framing
of Reynolds to become a powerful litigation tool for both private and
public actors. A number of insights from this more careful exposition
present themselves.
717

Robert S. Woodruff’s Motion for a Protective Order Staying His Deposition Until the Disposition of His Motion to Dismiss at 2, Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. 050480) [hereinafter Woodruff’s Motion for Protective Order]; see also The United States’
Consolidated Reply in Support of its Motion for Entry of Protective Order at 2, Nacchio,
614 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (No. 05-0480) (discussing McConnell’s assertion of privilege).
718
Woodruff’s Motion for Protective Order, supra note 717, at 2.
719
See, e.g., Defendants’ Answer Brief at 16, Al-Turki v. FBI Document Custodian,
No. 06-1076 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2007), 2007 WL 3195129 (asserting state secrets privilege over classified documents and information being submitted ex parte, in camera);
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof at 30-33,
Abdel-Hafiz v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., No. 096-204518-04 (Tex. Dist. Apr. 5, 2008),
2008 WL 5687221 (listing materials that the Justice Department refused to produce).
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The executive branch appears to have a fairly conservative approach to intervening in third party disputes, particularly when class
action torts, conduct of war, or foreign state secrets cases present
themselves. In contrast, the executive seems more likely to become
involved when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes are
at issue. Such suits take many years to unfold, and once the executive
branch invokes state secrets, subsequent administrations hold the line.
The range of technologies, disputes, and types of activities being challenged appears to be steadily expanding. However, considering that
the War on Terror is still in its early stages, and that such cases may
span decades, exactly how most of these suits will evolve is unknown.
What is remarkable is that, notwithstanding Reynolds, corporations in
the first instance are citing state secrets as an affirmative defense.
Even where the government does not intervene in commercial disputes, corporate entities gain a significant tactical advantage by raising
its specter. This gives rise to concern about the emergence of a new
form of graymail, as well as the impact of the mere reference to state
secrets in the course of litigation.
The telecommunications cases related to the NSA’s warrantless
wiretapping program stand apart from the general third-party cases.
Here the government has acted variously as plaintiff, intervenor, and
defendant. Although none of the forty-six cases dismissed under the
MDL turned on the invocation of state secrets, the privilege played a
key role throughout. The executive’s decision to invoke state secrets
in this set of cases rested on a closely held executive branch jurisprudence—suggesting that this body of opinions may be relevant to understanding operation of the privilege. This set of suits also reveals a
parallel effect: when invoked in one case, courts may treat similarly
positioned cases as though the state secrets privilege has been asserted, even in the absence of a formal invocation thereof. The telecommunication suits also bring to the fore the major battles between
the branches that mark invocations of the privilege.
In suits alleging such varied legal claims as Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations, the abrogation of international law, environmental degradation, wrongful termination, unlawful discrimination,
defamation, and breach of contract, the executive invoked the state
secrets privilege as part of its own defense. These cases suggest that, at
times, the privilege is used not just to protect national security interests, but to hide officials’ bad behavior. A different type of cost
presents itself in allowing state secrets privilege to apply in cases claiming constitutional violations, as opposed to civil suits between private
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parties. As in third-party disputes and the telecommunications realm,
once the executive branch invokes the state secrets privilege, it holds
its course—even when it does not seem in its best interests to do so.
Perhaps this should not come as a surprise: even where cases are not
dismissed, the advantage of invoking the privilege goes well beyond
simply suppressing a document, influencing motions, protecting attorney-client communications, and controlling discovery. In at least
one case, the privilege provided the government with opposing counsel’s client files once the attorney tried to withdraw from the case.
The final set of cases considered in this Article focused on the
criminal context. Despite historical concern about prosecutorial use
of state secrets, a number of courts have upheld the state secrets privilege in criminal cases, suggesting that the common law privilege precedes CIPA section 4 procedures. The circuits, however, do not appear to be in agreement on this point, and commentators have been
quick to criticize courts who have taken this line. What is remarkable
here is that, in at least two cases, the executive branch did not even
have to invoke the state secrets privilege—as required by Reynolds. Instead, the court, issuing a mild admonition, simply assumed that it
had been asserted and, therefore, applied.
Failure to appreciate the extent to which state secrets doctrine
now permeates substantive law sidesteps the difficult question of
whether the law is what it appears to be. Few people realize by reading
tort law that private contractors who possess state secrets are exempted
from their duties to behave nonnegligently. Pari passu, employment
law, patent law, contract law, environmental law, and criminal law—in
these and other areas, private and public actors can bypass the values
and goals that animate the law. Evidence from the 2001 to 2009 period suggests that this is done with some regularity, and that the exercise of associated power distorts the course of litigation.
Judging by the number of lawsuits that emerged from 2001 to 2009,
720
If anythe use of the state secrets privilege is not going to subside.
thing, new issues, such as the emergence of graymail, will present themselves. Neither the DOJ guidelines, which lack an enforcement mechanism and are narrowly limited to the DOJ’s exercise of the state
secrets privilege (i.e., not the invocation of the same by the DoD, the
720

Indeed, new states secrets cases continue to arise. See, e.g., Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 10-1469 (D.D.C.
Aug. 30, 2010).
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CIA, or the State Department), nor the statutes currently before Congress have grasped the extent to which the state secrets privilege operates. The reason is because these “solutions” are built on only a partial
understanding of the problem—one based narrowly on published judicial opinions ruling on the invocation of the privilege.
By looking more carefully, however, at the range of cases in which
state secrets plays a role, a different picture emerges. At a minimum,
the evidence shows that the doctrine is engaged more often and in
different ways than have previously been presumed. This suggests that
it warrants more attention from the legislative branch in its oversight
function, from the courts in their Article III capacity, and from the
executive branch in its decision to invoke the privilege. The structures and procedures that would best meet the concerns raised in this
Article, while safeguarding the purpose for which the doctrine was
created, remain a subject for future work.

